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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court's journey on the road to creating
clear, rational, and workable search and seizure rules has not been a happy
one. From 1914 when the Court adopted the exclusionary rule for federal
courts and began developing search and seizure standards,' to 1961 when
it imposed the exclusionary rule on the states,2 the Court created a body
of doctrine regarded by judges and scholars as confusing, irrational, and
incomplete. Over the following three decades, the Court proceeded in a
1. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (holding that the exclusionary rule applies in
federal prosecutions to bar the use of evidence secured through searches and seizures in violation of the Fourth
Amendment).
2. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (holding that the Fourth Amendment is enforced against
the states by the same sanction of exclusion as against the federal government).
3. See Roger J. Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DUKE L.J. 319, 329 (1962)
(discussing how many of the present federal rules are confusing, underdeveloped or over-refined) [hereinafter
Traynor, Mapp at Large]; Rex A. Collings, Jr., Toward Workable Rules of Search and Seizure - an Amicus
Curiae Brief, 50 CAL L. REnv. 421, 422 (1962) (stating that the federal law is incomplete and decisions are not
always rational or consistent).
In People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434,450, 282 P.2d 905, 915 (1955), the case adopting the California rule,
Justice Traynor, mindful of the criticisms of the federal rules as arbitrary and confusing, declared that California
was not bound by decisions applying the federal rule. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d at 450, 282 P.2d at 915. Dissenting
Justice Spence, charged that neither federal nor state courts had developed workable rules of search and seizure.
Id at 456, 282 P.2d at 918 (Spence, J., dissenting).
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hesitant and haphazard fashion, often announcing ambiguous and
inconsistent standards, and in many significant areas leaving important
questions unanswered for years.4 Fourth Amendment literature is replete
with accusations that the Supreme Court's search and seizure decisions are
unclear or irrational and their rules imbalanced or unworkable.' The
Supreme Court itself, as well as individual justices, have often voiced
frustration with the Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.6
I submit that, under the leadership of Justice Roger Traynor,7 the
California Supreme Court better performed the task of developing search
4. See infra notes 507-824 and accompanying text.
5. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 349
(1974) (stating that "[f]or clarity and consistency, the law of the fourth amendment is not the Supreme Court's
most successful product"); Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MIcH. L. REv. 1468,
1468 (1985) (describing the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as "a mass of contradictions and
obscurities"); Roger B. Dworkin, Fact Style Adjudication and the Fourth Amendment: The Limits ofLanyering,
48 IND. L.J. 329, 329 (1973) (stating that "[tihe fourth amendment cases are a mess"); Wayne R. LaFave, Search
and Seizure: "The Course of True Law... Has Not... Run Smooth," 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 255, 255 (stating that
"no area of the law has more bedeviled the judiciary" than Fourth Amendment jurisprudence); Scott E. Sundby,
A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the MischiefofCamara and Terry, 72 MINN. L. REV. 383, 383
(1988) (discussing the Court's continuous and unsuccessful struggle to develop a coherent analytical framework);
Lloyd L. Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U, CH. L. REV. 47, 49 (1974) (criticizing the
Court's inconsistent treatment of the reasonableness and warrant clauses, accusing the Court of doing nothing
more than announcing "the latest shift of emphasis to one clause or the other, according to a result reached on
other grounds," resulting in the "absence of a continuously developing rationalization of the amendment").
6. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 577 (1991) (describing the rule governing the search of
containers found in automobiles as "the antithesis of a 'clear and unequivocal' guideline"); Cady v. Dombrowski,
413 U.S. 433,440 (1973) (stating that "this branch of the law is something less than a seamless web"); Coolidge
v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 483 (1971) (stating that "it would be nonsense to pretend that our decision
today reduces Fourth Amendment law to complete order and harmony").
Justice Frankfurter, concurring in Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961), noted that "[t]he course
of true law pertaining to searches and seizures . . . has not--to put it mildly-run smooth." Id. at 618
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). In 1971, Justice Harlan called for an "overhauling" of the Fourth Amendment law.
Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 490-91 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor, objecting to a public safety exception
to the Miranda rule, contended that such exception would force the Court to develop a new doctrine on public
safety exigencies similar to "the hair-splitting distinctions that currently plague our Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence." New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 664 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Scalia,
concurring in California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991), described the Court's holding as "the continuation
of an inconsistent jurisprudence that has been with us for years" and warned that "[t]here can be no clarity in
this area unless we make up our minds." Id. at 583 (Scalia, J., concurring).
7. Traynor served as Associate Justice of the California Supreme Court from 1940 to 1964, when he
was elevated to Chief Justice. His most important contributions to the development of search and seizure
standards occurred in the space of the first few years following California's adoption of the exclusionary rule
in 1955, while he held the position of Associate Justice. Accordingly, this Article will refer to him as Justice,
rather than as Chief Justice.
Traynor retired from the court in 1970, and became a member of the distinguished Sixty-Five Club faculty
at Hastings College of the Law in 1971. Coincidentally, this is the same year I left criminal trial practice for a
teaching career at Hastings. I was fortunate to have served as a law clerk for Associate Justice Raymond Peters
when Traynor was Chief Justice and, for over a decade at Hastings, to have had Justice Traynor as a colleague
and friend.
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and seizure standards, and that the California experience can guide and
enlighten courts in the search for reasonable and workable search and
seizure rules. The United States Supreme Court often has followed the lead
of Justice Traynor and the California Supreme Court in resolving difficult
search and seizure problems.' However, in many areas the Court's failure
to consider, or outright rejection of, the Traynor approach has led to
unworkable or irrational rules.9
In April 1955, six years before Mapp v. Ohio" imposed the
exclusionary rule on the states, the California Supreme Court adopted its
own exclusionary rule as a judicially created rule of evidence. Abandoning
his earlier opposition to the rule," Justice Traynor authored the court's
opinion in People v. Cahan2 which declared that products of unlawful
searches and seizures would no longer be admissible in California
courts. 3 At this time, the federal rules of search and seizure were
confusing and inconsistent,' 4 and California search and seizure law was
unclear or non-existent.'5 Noting the current chaotic state of search and
8. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968) (following, but not citing, the view expressed by
Traynor in People v. Simon, 45 Cal. 2d 645, 648, 290 P.2d 531, 533 (1955) and People v. Martin, 46 Cal, 2d
106, 108, 293 P.2d 52, 53 (1956), that stops, frisks, and detentions may be based on suspicious circumstances
short of probable cause for arrest); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 300 n.6 (1967) (adopting Traynor's
position against the mere evidence rule expressed in People v. Thayer, 63 Cal. 2d 635, 642, 408 P.2d 108, 112,
47 Cal. Rptr. 780, 784 (1965)); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 38 (1963) (relying on Traynor's opinion in
People v. Maddox, 46 Cal. 2d 301, 305-07, 294 P.2d 6, 9-10 (1956), concerning the failure to comply with
knock and announce requirements); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651-52 (1961) (relying on Traynor's opinion
in People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434,445,282 P.2d 905,911 (1955)); cf Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 186
(1990) (following, but not citing, Traynor's view in People v. Gorg, 45 Cal. 2d 776, 783, 291 P.2d 469, 473
(1955), that police may rely on consent of a third party whom they reasonably but mistakenly believe possesses
common authority over the premises searched).
9. See, e.g., infra notes 185-197, 214-229, 244-263 and accompanying text.
10. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
11. People v. Gonzales, 20 Cal. 2d 165, 169, 124 P.2d 44, 46 (1942).
12. Id at 445, 282 P.2d at 911.
13. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d at 445, 282 P.2d at 911 (1955).
14. See Monrad G. Paulsen, Criminal Law Administration: The Zero Hour Was Coming, 53 CAL. L. REV.
103, 108 (1965) (stating that the federal cases "are far from satisfactory. A great many technical rules have been
formulated which lack the underpinning of sound reason.").
Traynor agreed. See Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d at 450, 282 P.2d at 914-15; see, e.g., People v. Michael, 45 Cal.
2d 751, 753, 290 P.2d 852, 854 (1955) (stating that United States Supreme Court cases on the question of
voluntary consent "are difficult if not impossible to reconcile"). Even after Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961),
Traynor regarded the federal search and seizure rules as "confusing... underdeveloped or over-refined....
Who can tell with certainty why a search or seizure was held unreasonable? Who knows whether it was deemed
in violation of the Constitution or of lesser law or of both? Where is the lead that state courts can follow?"
Traynor, Mapp at Large, supra note 3, at 329.
15. See Paulsen, supra note 14, at 108 (explaining that California had almost no case law respecting the
legality of arrests, searches and seizures). Justice Spence, dissenting in Cahan, warned that neither the federal
nor state courts which had adopted the exclusionary rule had found satisfactory answers to problems in
developing "workable rules." Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d at 456, 282 P.2d at 918 (Spence, J., dissenting).
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seizure law, Traynor concluded that the court's immediate task was to
develop clear and workable rules of search and seizure. 16 Traynor wrote
that adoption of the exclusionary rule, "opens the door to the development
of workable rules governing searches and seizures and the issuance of
warrants that will protect both the rights guaranteed by the constitutional
provisions and the interest of society in the suppression of crime."17 Thus
began a "long overdue clarification of standards of reasonableness in law
enforcement." 18 Following Cahan, the California Supreme Court, with
Traynor taking the leading role, began the development of rules of search
and seizure that were both workable and balanced in accommodating
individual privacy and effective law enforcement.
During the first year after Cahan, the California Supreme Court
decided twenty-one search and seizure cases, with Justice Traynor writing
eighteen of the court's opinions." Most of Traynor's opinions were short,
with few footnotes. During the fifteen years between Cahan and Traynor's
retirement in January 1971, he wrote fifty opinions for the court on search
and seizure issues, averaging five pages each with 1-1/3 footnotes.20 From
1955 through August of 1962, nearly 700 appellate decisions dealt with
Shortly after Cahan, Professor Edward Barrett noted that California search and seizure rules were "ill-
defined," police discretion in determining reasonableness of searches was rarely subject to check, and law
enforcement groups preferred the ambiguity of seldom-litigated rules. Edward L. Barrett, Jr., Exclusion of
Evidence Obtained by Illegal Searches-A Comment on People v. Cahan, 43 CAL L. REv. 565, 587 (1955)
[hereinafter Barrett, Exclusion of Evidence].
[l]n broad areas involving commonly used tactics of the best police departments, and justified by
them as essential to the control particularly of organized criminal operations, it is not possible to
know whether the police are acting legally or illegally.
Id. at 576; Comment, The Cahan Case: The Exclusionary Rule, and the Law of Search, Seizure, and Arrest in
California, 3 UCLA L. REV. 55, 57 (1955) (observing that "[u]nfortunately the California case law respecting
the right of peace officers to search and seize, both with and without a warrant, is unduly technical and most
uncertain").
16. Paulsen, supra note 14, at 108.
17. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d at 451, 282 P.2d at 915.
18. Traynor, Mapp at Large, supra note 3, at 323.
19. Collings, supra note 3, at 421. On February 24, 1956, the court handed down nine cases involving
search and seizure questions, with Traynor writing the opinion for the court in all nine. Paulsen, supra note 15,
at 108.
The authors of an article reviewing the two years following Cahan concluded that:
It is interesting to note that Justice Traynor has written the majority opinion in almost every
important search and seizure case. The rules laid down by him have been clear and concise and have
been consistently and logically followed in later opinions. California district courts of appeal are
seldom reversed in search and seizure cases now, in tribute to their willingness to follow the supreme
court's "workable rules" and to Justice Traynor's clarity in laying them down.
Note, Two Years with the Cahan Rule, 9 STAN. L. REV. 515, 537 (1957).
20. The averages are based on complete opinions. Some dealt with other issues, and no effort was made
to include only those parts devoted to search and seizure.
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search and seizure questions.2" In 1962, Traynor reflected that following
Cahan, hundreds of search and seizure cases came before California
appellate courts and "compelled detailed articulation of what is reasonable
and what is unreasonable. 2 2 In 1965, Justice Walter Schaefer wrote,
In the years that intervened between Cahan and Mapp, the
California court decided forty-five search and seizure cases, with
Chief Justice Traynor writing the opinion of the court in twenty-
three. These cases presented most of the possible variations, and
they produced what is, in my opinion, the most valuable body of
search and seizure law that is available.'
Thus, Justice Roger Traynor led the court in writing on a clean slate,24
within a relatively brief period, a comprehensive body of "workable rules
governing searches and seizures" which was largely accepted as
balanced, rational, and workable. What can we learn from Justice Traynor
and the California experience?
Traynor viewed the exclusionary rule's primary objective as the
protection of privacy through encouraging law enforcement officials to act
reasonably. Traynor believed that this goal could be achieved by providing
officers with a clear, practical guide to proper law enforcement and then
denying to them the fruits of unlawful searches and seizures. 26 This
Article contends that the United States Supreme Court should follow
Traynor's lead. Clearly focusing on these objectives, the Court would
recognize the need for a number of changes in current search and seizure
rules. Viewing the exclusionary rule's purpose as primarily to discourage
illegal searches and seizures, rather than to compensate the victims of such
searches, the Court should loosen standing rules and allow defendants to
object to evidence procured through unreasonable searches that violate the
rights of other suspects.2 7 Also, focusing on police conduct would lead
to reliance on apparent, rather than on actual, authority to consent and to
21. See supra note 20.
22. Traynor, Mapp at Large, supra note 3. at 327.
23. Walter V. Schaefer, Chief Justice Traynor and the Judicial Process, 53 CAL L. REV. 11, 14 (1965)
[hereinafter Schaefer, Justice Traynor].
24. When the California Supreme Court adopted its exclusionary rule in 1955, six years before it was
imposed on the states by Mapp v. Ohio, the court approached the task of developing search and seizure standards
feeling largely unfettered by federal law. See infra note 45.
25. People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 450-51, 282 P.2d 905, 914-15 (1955).
26. See infra notes 191-197 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 184-197 and accompanying text.
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a more expansive definition of Fourth Amendment seizures which does not
require touching or submission to authority.2"
Regarding the search and seizure rules primarily as a means of guiding
and controlling police conduct, the Court should reject complex or
technical rules in favor of clear, practical standards.29 The Court should
recognize that in pronouncing search and seizure standards, it is laying
down a code of conduct for law enforcement officials who daily are faced
with varying complex, volatile, and often dangerous situations and who
therefore require guidance from practical rules that can be easily
understood and quickly applied.30 Traynor emphasized the need to avoid
"needless refinements and distinctions," and California Supreme Court
cases following Cahan took a practical, common sense approach, usually
upholding natural police responses to suspicious circumstances, particularly
when they involved only slight or minor intrusions into privacy.
Focusing on the goal of promoting reasonable police conduct, the United
States Supreme Court should reject complex and technical rules and should
be reluctant to hold as unreasonable, police conduct which is a natural
reaction to suspicious circumstances and which involves only slight or
minor intrusions of privacy. 2
The search for simple, practical, and rational rules demands clari-
fication of the dimensions of the warrant clause, particularly with respect
to search incident to arrest and to the search of movable containers outside
the contexts of homes or automobiles.3 3 Currently, a search incident to
the arrest of one inside a home is limited to the arrestee's person and the
area from which the arrestee might gain possession of a weapon or de-
structible evidence2 4 No further search is permitted even with full pro-
bable cause to believe that evidence of the crime for which the person is
arrested is located in the house.35 On the other hand, following an arrest
in a public place or in an automobile, the Supreme Court's "workable rule"
allows police automatically to conduct a search incident without any
suspicion and unlimited in scope by any requirement of cause to discover
28. See infra notes 198-263 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 308-312 and accompanying text.
30. See infra note 308 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 403-430 and accompanying text.
32. See infra note 467 accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 468-472 and accompanying text.
34. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
35. See infra notes 519-522 and accompanying text.
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evidence of crime relating to the arrest.36 Some courts are using this
"workable rule" to expand searches of homes as incident to the arrest of
an occupant. 37 The approach of Justice Traynor and the California
Supreme Court would allow a search of the entire premises as incident to
the arrest of an occupant, but would guard against exploratory searches by
requiring reasonable cause to believe that evidence of the crime for which
the suspect was arrested would be found on the premises and limiting the
search to areas likely to contain such evidence. 8 With guidelines to guard
against abuses,39 the Traynor approach would be worth considering as to
both home and automobile searches.
With respect to automobile searches, Traynor initially adopted the
simple, workable approach taken by the United States Supreme Court in
1925: If police have probable cause to believe that an automobile contains
contraband, they need not obtain a warrant in order to search it.40 How-
ever, both Traynor and the United States Supreme Court sank into the
search and seizure quicksand when they attempted to distinguish auto-
mobile from other movable container searches and then to further dis-
tinguish all container searches from seizures and inspections of "evidence"
or "instrumentalities" of crime in plain view.4" Consequently, neither
Traynor nor the United States Supreme Court succeeded in developing
rational, workable standards with respect to searches of movable containers
outside the context of homes or offices.42
The simplest and most reasonable approach would treat movable
containers the same whether they are found in an automobile, on a person,
or unattended. In general, a search warrant should not be required for the
search of a movable container found in a public place. In fact, the Court
might explicitly recognize what has become the practical result of the
many exceptions to the warrant requirement: In order that a search be rea-
sonable, the Fourth Amendment demands a warrant only for intrusions
comparable in seriousness to home or office searches, electronic inter-
ception of conversations,43 or invasions of the body of a suspect.44 This
36. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 227 (1973).
37. See infra notes 539-541 and accompanying text.
38. See infra note 543 and accompanying text.
39. See infra note 555 and accompanying text.
40. See People v. Gale, 46 Cal. 2d 253,255,294 P.2d 13, 15 (1956) (citing Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132, 153 (1925)).
41. See infra notes 594-747 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 594-747 and accompanying text.
43. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358 (1967) (holding that a search warrant is required
to make an electronic interception of a conversation reasonable, even when based on probable cause).
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simple rule, based on probable cause, would largely eliminate the irrational
and unworkable distinctions that have developed around the concept of
plain view. Once an article is seizable by reason of probable cause to
believe it contains contraband or otherwise is associated with criminal
activity, it would be subject to inspection either on the ground that the
same probable cause renders the container's search reasonable or, if the
object's appearance or other factor advertises its contents, on the ground
that the inspection invades no legitimate expectation of privacy and, thus,
is not a search under the Fourth Amendment.
To meet its responsibility of clarifying unsettled and confusing areas
of the law, the Court also should, in its opinions, offer guides to
application of the rules in other contexts, such as by the use of example
or analogy. Moreover, the Court should face up to and overrule unwork-
able or unreasonable decisions rather than subject them to capital punish-
ment on the installment plan through slow, painful creation of exceptions
and distinctions. An unhealthy respect for bad precedent too often has led
to formal, artificial bows to its skeletal remains at the same time the Court
has disregarded its principles. Much of the mischief perpetrated by the
United States Supreme Court in the search and seizure area can be traced
directly to the Court's practice, when discovering that it has made bad law,
to distinguish it away rather than to overrule it outright.45 In many areas,
the Court has announced a sweeping new rule without clearly thinking
through its consequences.4 When the Court has later discovered that the
rule's application has led to illogical or unworkable results, the Court's
reluctance to overrule bad precedent has resulted in the creation of
precedential ghosts in the form of subtle, illogical, and often unworkable
distinctions which return to haunt courts and law enforcement officials.
II. CHIEF JUSTICE ROGER TRAYNOR
California's exclusionary rule was adopted and its search and seizure
standards developed under the direction and leadership of Justice Roger
Traynor, who has been ranked among the greatest American jurists of the
twentieth century. Serving thirty years on the California Supreme Court,
44. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 761-62 (1985) (holding that in view of the heightened privacy
interest involved, some bodily intrusions may not be justified even when based upon a judicial finding of
probable cause).
45. See infra notes 812-813 and accompanying text.
46. See infra note 815 and accompanying text.
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the last six as Chief Justice, he wrote opinions which still have great
influence in numerous areas of American law. His contributions have been
widely acknowledged by such greats as Justice Henry Friendly, who found
Traynor to be the ablest judge of his generation in the United States, 47
and Illinois Supreme Court Justice Walter Schaefer, who concluded that
Traynor's impact on the law exceeded that of any other American
judge.48
Justice Traynor's decisions demonstrate caution and moderation, and
most important, a healthy respect for competing interests and reasonable
contrary arguments. While Traynor often is regarded as an activist judge,
he was not a narrow-visioned activist intent on implementing his own per-
sonal agenda. When faced with the conflicts between individual rights and
state concerns in effective law enforcement that typify major criminal pro-
cedure battles, Traynor demonstrated an ability to balance interests with an
eye to both reason and practical experience. 49 He was fond of using the
United States Supreme Court's well-turned phrase to remind everyone,
including its author, that "[t]here is no war between the Constitution and
common sense."
50
47. In 1983, as Senior Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Justice
Friendly looked back on Traynor's judicial career.
My thesis is simply stated: For the thirty years of his service on the Supreme Court of
California, from 1940 to 1970, Roger Traynor was the ablest judge of his generation in the
United States. I say this without hesitation, qualification, limitation, or fear of successful
contradiction. . . . [N]o other judge of his generation matched Traynor's combination of
comprehensive scholarship, a sense for the "right" result, craftsmanship, and versatility. He
illuminated and modernized every field of law that he touched, and, in the course of his long judicial
service, he touched almost all....
... He was like a great oak-sturdy, unbending, growing high and casting its branches wide.
He left the fabric of the law immensely stronger and richer than he found it.
Henry J. Friendly, Ablest Judge of His Generation, 71 CAL. L. REV. 1039, 1039-43 (1983) [hereinafter Friendly,
Ablest Judge].
48. Walter V. Schaefer, A Judge's Judge, 71 CAL. L. REV. 1050, 1050 (1983) [hereinafter Schaefer,
Judge's Judge]. On the occasion of Traynor's elevation to Chief Justice, Schaefer wrote:
Making allowance for the tendency of each generation to exaggerate its own problems and the
significance of its own achievements, I have been unable to think of any other twenty-five year span
that has produced such important changes in so many areas of constitutional and common law. Nor
do I know of any other judge whose work has been so significant in so many areas of the law.
Schaefer, Justice Traynor, supra note 23, at 11-12.
49. See, e.g., infra note 60 and accompanying text (describing Traynor's role in the development of
California's liberal discovery rules).
50. See, e.g., People v. Thayer, 63 Cal. 2d 635, 642, 408 P.2d 108, 112, 47 Cal. Rptr. 780, 784 (1965)
(quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961)).
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Certainly, he was sympathetic and attentive to the rights of the
individual. As pointed out by his colleague, Justice Stanley Mosk,
Justice Traynor was frequently light-years ahead of the United
States Supreme Court and of other state courts, particularly in
developing law designed to protect the individual whose home was
invaded by authorities or whose health was impaired by harmful
products. In short, his prevailing concern was to make our system
of justice responsive to the rights of the individual in an urban and
mechanized society.51
Traynor argued, for example, that California's practice of affording counsel
on appeal to an indigent defendant only after the District Court of Appeal
made an independent investigation of the record and determined that there
was merit in the request for review violated the equal protection of the
laws52 as established by the Supreme Court in Griffin v. Illinois.
53
Traynor reasoned that the system allowed the wealthy the benefit of
lawyers to argue their appeals, but denied indigents appointed counsel
unless the merits of the appeal passed a preliminary screening of the
record by the Court of Appeals. 4 Traynor's argument was subsequently
adopted by the United States Supreme Court.55
Yet Traynor often was sympathetic to state interests in effective law
enforcement, particularly when it came to the adoption of rules which
might impede the factfinder in arriving at a reliable verdict. For example,
in the trial context, Traynor demonstrated a moderate and cautious ap-
proach to the expansion of constitutional rights for criminal defendants
which might frustrate or inhibit the jury's truth-determining function. In
rejecting the argument that California's constitutional provision allowing
comment on a defendants' failure to testify violated the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination, Traynor believed that the rule merely
51. Stanley Mosk, A Retrospective, 71 CAL. L. REv. 1045, 1045 (1983). At the time of Justice Mosk's
observation, he was the only surviving colleague of Chief Justice Traynor on the California Supreme Court.
Eleven years later, he remains a member of that court.
52. People v. Brown, 55 Cal. 2d. 64, 70-71,357 P.2d 1072, 1076, 9 Cal. Rptr. 816, 820 (1960) (Traynor,
J., concurring).
53. 351 U.S. 12 (1955).
54. Brown, 55 Cal. 2d at 70-71, 357 P.2d at 1076, 9 Cal. Rptr. at 820. Traynor felt that this
discrimination was inconsistent with the equality principles announced in Griffin, 351 U.S. at 18 (1955).
However, Griffin on its facts could well have been read as an access case and limited to situations in which
indigents were excluded from any appellate review whatsoever.
55. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355 (1963).
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allowed the judge or prosecutor to call the jury's attention to facts that
ordinarily have significance and relevance to the defendants' guilt and that
are clearly apparent to the jury in any event.5 6 On this issue, the United
States Supreme Court disagreed, 7 but cogent arguments can be made that
the Court was wrong in rejecting Traynor's position.5
Traynor's inclination toward balance and moderation is most strikingly
illustrated in his approach to reconciling the conflicting goals of truth
discovery and Fifth Amendment restrictions on using the accused as a
source of testimonial evidence. It is no exaggeration to state that Traynor
almost single-handedly pioneered California's liberal discovery rules for
the benefit of criminal defendants. Beginning in 1956, he led the court in
the development of judicially created rules of criminal procedure requiring
the prosecution to disclose to the defense all evidence it possessed or could
reasonably obtain relevant to the defendant's guilt or punishment.5 9
However, recognizing the strong interest of the public in truth discovery,
Traynor felt that criminal discovery should be a two-way-street. In Jones
v. Superior Court,60 Traynor stated that criminal discovery was not a one-
way street and opened the door to prosecutorial efforts to obtain discovery
from defendant. Prosecution discovery, he reasoned, at least to some
extent, should not be inconsistent with the privilege against self-
incrimination.62
In summary, Justice Traynor's distinguished legal work in relation to
the administration of criminal justice was aptly described by
Professor Monrad Paulsen:
56. People v. Modesto, 66 Cal. 2d 695, 705, 427 P.2d 788, 795, 59 Cal. Rptr. 124, 131 (1967).
57. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 611-12 (1965).
58. See Gordon Van Kessel, Adversary Excesses in the American Criminal Trial, 67 NOTRE DAMs L.
REv. 403, 479-83, 540-41 (1992).
59. People v. Riser, 47 Cal. 2d 566, 305 P.2d 1 (1956) (en banc), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 930 (1957).
60. 58 Cal. 2d 56, 372 P.2d 919, 22 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1962) (en bane).
61. Id. at 60, 372 P.2d at 921, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 881.
62. Id. at 61-62, 372 P.2d at 922, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 882. His colleagues, Justices Dooling and Peters,
strongly objected, contending that two-way-street criminal discovery would violate the defendant's privilege
against self-incrimination. See id. at 62-64, 372 P.2d at 922-24, 927, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 882-84, 887 (Dooling, J.
& Peters, J. dissenting); see also Mosk, supra note 51, at 1048-49.
Later, the dissenting justices had their way. The court refused to adopt judicially created rules of
prosecution discovery for fear they would collide with the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination. See
People v. Collie, 30 Cal. 3d 43, 634 P.2d 534, 177 Cal. Rptr. 458 (1981); Reynolds v. Superior Court, 12 Cal.
3d 834, 528 P.2d 45, 117 Cal. Rptr. 437 (1974) (en bane); Gordon Van Kessel, Prosecutorial Discovery and
the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Accommodation or Capitulation, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 855 (1977).
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He has not copied the precedents but has cut new paths by asking
questions: What is this rule to do? What considerations of policy
are involved in this case? What can we do that is just, fair, and
practical?63
III. DEVELOPMENT OF THE RULES
A. General Approach: Detailed Development by the States or by the
United States Supreme Court?
Justice Traynor and the Cahan6 majority went about their work
assuming they could write on a clean slate. They anticipated, wrongly as
it turned out, that the United States Supreme Court would leave states
largely free to develop their own search and seizure standards unbound by
the confusing and uncertain federal rules. For example, the California
Supreme Court stated:
In developing a rule of evidence applicable in the state courts, this
court is not bound by the decisions that have applied the federal
rule, and if it appears that those decisions have developed needless
refinements and distinctions, this court need not follow them.
Similarly, if the federal cases indicate needless limitations on the
right to conduct reasonable searches and seizures or to secure
warrants, this court is free to reject them.65
Thus, Traynor began optimistically, looking forward to "the development
of workable rules governing searches and seizures and the issuance of
warrants that will protect both the rights guaranteed by the constitutional
provisions and the interest of society in suppression of crime."
66
After Mapp v. Ohio,67 however, Traynor faced the question "whether
the federal rules governing police investigations and arrests have
63. Paulsen, supra note 14, at 120.
64. People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
65. Id. at 450-51, 282 P.2d at 915.
66. Id. at 451, 282 P.2d at 915. Following the court's experience in developing search and seizure rules
in California, Traynor continued to be optimistic about the development of such rules at the federal level
following Mapp: "It should be possible to develop with clarity as well as constitutional nicety rules that will
operate realistically without frustrating either the exclusionary rule or law enforcement." Traynor, Mapp at
Large, supra note 3, at 332.
67. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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superseded our own."68 Believing in the importance of leaving states
"[free]dom from entangling alliances with confusing federal rules that have
no clear constitutional basis,"69 and in local development of search and
seizure standards, he hoped that the United States Supreme Court would
refrain from imposing upon the states detailed rules of criminal procedure.
Traynor thought it important to retain local control over the job of policing
the police:
Perhaps there will be no automatic extension of all federal rules to
state prosecutions in the wake of Mapp. There is no substitute for
close evaluation of the local context to determine what is
unreasonable.7"
Traynor's expectation that the United States Supreme Court would
refrain from imposing on the states all its search and seizure standards,
even those declared to be based on the Fourth Amendment, also rested on
the recognition that many such standards were announced when the Fourth
Amendment's exclusionary rule applied only to the federal courts. At that
time, the Court "could not have known that basing its decision on the
Constitution, rather than on the Court's power to prescribe rules of
evidence for the federal courts, might one day have the consequence of
imposing the rule upon the states." 71 Accordingly, he felt that opinions
written before Fourth Amendment standards were imposed on the states
"may have to be reinterpreted in the light of 'the demands of our federal
system.' 7 2 Furthermore, Traynor assumed that it would be impractical for
the United States Supreme Court to undertake such a burden.
In the main such a responsibility can hardly be shifted from state
courts conversant with the local scene to the United States Supreme
Court, particularly since the latter would be in no position to take
on so onerous a burden. . . .There is little chance that the...
Court would be willing and able to receive fifty... processions [of
state court cases] marching through its doors, calling upon it to
68. People v. Mickelson, 59 Cal. 2d 448, 450, 380 P.2d 658, 659, 30 Cal. Rptr. 18, 19 (1963).
69. Traynor, Mapp at Large, supra note 3, at 331.
70. Id. at 329-30.
71. People v. Thayer, 63 Cal. 2d 635, 639, 408 P.2d 108, 110, 47 Cal. Rptr. 780, 782 (1965).
72. Id. at 639,408 P.2d at 110, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 782 (quoting Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33 (1963)).
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give the details that make up the rules that govern the officials who
search and seize.73
Finally, Traynor read the Fourth Amendment as setting forth "no more
than the basic outlines of lawful law enforcement,"7 4 and believed that
"[t]he United States Supreme Court has not interpreted [that amendment]
as requiring that court to lay down as a matter of constitutional law precise
rules of police conduct."'75
If a state adopts rules of police conduct consistent with the
requirements of the Fourth Amendment and if its officers follow
those rules, they do not act unreasonably within the meaning of the
amendment although different rules may govern federal officers.76
Accordingly, Traynor, writing for the court, found that the Fourth
Amendment did not embody the rigid federal rule requiring full probable
cause for automobile stops, and upheld the more flexible California rule
which allowed police to stop and question motorists on less than probable
cause required for arrest.77 The California rule, he felt, represented a rea-
sonable accommodation of interests. "It strikes a balance between a per-
son's interest in immunity from police interference and the community's
interest in law enforcement." 78 Similarly, Traynor believed that the United
States Supreme Court's prohibition on seizures of "mere evidence," as
opposed to contraband or instruments or fruits of crime, was without pur-
pose or rational basis.79 He thus regarded it as a federal procedural rule
rather than a constitutional command. 0 Traynor seemed to be writing a
brief to the United States Supreme Court urging it to respect "the demands
of our federal system" and distinguish "between constitutional and super-
visory rules [which] separate fundamental civil liberties, which the states
must respect, from federal procedural rules, which the states may
ignore.",8 ' These views on federalism had the support of Judge Henry
73. Traynor, Mapp at Large, supra note 3, at 327.
74. People v. Mickelson, 59 Cal. 2d 448, 451, 380 P.2d 658, 660, 30 Cal. Rptr. 18, 20 (1963).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 452, 380 P.2d at 660, 30 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
77. Id. at 451-52, 380 P.2d at 660-61, 30 Cal. Rptr. at 20-21.
78. Id. at 452, 380 P.2d at 660-61, 30 Cal. Rptr. at 20-21 (citing Edward L. Barrett, Jr., Personal Rights,
Property Rights, and the Fourth Amendment, 1960 SuP. Cr. REv. 46, 65-66, 69-70).
79. See infra notes 324-331 and accompanying text.
80. People v. Tliayer, 63 Cal. 2d 635, 642, 408 P.2d 108, 112, 47 Cal. Rptr. 780, 784 (1965).
81. Id. at 639, 408 P.2d at 110, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 782.
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Friendly, who believed that in applying the Bill of Rights to the states,
"the Supreme Court should not regard these declarations of fundamental
principles as if they were a detailed code of criminal procedure, allowing
no room whatever for reasonable difference of judgment or play in the
joints. The 'specifics' simply are not that specific."8 2
However, the United States Supreme Court was not deterred, and
strode forward into the murky field of defining the details of search and
seizure standards. While the Court agreed with Traynor concerning the
reasonableness of flexible rules governing stops and detentions,83 as well
as the irrationality of the "mere evidence" rule,' it decided to accept the
burden of developing detailed and pervasive Fourth Amendment standards
applicable to all state criminal prosecutions.
There were alternative paths. The Court might have developed details
of search and seizure rules for the federal courts based on existing federal
statutes, the common law, or the Court's supervisory powers,85 and thus
avoided "[laying] down as a matter of constitutional law precise rules of
police conduct.' 86 The Court's detailed rules for federal courts would
have guided, though not commanded, parallel state law development which
would have to conform only to "the basic outlines of lawful law enforce-
ment. T87 Alternatively, the Court could have taken the Harlan-Frankfurter
fundamental fairness approach and read Fourteenth Amendment due pro-
cess as incorporating only core or fundamental Fourth Amendment values.
The Court then could have developed detailed search and seizure rules
founded on the Fourth Amendment while not obligating the states to
follow it "jot-for-jot and case-for-case."
88
Mapp v. Ohio9 left the matter somewhat murky. While the Court
found that the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy was enforceable
against the states by the same sanction of exclusion as against the federal
government and that this sanction was commanded by the Constitution,
90
the Court did not state whether it viewed the Fourteenth Amendment as
82. Henry J. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CAL L. REV. 929,953-54
(1965) [hereinafter Friendly, Bill of Rights].
83. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968).
84. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 302 (1967).
85. Traynor noted these possibilities in People v. Mickelson, 59 Cal. 2d 448, 451, 380 P.2d 658, 660,
30 Cal. Rptr. 18, 20 (1963).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 181 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
89. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
90. Id. at 655, 660.
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incorporating all Fourth Amendment guarantees or only basic rights
residing at the core of the Fourth Amendment. However, two years after
Mapp, the Court made clear that alternatives to incorporation of all Fourth
Amendment standards were unacceptable. In Ker v. California,9' the
Court interpreted Mapp as holding that the exclusionary rule was enforce-
able against the States through the Fourteenth Amendment by application
of the same Constitutional standard prohibiting unreasonable searches and
seizures.92 "The standard of reasonableness is the same under the Fourth
and the Fourteenth Amendments," 93 and thus, the reasonableness of a
search or seizure must be judged by the "federal constitutional
standard." 94  The Court viewed reasonableness as a substantive
determination to be made by the Court "in light of the 'fundamental
criteria' laid down by the Fourth Amendment and in [Supreme Court]
opinions ...applying that Amendment." 95 Concurring in Ker, Justice
Harlan objected to the single Constitutional standard governing both
federal and state prosecutions.96 Harlan noted that until today, federal
searches and seizures had been governed by the Fourth Amendment
reasonableness standard, whereas state searches and seizures had been
judged by the more flexible concept of fundamental fairness embraced
within Fourteenth Amendment due process.97 Harlan described Ker as
eliminating this distinction such that "[h]enceforth state searches and
seizures are to be judged by the same constitutional standards as apply in
the federal system." 98 This approach, Harlan argued, will lead to diluting
Fourteenth Amendment standards in the interest of leaving states "at least
some elbow room in their methods of criminal law enforcement."
99
Nevertheless, Ker left the door ajar to some state participation in the
development of the specifics of the rules. Voicing respect for "a healthy
Federalism,"' ° Ker read Mapp as implying "no total obliteration of state
laws relating to arrests and searches in favor of federal law."' ' ' The
91. 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
92. Id. at 30-31.
93. Id. at 33.
94. Id. at 34.
95. Id. at 33. The Court held that the officer's conduct was not unreasonable "under the standards of the
Fourth Amendment as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment" Id at 41.
96. Id. at 44 (Harlan, J., concurring).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 45.
99. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S 752, 769 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring).
100. Ker, 374 U.S. at 31.
101. Id.
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supervisory authority of the Supreme Court would affect only federal
criminal prosecutions,0 2 and "Mapp ...established no assumption by
this Court of supervisory authority over state courts ... ,"103 The Court
stated:
The States are not thereby precluded from developing workable
rules governing arrests, searches and seizures to meet "the practical
demands of effective criminal investigation and law enforcement"
in the States, provided that those rules do not violate the
constitutional proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures
and the concomitant command that evidence so seized is
inadmissible against one who has standing to complain. t°
Thus, the Court left open the possibility of using its supervisory
authority to develop the details of search and seizure law and of leaving
the states free to create their own rules as long as they did not violate the
fundamental values of the Fourth Amendment. In other contexts as well,
there remained the possibility that the Court would refrain from imposing
each aspect of a particular Constitutional guarantee on the states through
Fourteenth Amendment due process. When, in 1963, the Court in Gideon
v. Wainwright'0 5 held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was
fundamental and applied to the states through the due process clause,
Justice Harlan still contended that when the Court holds a right or
immunity of the Bill of Rights to be implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty, and thus valid against the states, it does not mean that the entire
body of federal law is automatically carried over and applied in full sweep
to the states. 0 6 However, the Court soon clearly rejected this approach
as well. During the 1960s, the Court approved the "bag and baggage"
approach to incorporation with respect to the Fourth,'0 7 Fifth'0 8 and
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 34.
105. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
106. Id. at 352 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Douglas also concurred, but objected to Harlan's view that
the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the states only "a watered-down" version of a Bill of Rights guarantee
that has been determined to be fundamental. Id. at 346-47 (Douglas, J. concurring).
107. See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 110 (1964) (holding that the same standards for obtaining a
warrant apply to the states as to the federal government).
108. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3, 10 (1964) (rejecting the notion that Fourteenth Amendment due
process applies to the states only a "watered-down, subjective version of the individual guarantees of the Bill
of Rights." and holding that the Fifth Amendment privilege applies to the states "under the applicable federal
standard").
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Sixth Amendments.'o By 1969, the end of the Warren Court activist era,
it was apparent that nearly all search and seizure standards developed by
the Court were based on the Fourth Amendment and, hence, binding upon
the states. Thus, when Chimel v. California110 established new Fourth
Amendment restrictions on the scope of searches incident to arrest,
Justice Harlan concurred reluctantly, noting that the Court had decided that
"every change in Fourth Amendment law must now be obeyed by state
officials facing widely different problems of local law enforcement.""'
It was now clear that the Court had rejected Traynor's view that the Fourth
Amendment's protection was limited to "fundamental civil liberties""!2
and established "no more than the basic outlines of lawful law enforce-
ment,"' 3 and that Traynor was surprised and most likely disappointed
by the Court's view that the Fourth Amendment required it to "lay down
as a matter of constitutional law precise rules of police conduct."
'"14
B. Iterests Protected by Search and Seizure Rules
The contrast between the views of Traynor and the Supreme Court as
to the nature of interests encompassed within the Fourth Amendment's
exclusionary rule is reflected in their different approaches to the appli-
cation of the Fourth Amendment to interception of conversations. Federal
cases prior to the California Supreme Court's decision in Cahan"5 made
clear that the Fourth Amendment was not implicated by the interception
of conversations, whether by wiretapping bugging or eavesdropping,
without some physical trespass. 1 6 Cahan involved the surreptitious and
109. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (holding that Fourteenth Amendment due process
guarantees the right to ajury trial in all criminal cases which, were they to be tried in federal court, would come
within the Sixth Amendment's guarantee).
110. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
111. Id. at 769 (Harlan, J., concurring). In 1970, Justice Harlan observed that "[w]ith few exceptions the
Court has 'incorporated,' each time over my protest, almost all the criminal protections found within the first
eight Amendments to the Constitution, and made them jot-for-jot and case-for-case' applicable to the States."
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 131 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting).
112. People v. Thayer, 63 Cal. 2d 635, 639, 408 P.2d 108, 110, 47 Cal. Rptr. 780, 782 (1965).
113. Traynor, Mapp at Large, supra note 3, at 329-330.
114. People v. Mickelson, 59 Cal. 2d 448, 451, 380 P.2d 658, 660. 30 Cal. Rptr. 18, 20 (1963).
115. People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
116. Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 135 (1942) (stating that with respect to the nontrespatory
use of a detectaphone, "[w]e hold that the use of the detectaphone by Government agents was not a violation
of the Fourth Amendment"); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928) (stating, in reference to wire
tapping: "The [Fourth] Amendment does not forbid what was done here. There was no searching. There was no
seizure. The evidence was secured by the use of the sense of hearing and that only. There was no entry of the
houses or offices of the defendants."); see Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 132 (1954) (finding for the first
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trespatory installation of dictagraphs, and the court did not indicate
whether a trespass was necessary to bring about Fourth Amendment
protections, nor did the court clarify whether the illegal search was the
trespass involved in installing the dictagraphs or the later eavesdropping.
For some time after Cahan, the California Supreme Court left the question
unanswered, 117 and the lower California courts generally followed the
federal approach which required a technical trespass.1
Traynor, however, strongly suggested in Cahan and in his later writings
that physical trespass was not necessary to bring about application of
California's exclusionary rule." 9 The Cahan opinion focused on privacy
rather than property rights. 2 The court emphasized the need to protect
"the privacy of homes" from government invasions12 ' and maintaining
"an atmosphere of freedom as against a feeling of fear and repression for
society as a whole."'2 Also, Traynor cited and relied on the dissenting
opinions of Justices Holmes and Brandeis in Olmstead v. United
States, 23 the leading federal case holding that a trespass was required in
the context of wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping.' 24 Shortly after
Cahan, Traynor declined the Attorney General's invitation to adopt
Olmstead's property-based rules as the standard in California, and instead,
looked to whether the particular intrusion constituted an "unreasonable
invasion of privacy."'2 Moreover, Traynor's writings after Cahan
pointed out that the Fourth Amendment protects privacy rather than pro-
perty rights, and suggested that California should reject the federal rule. In
time that the use of a dictagraph which had been installed by an illegal trespass constituted an illegal search and
seizure).
117. See People v. Tarantino, 45 Cal. 2d 590,595,597,290 P.2d 505,509-10 (1955) (holding inadmissible
recordings made pursuant to a surreptitiously installed microphone, but relying on the fact that the agent
installing it had committed an obvious trespass).
118. People v. Graff, 144 Cal. App. 2d 199,205, 300 P.2d 837, 840 (1956); People v. Anderson, 145 Cal.
App. 2d 201, 205, 302 P.2d 358, 361 (1956).
119. See infra note 126 and accompanying text.
120. See infra notes 121-124 and accompanying text.
121. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d at 447, 282 P.2d at 912-13.
122. Id. at 449, 282 P.2d at 914 (quoting Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Harris v. United States, 331 U.S.
145, 173 (1947)).
123. 277 U.S. 438, 469-71, 471-85 (1928).
124. Id at 445-46.
125. People v. Malotte, 46 Cal. 2d 59, 63, 292 P.2d 517, 519 (1956). An undercover police officer's call
to the defendant was recorded by means of a recording device connected to an induction coil designed to record
the conversation without making physical connection with the telephone circuit. Id. Bypassing Olmstead, Traynor
concluded that "[w]hen a person discusses the commission of a crime with another, face to face or at a distance
through the use of any means of communication, there is no unreasonable invasion of privacy when the other
uses the conversation against him." Id.
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1962, Traynor strongly criticized the United States Supreme Court's
reliance on property and trespass concepts:
Eloquent declarations of the past have condemned unreasonable
searches and seizures as invasions of the four walls that constitute
a man's castle. However clearly such declarations have sounded the
fourth amendment's concern with a man's right to privacy, their
emphasis on the castle has not merely restricted the right to
property connotations but has deadened inquiry what constitutes the
right in a modem context....
There has been no lack of signs that the right to privacy
transcends property connotations and that even in a property sense
it needs redefinition....
Confusion enough has resulted from over-refined preoccupation
with trespass to property instead of with invasion of the right to
privacy itself.
126
Thus, it is clear that Traynor had hoped that the United States Supreme
Court would abandon property interest and trespass standards as touch-
stones of Fourth Amendment analysis. Traynor was gratified in 1967 when
the Court eventually did so.' 27
C. Nature of the Exclusionary Rule
Traynor's initial optimism was reinforced by his clear perception of
both the nature and purpose of the newly adopted exclusionary rule. Cahan
emphasized the tentative, even experimental, character of the rule,
describing it as a "judicially declared rule of evidence,"' 28 thereby
implying that it could be modified, even supplanted, by legislative action.
Thus, Traynor proceeded in a cautious manner, avoiding the temptation to
flex judicial muscle and encase the exclusionary rule within the California
Constitution. Professor Barrett admired Traynor's restrained approach.
126. Traynor, Mapp at Large, supra note 3, at 332-33. Traynor accurately saw Silverman v, United States,
365 U.S. 505 (1961), as portending the demise of the property-trespass limitation of the Fourth Amendment. Id
at 332 n.37.
127. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
128. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d at 442, 282 P.2d at 910.
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While Barrett believed that the new exclusionary rule would "force a
clarification, judicially or legislatively, of the applicable rules, and provide
a mechanism for their enforcement,"'129 he cautioned that this "is not
necessarily an argument for the desirability of the rule as a permanent
matter-a full scale legislative consideration of the problem might end up
with elimination of the exclusionary rule." 130 Nevertheless, Barrett
believed that "even should this happen, the decision would have served a
useful purpose."' 31 Thus, when Traynor referred to the California exclu-
sionary rule as "no more than a judicially created rule of evidence,"'
132
he clearly had in mind the benefits of an experimental, flexible approach
to developing search and seizure rules which would leave room for and
encourage significant legislative participation in the difficult area of
balancing the need for effective law enforcement with protection of
individual privacy.
In Mapp, on the other hand, the Supreme Court plainly stated that the
exclusionary rule was of constitutional dimension, and in fact was
commanded by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. 33 The Court
rejected the suggestion that the exclusionary rule, was "one of evidence"
rather than "of constitutional origin."'T ' Two years after Mapp, the
United States Supreme Court in Ker v. California35 interpreted Mapp as
holding that the exclusionary rule was enforceable against the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment. 136 The Court explained that the
Fourth Amendment was enforceable against the states by the same sanction
of exclusion as is used against the federal government. 137 In 1965, the
Court again characterized Mapp as requiring exclusion of illegally obtained
evidence under the command of the due process clause of the Fourteenth
129. Barrett, Exclusion of Evidence, supra note 15, at 587.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Traynor, Mapp at Large, supra note 3, at 339. One purpose of resting the rule on such an infirm need
may have been to prevent its use in habeas corpus proceedings by prisoners who had been convicted by the use
of illegally obtained evidence. Barrett, Exclusion of Evidence, supra note 16, at 566 n.5. Traynor noted that since
the Cahan rule was only a rule of evidence, it could not be used to collaterally attack a judgment of conviction
which had become final before adoption of the rule. Traynor, Mapp at Large, supra note 3, at 339.
133. The Court described the "exclusion doctrine" as an "essential part of the right to privacy" which is
"embodied in the Fourth Amendment and is enforceable against the States." Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656,
660 (1961). The Court characterized the exclusionary rule as "an essential part of both the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments." Id. at 657.
134. Id. at 649.
135. 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
136. Id. at 30-31.
137. Id.
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Amendment. 138 Thus, it is not surprising that judges and scholars took
the Court at its word. Traynor, for example, concluded that the Mapp
Court had found the rule "part and parcel of the Constitution,"' 39 and
Professor Francis Allen saw Mapp as unequivocally holding that the rule
is not a "mere rule of evidence," but is commanded by the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments14
However, a decade after Mapp, the Court shifted the exclusionary rule
to a less stable foundation, describing it as "a judicially created remedy
designed to safeguard the Fourth Amendment rights . . . rather than a
personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved."'141 Over two decades
after Mapp, the Court admitted that it has not been consistent in its
characterization of the nature of the exclusionary rule. 142 Acknowledging
that it once thought of the rule as "a necessary corollary of the Fourth
Amendment," the Court characterized the rule, not as a constitutional right
of the party aggrieved, but as "a judicially created remedy designed to
safeguard Fourth Amendment rights .... "1 43 This characterization of the
rule seems to parallel the language the Court used thirty-five years earlier
in Wolf v. Colorado'4 when, speaking through Justice Frankfurter, the
Court described the exclusionary rule in federal cases as a product of
"judicial implication" and not part of the Fourteenth Amendment.
45
Justice Black concurred in Wolf, pointing out what to him was the "plain
implication" of the Court's opinion: "[T]he federal exclusionary rule is not
a command of the Fourth Amendment but is a judicially created rule of
evidence which Congress might negate." 146 Thus, the Court now seems
138. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 619 (1965). The Court repeated Mapp's statement that the
exclusionary rule was "an essential part of both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments." Id. at 634.
139. Traynor, Mapp at Large, supra note 3, at 339.
140. Francis A. Allen, Federalism and the Fourth Amendment: A Requiem for Wolf, 1961 SUP. Cr. REV.
1, 23-24 (1961).
141. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974); see Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494-95
(1976) (stating that the rule is not a personal constitutional right of an accused. It is calculated to deter unlawful
police conduct, not to redress injury to the privacy of victims of unlawful searches or seizures).
142. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 905-06 (1984).
143. Id.
144. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
145. Id. at 33. The Court held that "in a prosecution in a State court for a State crime the Fourteenth
Amendment does not forbid the admission of evidence obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure." Id
146. Id at 39-40 (Black, J., concurring). Justice Black repeated the same proposition in United States v.
Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56,66 (1950), and in his concurring opinion in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 661 (1961)
(Black, J., concurring), where he was "still not persuaded that the Fourth Amendment, standing alone, would
be enough" to support the exclusionary rule. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 661.
While Justice Frankfurter in Wolf did not use identical language, he pointed out that the rule was not to
be found in the Constitution and suggested that it might not survive congressional repeal. Wolf, 338 U.S. at 33.
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to have returned the rule to its original, more flexible foundations, an
approach closely coinciding with that taken by Justice Traynor and the
California Supreme Court in Cahan.
D. Purpose of the Exclusionary Rule
Cahan clearly focused on the exclusionary rule's deterrent, as opposed
to remedial purpose. 47 The fundamental objective of the rule was not to
compensate victims of unlawful searches or seizures or even to punish
police who engage in such practices, but to remove incentives for unlawful
searches and seizures and thereby to discourage police from conducting
them. 48 Traynor later elaborated on the notion of deterrence:
[T]he raison d'9tre of the exclusionary rule is the deterrence of
lawless law enforcement .... The objective of the exclusionary
rule is certainly not to compensate the defendant for the past wrong
done to him any more than it is to penalize the officer for the past
wrong he has done. The emphasis is forward.
149
The United States Supreme Court did not so clearly perceive the pur-
pose of the exclusionary rule. To be sure, the Court in Mapp, quoting from
Elkins v. United States,'50 stated that the purpose of the exclusionary rule
"'is to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only
effectively available way-by removing the incentive to disregard it."""'
However, the Court relied heavily on the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination, suggesting that use of unlawfully seized evi-
dence against an accused was tantamount to compelling the accused to be
a witness against himself in violation of that guarantee. The Court reaf-
firmed the central premise of Boyd v. United States,"2 quoting with
approval Boyd's view that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments run "almost
147. See infra notes 148-149 and accompanying text.
148. People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 431, 448 282 P.2d 905, 913 (1955) (asserting that "the adoption of the
exclusionary rule will not prevent all illegal searches and seizures, it will discourage them").
149. Traynor, Mapp at Large, supra note 3 at, 334-35. Professor Barrett believed that the deterrent
rationale of Cahan rested on the assumption that the police perception that their illegal activities will result in
failures of convictions will have greater effect on police practices than more direct remedies. Barrett, Exclusion
of Evidence, supra note 16, at 582.
150. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
151. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,656 (1961) (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206,217 (1960)).
152. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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into each other,' ,5 3 and that "any forcible and compulsory extortion of
a [person's] own testimony or of [a person's] private papers to be used as
evidence to convict [that person] of crime" is condemned by both amend-
ments.'" This "'intimate relation""'  between the two guarantees
assures "in either sphere.., that no man is to be convicted on unconsti-
tutional evidence." ' 6 Indeed, the Court characterized the exclusionary
rule as a "most important constitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion
of evidence which an accused had been forced to give by reason of the
unlawful seizure."'" Consequently, it was tempting to view the new
right created by Mapp, not as a right to privacy, but rather as a "privilege
against conviction by unlawfully obtained evidence. ' 158 This apparently
was the view of Justice Black who added the essential fifth vote and was
persuaded that the Fifth Amendment, rather than the Fourth, was the true
basis of the exclusionary rule. 9 Black had described the exclusionary
rule for the federal courts as "not a command of the Fourth Amendment
but... a judicially created rule of evidence which Congress might
negate, '' 6° and was "still not persuaded that the Fourth Amendment,
standing alone, would be enough [to support the rule].' 6' However,
Black reasoned that when the Fourth Amendment is "considered together
with the Fifth Amendment's ban against compelled self-incrimination, a
constitutional basis emerges which.., requires the exclusionary rule.'
62
The Court in Mapp also relied on what it had earlier described as "the
imperative of judicial integrity,"'6' a notion that courts participate in
unlawful police conduct by admitting in evidence the fruits of such
searches, and on Justice Brandeis' language in his Olmstead dissent that
"[i]f the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law;
it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy."'
64
The Court concluded that its decision gave "to the courts, that judicial
integrity so necessary in the true administration of justice."'
65
153. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 646 (quoting Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630).
154. I at 647.
155. Id. at 657 (quoting Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 543-44 (1897)).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 656.
158. Allen, supra note 140, at 35.
159. Id. at 25.
160. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 39-40 (1949) (Black, J., concurring).
161. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 661 (Black, J., concurring).
162. Id at 662 (Black, J., concurring).
163. Id. at 659 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960)).
164. Id at 659 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
165. Id. at 660.
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Subsequently, in a series of cases decided during the 1970s, the
United States Supreme Court separated Fourth Amendment from Fifth
Amendment protections and clearly rejected the integrated approach first
*articulated by Boyd and resurrected in Mapp. The Court accomplished this
severance primarily by restricting the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination to instances of personal compulsion.'6 Rejecting
Boyd's suggestion that "any forcible and compulsory extortion of a man's
... private papers to be used as evidence to convict him of crime"
violated both amendments, the Court narrowed coverage of the Fifth
Amendment to protection of possession, rather than ownership, and to
protection only against compulsion from the person. 167 The Court
described the privilege as "an intimate and personal one"' 6 which
"adheres basically to the person, not to information that may incriminate
him."
169
Emphasizing the distinct operation of the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments, the Court in Andresen v. Maryland,'7" held that the Fifth Amend-
ment does not prevent search of a person's office and the seizure and
introduction into evidence of a person's private business papers. 7 1 The
Court further reformulated the concept of compulsion. In Boyd and earlier
cases, "the unlawfulness of the search and seizure was thought to supply
the compulsion of the accused necessary to invoke the Fifth Amend-
ment."172 However, in Andresen the Court pointed out that the statements
previously made on private business papers were made voluntarily. 73 At
the time of the search and seizure, Andresen "was not asked to say or to
do anything,"' 74 and thus, there was no compulsion involved in either the
creation or the seizure of the papers. 75 The Court stated that "the
individual against whom the search is directed is not required to aid in the
discovery, production, or authentication of incriminating evidence,"
17 6
and no compulsion is involved when the papers are introduced at trial
166. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 330-31 (1973).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 327.
169. Id. at 328. "It is extortion of information from the accused himself that offends our sense of justice."
Id.
170. 427 U.S. 463 (1976).
171. Id. at 477.
172. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 635.
173. Andresen, 427 U.S. at 473.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 473-74.
176. Il at 474.
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without any compulsion against the person other than the inherent
psychological pressure to respond to unfavorable evidence." 1"
The Court also firmly rejected the notion that the Fifth Amendment
independently protects privacy. While the Fifth Amendment may inci-
dentally protect privacy through its prevention of compelled testimonial
self-incrimination, it offers no protection of private information absent such
compulsion. 7 ' "[T]he Fifth Amendment protects against 'compelled self-
incrimination, not [the disclosure of] private information.""' 179 While the
Court recognized that "the Fifth Amendment protects privacy to some
extent,... unless incriminating testimony is 'compelled,' any invasion of
privacy is outside the scope of [its] protection."'180 Clearly then, since
Boyd, the Court has separated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments such that
their protections are now distinct. A search or seizure rarely, if ever, will
implicate the privilege against self-incrimination, and a violation of that
privilege seldom will amount to a search or seizure.
During the course of distinguishing the Fourth from the Fifth
Amendment, the Court abandoned its suggestion that the exclusionary rule
was intended as a remedy for the violation of a defendant's privacy.'
Over a decade after Mapp, the Supreme Court concluded that exclusion of
illegally obtained evidence is neither intended nor able to cure the vio-
lation of Fourth Amendment rights."8 2 Also, the Court recognized that
the primary rationale for the exclusionary rule is deterrence of illegal
police conduct, and that judicial integrity concerns play only a limited role
in its justification.183 Nonetheless, in a number of contexts the Court has
continued to lose sight of the central purpose of the exclusionary rule. This
can be seen in the Court's irrational standing rules, its confusing approach
177. 1m1 at 473.
178. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 399-400 (1976).
179. Id. at 401 (citing United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 233 n.7 (1975)).
180. Andresen, 427 U.S. at 477.
181. See infra note 182 and accompanying text.
182. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 540 (1976); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984).
183. Stone, 428 U.S. at 492. The Court stated that:
Evidence obtained by police officers in violation of the Fourth Amendment is excluded at trial
in the hope that the frequency of future violations will decrease.... [W]e have assumed that the
immediate effect of exclusion will be to discourage law enforcement officials from violating the
Fourth Amendment by removing the incentive to disregard it. More importantly, over the long term,
this demonstration that our society attaches serious consequences to violation of constitutional rights
is thought to encourage those who formulate law enforcement policies, and the officers who
implement them, to incorporate Fourth Amendment ideals into their value system.
Id.
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to consent, and its unduly restrictive definition of Fourth Amendment
seizures.
1. Standing Rules
Traditional federal standing rules focused on property interests and
required that a defendant claim either ownership or possession of the
property seized or a substantial possessory interest in the premises
searched."84 In 1960, the Court made it easier to move to suppress
evidence by granting standing to anyone charged with possession of the
items seized, as well as to anyone legitimately on the premises
searched. 8 5 Such persons automatically were viewed as aggrieved by the
unlawful search or seizure under both the Fourth Amendment and Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(e).8 6 However, the Court later discarded
these automatic standing rules, along with traditional standing rules based
on property interests, in favor of the expectation of privacy standard rooted
in Katz v. United States.18 7 The Court shifted the focus of the standing
inquiry from whether the accused had a property right in the items seized
to whether the accused had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area
or place searched.' In this way, the Court tightened the test for
standing, but maintained the requirement that defendants establish that they
were personally aggrieved by the search or seizure. A defendant could not
claim standing by asserting the privacy rights of co-conspirators or
184. See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960); cf. Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114,
120-122 (1941).
However, in order to allow an accused to object to seizures of narcotics when the defendant had no
possessory interest in the premises searched, the Court recognized a fictitious property interest in contraband
which entitled the accused to utilize the exclusionary rule but not to move for the return of the contraband. See
United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 53-54 (1951) (accepting the defendant's argument that the contraband was
"his property, for purposes of the exclusionary rule").
185. Jones, 362 U.S. at 267; see Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 369 (1968).
186. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e).
187. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
188. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133 (1978); United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 82, 85 (1980). Even
the defendant's claim of ownership or possession of items seized would not confer standing when the defendant
lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place searched. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105
(1980).
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others. 189 "Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which... may
not be vicariously asserted."' 9°
Shortly after Cahan,'9' Traynor wrote People v. Martin92 which
rejected federal standing rules and adopted a vicarious standing principle
allowing defendants to assert the rights of other persons. ' 93 Thus, if the
police discover evidence that incriminates a defendant in the course of an
illegal arrest or search of some other person, the defendant will have
standing to move for its suppression. 94 The defendant "need only show
that the state obtained the evidence illegally, whether in violation of his
rights or those of third parties, which is to say that he must show that the
state obtained the evidence in the course of a search and seizure that was
unreasonable."' 95 Traynor believed that this broad standing principle was
mandated by the very rationale of the exclusionary rule. "[Defendant's]
right to object to the use of the evidence must rest, not on a violation of
his own constitutional rights, but on the ground that the government must
not be allowed to profit by its own wrong and thus encouraged in the
lawless enforcement of the law."1 96 As Traynor later noted,
[The federal] rules have rested on property concepts, with an
admixture of tort concepts. Standing to object has depended on
whether the defendant could show that he had a property interest
in the premises searched or the evidence seized. The exclusionary
189. United States v. Padilla, 113 S. Ct. 1936, 1938-39 (1993); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165,
174 (1969).
190. Alderman, 394 U.S. at 174. Furthermore, these personal standing requirements cannot be avoided by
relying on either the Court's supervisory power or due process to allow an accused to assert the rights of third
parties. United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 731 (1980).
191. People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
192. 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 P.2d 855 (1955).
193. Id. at 759-61, 290 P.2d at 856-57.
194. Id. at 761, 290 P.2d at 857.
195. Traynor, Mapp at Large, supra note 3, at 335. By the early 1960s, California's vicarious standing
rule was regarded by Traynor as "commonplace to any attorney engaged in criminal trials." People v. lbarra,
60 Cal. 2d 460, 465, 386 P.2d 487, 491, 34 Cal. Rptr. 863, 867 (1963).
Traynor rejected the government's forfeiture argument on a similar rationale, based on deterrence as the
purpose of the exclusionary rule. The state had sought to justify the search of a car on the ground that it had
been forfeited to the state, but Traynor responded:
[E]ven if it is assumed that a forfeiture would relate back to the time of the seizure, it would still be
necessary for the state to base its right to forfeiture on the fruits of an unreasonable search. It is settled,
however, that a search cannot be justified by what it turns up.
People v. Gale, 46 Cal. 2d 253, 258, 294 P.2d 13, 16 (1956) (citing People v. Brown, 45 Cal. 2d 640, 643, 290
P.2d 528, 530 (1955)).
196. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d at 761, 290 P.2d at 857; see People v. Maddox, 46 Cal. 2d 301, 305, 294 P.2d
6, 8-9 (1956).
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rule ordinarily operated when such an interest existed, but
otherwise failed to operate. This limitation may well have lessened
its deterrent effect. . . . [Focusing] on a relation between the
defendant and the property involved.., suggests, though perhaps
unintentionally, that the objective of the exclusionary rule is to
make amends to the defendant. What should be of primary concern
is not the grievances of selected guilty defendants such as
landowners or the gentry of invitees, but the grievousness of
official lawlessness. 97
2. Consent: Actual or Apparent Authority
During the seven years following Cahan,98 the California courts
decided approximately ninety cases involving problems of consent to
search, most of which were consistent with federal cases.' However,
very soon after Cahan, Traynor came to grips with a consent issue which,
for decades after Mapp, remained a vague and troubled area of federal law.
In judging the validity of consent searches, should courts ask whether the
person whose privacy was invaded voluntarily consented to the search, or
whether police acted reasonably under the circumstances? In particular, can
valid consent be based on a reasonable, though mistaken, belief that the
person granting permission has authority to do so?
In People v. Gorg,2 ° Traynor announced the principle that a search
is valid if based on the consent of a third person whom the officers
reasonably and in good faith believe has authority to consent, even though
that person may not actually have such authority. °t In Gorg, the
defendant occupied a room with a bath in the home of Don Stevens, in
exchange for gardening work.2' Following the defendant's arrest for
shoplifting, police learned that the defendant had been arrested for
197. Traynor, Mapp at Large, supra note 3, at 335.
198. People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
199. See People v. Corrao, 201 Cal. App. 2d 848, 853, 20 Cal. Rptr. 492, 496 (1962); People v. Terry,
57 Cal. 2d 538, 557-58, 370 P.2d 985, 996-97 (1962); People v. Dominguez, 144 Cal. App. 2d 63, 65, 300 P.2d
194, 196 (1956); People v. Wilson, 145 Cal. App. 2d 1, 5, 301 P.2d 974, 976-77 (1956); cf. Abel v. United
States, 362 U.S. 217, 235-37 (1960); Channel v. United States, 285 F.2d 217, 221 (9th Cir. 1960). But cf.
Chapman v. United States 365 U.S. 610, 615-16 (1961) (reversing a conviction based on evidence seized in a
warrantless search, conducted under circumstances which the Court believed required the officers to delay and
present evidence to a magistrate).
200. 45 Cal. 2d 776, 291 P.2d 469 (1955).
201. Id. at 783, 291 P.2d at 473.
202. Id. at 778-79, 291 P.2d at 470.
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narcotics offenses and went to his residence. 3 When the officers
arrived, Stevens showed them a bucket containing growing plants which
he had discovered while cleaning in defendant's bathroom.2 4 Analysis
proved that the plants were marijuana, and the officers returned to the
residence later that day.20 5 They did not have a search warrant but
Stevens gave them permission to enter and to search the entire house.
206
Marijuana was discovered in bureau drawers in defendant's room.2 7
Noting that the officers were unaware, as Stevens may have been, that
Stevens had no right to enter the room and bath rented to the defendant,
the court upheld the search of the defendant's room, stating:
[W]hether [the defendant] was in fact a tenant, servant, or guest,
[the owner] believed that he had at least joint control over
[defendant's] quarters and the right to enter them... and authorize
a search thereof. Under these circumstances the officers were
justified in concluding that [the owner] had the authority over his
home that he purported to have, and there was nothing
unreasonable in their acting accordingly.2 8
Holding that the lack of actual authority of the person giving consent does
not necessarily make the search unlawful, the court looked primarily to
reasonable reliance on the part of the police and focused on the deterrent
purpose of the exclusionary rule-to discourage unreasonable activity by
peace officers-rather than to enforce rights under the law of trespass or
landlord and tenant.209 As Traynor later described his approach in Gorg,
"Once it is determined that [police] conduct is not unreasonable in the
circumstances, it is not rendered unreasonable in the event that it is
deemed to have involved a civil trespass. 210
Traynor emphasized the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness clause
and focused on the limited purpose of the exclusionary rule-to promote
reasonable, good faith police conduct.
203. Id. at 778-79, 291 P.2d at 470-71.




208. Id. at 783. 291 P.2d at 473.
209. Id.
210. Traynor, Mapp at Large, supra note 3, at 337.
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[W]e are not concerned with enforcing defendant's rights under the
law of trespass and the landlord and tenant, but with discouraging
unreasonable activity on the part of law enforcement officers. "A
criminal prosecution is more than a game in which the Government
may be checkmated and the game lost merely because its officers
have not played according to rule." [A]nd when as in this case the
officers have acted in good faith with the consent and at the
request of a homeowner in conducting a search, evidence so
obtained cannot be excluded merely because the officers may have
made a reasonable mistake as to the extent of the owner's
authority.
211
However, the concept of good faith was not given free reign. In People v.
Roberts,212 the court stated that police could not base entry into an apart-
ment on a good faith belief that the apartment manager had authority to
consent to the search.213
At the federal level, the validity of Gorg was questioned shortly after
Mapp,214 and federal law on the subject remained unclear for decades.
In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,21 the United States Supreme Court
adopted the general test to determine the voluntariness of consent to search
which had been articulated by Traynor years earlier: whether apparent
consent was in fact voluntarily given or was in submission to an express
or implied assertion of authority is a question of fact to be determined in
the light of all circumstances, and whether a person was advised of the
right to refuse consent is merely one factor to be considered and is not
determinative.2 6 However, Schneckloth did not clearly answer the
question of whether the inquiry should focus on actual or apparent consent.
On the one hand, the Court required the prosecutor to demonstrate "that
consent was in fact voluntarily given," and listed as relevant factors the
suspect's youth, lack of education, and low intelligence, which often are
211. Gorg, 45 Cal. 2d at 783, 291 P.2d at 473 (citation omitted).
212. 47 Cal. 2d 374, 303 P.2d 721 (1956).
213. Id. at 377, 303 P.2d at 722; cf. Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 617-18 (1961) (finding
unreasonable police reliance on the consent of a landlord with a right to inspect the premises).
214. Collings, supra note 3, at 448.
215. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
216. Id. at 248-49 (adopting the essence of Traynor's standard set out in People v. Michael, 45 Cal. 2d
751, 753, 290 P.2d 852, 854 (1955)).
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unknown to the officer at the time of requesting consent.2"7 On the other
hand, the Court rejected a "waiver" approach to consent searches.218
The following year, the Court affirmed that police may rely on the
consent of a third party who possesses common authority over the
premises, but expressly reserved the question of the validity of reasonable
but mistaken reliance on the consent of a third party.1 9 It was not until
1990 that the United States Supreme Court provided a clear answer. In
Illinois v. Rodriguez,22 ° the Court held that a warrantless entry into a
dwelling is valid when based on the consent of a third party whom the
police at the time of entry reasonably believe possesses common authority
over the premises, but who, in fact, does not.221 Finally, the Court un-
equivocally abandoned the waiver approach and focused on the reason-
ableness of the officer's reliance on consent:
What [a defendant] is assured by the Fourth Amendment ... is not
that no government search of his house will occur unless he
consents; but that no such search will occur that is "unreasonable."
... [The] issue.., is not whether the right to be free of searches
has been waived, but whether the right to be free of unreasonable
searches has been violated.
222
While not citing Gorg, the Court adopted Traynor's objective test: whether
facts available to the officer at the moment warrant a man of reasonable
caution in the belief that the consenting party had authority over the
223premises.
Unfortunately, the Court added a comment that again muddied the
waters of the law of consent searches. After pointing out that the validity
of consent searches must be judged by the foregoing objective standard,
the Court continued, "If not, then warrantless entry without further inquiry
is unlawful unless authority actually exists. But if so, the search is
valid."
224
217. Id. at 226.
218. Id. at 241.
219. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 n.14 (1974).
220. 497 U.S. 177 (1990).
221. Id. at 185-86.
222. Id. at 183, 187 (emphasis added).
223. Id. at 185-86; Gorg, 45 Cal. 2d at 783, 291 P.2d at 473.
224. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188-89 (emphasis added).
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The Court made no effort to explain this qualification of its otherwise
reasonable approach to consent searches, but its language suggests that in
a case where the person expressing permission to search has actual
authority to consent but the police have no reasonable belief that he or she
does, the police nevertheless do not act unlawfully in conducting the
search. This result flies in the face of the obvious unreasonableness of the
search when viewed from the perspective of the searching officers. Just as
facts undisclosed to the magistrate cannot validate an otherwise insufficient
search warrant,2 5 the fact that the police unreasonably rely on one who
actually has authority to give consent should not render lawful an
otherwise unreasonable search. In such a case, the search should be unrea-
sonable and unlawful despite the fact the authority for the search existed
and the search would have been lawful had the searching officers been
aware of it. Suppose, for example, a police officer requests consent to
search a home, and the owner mumbles, "I don't care if you do it."
However, the officer understands the response as, "I don't care to have you
do it," but undertakes to search anyway, erroneously believing that the
search is justified by exigent circumstances. The search would be unrea-
sonable from the perspective of the officer and the evidence should be
suppressed in order to serve the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule.
The prosecution might respond that in this case the person with
authority to consent actually intended to give consent and thus waived or
abandoned the expectation of privacy. The short answer to this argument
is that the Court rejected this approach in Michigan v. Tyler.226 The
Court in Tyler held that official entries into fire-damaged premises must
be made pursuant to the warrant procedures governing administrative
searches, and rejected the argument that defendants' later convictions for
arson demonstrated that they had abandoned any expectation of privacy by
setting fire to and leaving the premises.2 7 Refusing to justify a search
on the ground of abandonment by arson when that arson has not yet been
proved, the Court stated that a conviction cannot be used ex post facto to
validate the introduction of evidence used to secure that conviction.228
Thus, as an owner's abandonment of a dwelling cannot justify a search of
the dwelling without a warrant when acts of abandonment are unknown to
225. Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 565 n.8 (1971).
226. 436 U.S. 499 (1978).
227. Id. at 505.
228. Id. at 506; see Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 297 (1984) (distinguishing Tyler from a factual
situation in which a warrantless search was conducted several hours after the entry to extinguish the fire, and
involved the heightened privacy interest which attaches to a home).
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the officers at the time of the search, the fact that the consentor actually
had authority to give consent should not render lawful an otherwise unrea-
sonable search.
Fundamentally, however, the principle that actual authority prevails
over apparent authority rests on the requirement of personal standing, the
view that the actual waiver or aband6nment of expectation of privacy
deprives the consentor of standing to complain of the unreasonable search
or seizure. As noted above, this narrow standing rule conflicts with the
purpose of the exclusionary rule. The Court should have relied on
Traynor's approach in Gorge2 and simply focused on the reasonableness
of police conduct.
3. Defining Fourth Amendment Seizures
Traynor recognized and accommodated law enforcement's need to
investigate by allowing police to approach citizens to seek interviews both
at their homes and out of doors. He found nothing unreasonable "for
officers to seek interviews with suspects or witnesses or to call upon them
at their homes for such purposes," 2 0 as long as the officers do not
invade the privacy of a suspect's home by demanding that the suspect
open the door.231 However, he believed that police should not be immune
from the exclusionary rule when they attempt or threaten to conduct illegal
searches or seizures and the evidence is discovered as a direct result of
such illegal attempt or threat. In such case, the exclusionary rule serves a
useful purpose. In Badillo v. Superior Court,232 drug agents surrounded
a house in which the defendant was located.233 An agent knocked on the
door and received no response.- 4 The agent then forced the door open
and entered the house. 5 Shortly thereafter, the defendant ran out the
front door, pursued by the agent.1 6 The defendant threw a package of
229. See supra notes 200-211 (discussing Traynor's approach in Gorg).
230. People v. Michael, 45 Cal. 2d 751,754, 290 P.2d 852, 854 (1955); see People v. Simon, 45 Cal. 2d
645, 650, 290 P.2d 531, 534 (1955) (stating that "[t]here is, of course, nothing unreasonable in an officer's
questioning persons outdoors at night").
231. See People v. Shelton, 60 Cal. 2d 740, 746-47, 388 P.2d 665, 668-69, 36 Cal. Rptr. 433, 436-37
(1964) (holding that the right to seek interviews with suspects at their homes does not include the right to
demand that a suspect open his door).
232. 46 Cal. 2d 269, 294 P.2d 23 (1956).
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heroin toward another agent who recovered it. 7 Justice Traynor, writing
for the court, found that the heroin must be suppressed since it was the
product of a warrantless entry into the house which was not based on
reasonable cause and was therefore illegal.238 Answering the govern-
ment's argument that the defendant abandoned the heroin, Traynor pointed
out that the "defendants flight out the front door and attempted disposal of
the evidence was the direct result of [the agent's] illegal entry, and
accordingly, the evidence was obtained in violation of constitutional
guarantees."' 39 Following Badillo, the California Supreme Court char-
acterized this issue as follows: "whether there was a threat of such an
invasion capable of execution and sufficient to cause defendants' flight and
disposal of [contraband, such that] the evidence eventually obtained was
the product of an attempted illegal act of the officer."2 40 Flight or dis-
posal of evidence was deemed "tainted" when it was found to be "a direct
response to unlawful police action."24 Such unlawful action might be no
more than "a threat of an illegal search capable of being carried out.
... ,,242 or an "attempted illegal invasion of [defendant's] constitutional
rights."243
For decades, the United States Supreme Court left undecided the point
at which a show of authority by the police amounts to a seizure within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. In Terry v. Ohio,244 the Court held
that a person is "seized" whenever that person is accosted by an officer
and restrained from walking away.245 Twelve years later, the Court held
that a person is seized "only when by means of physical force or show of
authority his freedom of movement is restrained. 246 The test was
described as an objective one: whether, in view of all the circumstances
surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would believe that he or she
237. Id.
238. Id. at 272, 294 P.2d at 25.
239. Id. at 273, 294 P.2d at 25 (citing Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920),
which established the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine for the federal courts).
240. People v. Stout, 66 Cal. 2d 184, 191,424 P.2d 704, 709, 57 Cal. Rptr. 152, 157 (1967); see Gascon
v. Superior Court, 169 Cal. App. 2d 356, 359, 337 P.2d 201, 202 (1959).
241. In re Michael V., 10 Cal. 3d 676, 681, 517 P.2d 1145, 1147, 111 Cal. Rptr. 681, 683 (1974).
242. Stout, 66 Cal. 2d at 192, 424 P.2d at 709, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 157.
243. Gascon v. Superior Court, 169 Cal. App. 2d 356, 359, 337 P.2d 201, 202 (1959).
244. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
245. Id. at 16; see Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50 (1979).
246. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553 (1980). The lead opinion did not carry a majority,
but the concurring justices seemed to accept the test, disagreeing only with its application. The Court clearly
affirmed the test eight years later in Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573-74 (1988).
1270
1994 / Contrasting Approaches to Search and Seizure
was not free to leave.247 Factors indicating a seizure include the threa-
tening presence of several officers, the display of weapons, the physical
touching of the suspect, and the use of language or tone indicating
compliance with the officer's requests.248 Where the show of authority
fails to result in the submission or apprehension of the suspect, the Court
suggested that a seizure would be found when such show of authority was
sufficient to meet the objective test, that is, where "police conduct•., was
... 'so intimidating' that [defendant] could reasonably have believed that
he was not free to disregard the police presence and go about his
business." '249
However, in California v. Hodari,250 the Court held that to constitute
an arrest or other Fourth Amendment seizure, there must be either the
application of physical force, or submission to an officer's show of
authority to restrain the subject's liberty.251 In Hodari, two Oakland
police officers on patrol in an unmarked car, but with "Police" marked
jackets, saw four to five youths huddled around a parked car. 52 The
youths panicked and took flight when they saw the officers approach."5 3
One officer left his car and gave chase, eventually turning south on 62nd
Ave. 5 4 Hodari came out of an alley on 62nd running north. 5 Looking
behind, as he ran, he did not turn and see the officer until he was almost
upon him, whereupon Hodari tossed away what appeared to be a small
rock.2 5 6 A moment later, the officer tackled and handcuffed him.2 57 The
rock Hodari discarded was found to be crack cocaine."5 8 The Court
concluded that the police chase, though conveying the message to Hodari
that he was not free to leave and amounting to a show of authority under
Mendenhall v. United States,59 did not constitute a seizure under the
Fourth Amendment because Hodari had not yet either been touched or
247. See Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 574 (regarding as irrelevant the subjective, but uncommunicated, intent
of an officer to arrest or detain).
248. Id. at 575.
249. Id. at 576.
250. 499 U.S. 621 (1991).
251. Id at 626-27.
252. Id. at 622.
253. Id. at 622-23.





259. 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).
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submitted to authority.2" Since there was no seizure, the evidence was
regarded as the product of the suspect's abandonment of privacy interests
rather than of a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.
261
It is unfortunate that the United States Supreme Court did not follow
the lead of Justice Traynor. By requiring a touching or a submission to
authority in Hodari, the Court embraced a criteria having little relation to
the purpose of the exclusionary rule. A clearly unreasonable police pursuit
which strikes fear in the heart of a suspect will be outside the strictures of
the Fourth Amendment until the police succeed in contacting the suspect
or the suspect decides to stop. For example, if without reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity a uniformed police officer commands a
person to "halt" or "stop," and the suspect drops evidence and then stops,
the evidence will be admitted since it was abandoned prior to the seizure.
However, if the suspect immediately stops and then drops the evidence, the
evidence will-be suppressed as the product of the unlawful seizure.262 A
rule which allows Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable
police intrusions to turn on the often haphazard and unpredictable reactions
of suspects lacks a rational basis and poorly serves the purpose of
deterring unreasonable police conduct. The Court should have followed
Justice Traynor's approach which clearly focuses on the reasonableness of
police conduct and does not depend on circumstances beyond the control
of those whom the exclusionary rule is intended to influence.263
260. Hodari, 449 U.S. at 625-26.
261. Id. at 627-29.
262. See United States v. Wood, 981 F.2d 536, 537,54041 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (holding that a suspect was
seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when he "froze in his tracks" and dropped a handgun in
response to a police officer's command to "halt right there... stop"); see also United States v. Coggins, 986
F.2d 651, 654 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that the suspect was seized when he complied with officer's order to stay
put by sitting down, though he almost immediately reconsidered and ran off).
Furthermore, as a result of Hodari, reasonable suspicion for a stop may be based in part on events that
occurred after the illegal show of police authority, allowing police to rely on a person's response to their
attempted illegal seizure to bootstrap unfounded suspicion into reasonable suspicion or probable cause. See
United States v. Santamaria-Hernandez, 968 F.2d 980, 983-84 (9th Cir. 1992). What is the result if the suspect
is touched, but breaks away and discards contraband during the period of fugitivity? The question was
considered, but left undecided in United States v. Silva, 957 F.2d 157, 159 (5th Cir. 1992).
263. See supra notes 230-243 and accompanying text.
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IV. DEVELOPMENT OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE STANDARDS
A. Taking the Middle Road: Accommodating Privacy and Law
Enforcement Interests in Investigative Stops, Frisks, and Detentions
At the time Cahan2 64 was decided, federal law greatly restricted
police stops and detentions through the application of tort law con-
cepts.265 If police restricted a suspect's liberty of movement sufficiently
to commit the tort of false imprisonment, the restriction could be justified
only by demonstrating that police had probable cause to make a formal
arrest.266 Although the position of the United States Supreme Court was
not entirely clear,267 it appeared to favor the proposition that an arrest
occurs at the time the police stop a person or automobile for investi-
.gation.268 Traynor read Supreme Court cases as allowing "no middle
ground"2 69 and summarized the federal approach as follows:
[A]n arrest occurs when an automobile is stopped during the course
of a criminal investigation, and if the officer does not have
reasonable cause to arrest the occupant at that time, the arrest is
unlawful. Anything the officer learns as a result of stopping the
automobile is inadmissible in evidence and cannot justify a
search.270
264. People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
265. See infra note 267 and accompanying text.
266. See infra note 267 and accompanying text.
267. See Collings, supra note 3, at 435 (stating that "[t]he federal decisions involving problems of the right
to investigate are in a state of complete confusion ... Thus, it may be that any stopping of a car or detaining
of a person by police constitutes an arrest").
268. In Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959), officers, while investigating a theft from interstate
shipment, observed the defendant carry some cartons from his residence and load them in an automobile. Id. at
99. Officers stopped the car, saw cartons without addresses on them, and heard one of the occupants say "Hold
it; it is the G's:' Id. The officers took the cartons and occupants to their office and detained them for two hours
until learning that the cartons contained stolen merchandise, whereupon they placed the occupants of the car
under arrest. Id. at 99-100. The government conceded that an arrest took place at the time the car was stopped,
and the Court agreed, stating, "That is our view on the facts of this particular case." Id. at 103. Since the officers
lacked probable cause to make the arrest at the time the car was stopped, the Court held that the cartons were
unlawfully seized and were inadmissible. Id. at 104; see Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 166 (1949);
Rios v. United States 364 U.S. 253,256 (1960). See generally Edward L. Barrett, Jr., Personal Rights, Property
Rights, and the Fourth Amendment, 1960 Sup. Cr. REv. 46, 58-65 (hereinafter Barrett, Personal Rights].
269. People v. Mickelson, 59 Cal. 2d 448, 452, 380 P.2d 658, 661, 30 Cal. Rptr. 18, 21 (1963).
270. Id. at 450, 380 P.2d at 659, 30 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
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One of Traynor's most significant achievements following Cahan was
the development of a well-defined right on the part of law enforcement
officers to make limited investigative stops and detentions on grounds
short of reasonable cause to arrest, including a limited right to frisk a
suspect based on facts demonstrating danger to the officers. In People v.
Simon,27' the California Court found lacking reasonable cause to arrest
and search two young suspects, one of whom was a minor carrying
alcohol, who were walking in a warehouse, district at 10:40 p.m. 272 How-
ever, in dictum Traynor stated, "There is, of course, nothing unreasonable
in an officer's questioning persons outdoors at night, and it is possible that
in some circumstances even a refusal to answer could, in the light of other
evidence, justify an arrest. 2 73 Traynor continued, as if anticipating the
Supreme Court's decision in Terry v. Ohio274 and its progeny: "Even if
it were conceded that in some circumstances an officer making such an
inquiry might be justified in running his hands over a person's clothing to
protect himself from an attack with a hidden weapon, certainly a search so
intensive as that made here would not be so justified."27 5
From the Simon dicta developed police authority to stop and detain for
reasonable investigation, as well as the right to pat down or frisk for
weapons. People v. Martin276 established that a chain of reasonable
police conduct may result in a lawful seizure of contraband discovered in
the course of such investigation.2" Police patrolling a "lover's lane" 278
saw, with the aid of their spotlight, two men sitting in the front seat of a
parked car.279 As they made a U-turn to investigate, the car sped away
at a high rate of speed.280 The officers pursued and stopped the car.28'
Using a flashlight the officers saw each man with his hands over the
middle of the front seat.282 Officers ordered the occupants to put their
271. 45 Cal. 2d 645, 290 P.2d 531 (1955).
272. Id. at 649, 290 P.2d at 534.
273. Id. at 650, 290 P.2d at 534 (citations omitted).
274. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
275. Simon, 45 Cal. 2d at 650, 290 P.2d at 534. Traynor soon after pointed out that "[i]t is not
unreasonable for officers to seek interviews with suspects or witnesses or to call upon them at their homes for
such purposes." People v. Michael, 45 Cal. 2d 751, 754, 290 P.2d 852, 854 (1955).
276. 46 Cal. 2d 106, 293 P.2d 52 (1956).
277. Id. at 108, 293 P.2d at 53.
278. Id at 107, 293 P.2d at 52.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id., 293 P.2d at 52-53.
282. Id., 293 P.2d at 53.
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hands in front of them and observed a small bag.2"3 The officers ordered
the suspects out of the car, searched them for weapons, and examined the
bag, discovering marijuana.2" Justice Traynor, writing for the court,
declared that "the presence of two men in a parked automobile on a
lover's lane at night was itself reasonable cause for police investi-
gation."285 The sudden flight of the two occupants gave reasonable
grounds for believing that they were guilty of some crime, and left no
doubt as to the reasonableness and necessity for further investigation.
286
After stopping the car, the officers were justified in ordering "hands front,"
and in the interest of their own safety, the officers were justified in
searching the men for weapons before questioning them.287 Upon dis-
covery of the bag, the officers had reasonable cause to believe that the bag
was the reason for suspects' flight and, thus, had reasonable cause to
remove it from the car.288
In a companion case, People v. Blodgett,289 police observed the
defendant and his companions entering a cab at 3:00 a.m. in front of an
Oakland hotel, and decided to investigate.2 ° The investigation resulted
in suspicion that the defendant was concealing contraband and justified a
later search.291 Justice Traynor, writing for the majority, stated that,
"There is nothing unreasonable in an officer's questioning persons
outdoors at night."
292
The California Courts of Appeal applied these stop, detention, and frisk
principles in many contexts,293 so that by the time the Supreme Court
decided Terry v. Ohio,294 California had a well-developed body of rules
283. Id.
284. Id. at 107-08, 293 P.2d at 53.




289. 46 Cal. 2d 114, 293 P.2d 57 (1956).
290. I. at 115-16, 293 P.2d at 58.
291. Id. at 116-17, 293 P.2d at 58.
292. Id. at 117, 293 P.2d at 58; see People v. Duncan, 51 Cal. 2d 523, 528, 334 P.2d 858, 861 (1959)
(upholding the authority of officers to question and then make an arrest on the basis of probable cause that
developed during the course of questioning); Martin, 46 Cal. 2d at 108, 293 P.2d at 53.
However, when questioning elicits an explanation wholly consistent with innocence, police cannot proceed
to arrest or search. People v. Gale, 46 Cal. 2d 253, 257, 294 P.2d 13, 16 (1956).
293. See, e.g., People v. Beverly, 200 Cal. App. 2d 119,1 9 Cal. Rptr. 67 (1962); People v. Anguiano, 198
Cal. App. 2d 426, 310 P.2d 162, 18 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1961); People v. Washington, 163 Cal. App. 2d 833, 330
P.2d 67 (1958); People v. Wiley, 162 Cal. App. 2d 836, 328 P.2d 823 (1958); People v. Dewson, 150 Cal. App.
2d 119, 310 P.2d 162 (1957); People v. West, 144 Cal. App. 2d 214, 300 P.2d 729 (1956).
294. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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governing stops, detentions, other police activities falling short of a full
arrest:
[C]ircumstances short of probable cause to make an arrest may still
justify an officer's stopping pedestrians or motorists on the streets
for questioning. If the circumstances warrant it, he may in self-
protection request a suspect to alight from an automobile or to
submit to a superficial search for concealed weapons. Should the
investigation then reveal probable cause to make an arrest, the
officer may arrest the suspect and conduct a reasonable incidental
search.295
After Mapp,296 Traynor was fearful that the United States Supreme
Court would apply to states the federal rules which looked upon any police
stop as equivalent to a full arrest requiring ordinary probable cause. He
sought to justify California's approach, arguing that it was less technical,
more practical, and in some respects more supportive of the right to
privacy.
It might be possible, for example, to lessen the risk of arrest
without probable cause by giving the police clear authorization to
stop persons for restrained questioning whenever there were
circumstances sufficient to warrant it, even though not tantamount
to probable cause for arrest. Such a minor interference with
personal liberty would touch the right to privacy only to serve it
well. If questioning failed to reveal probable cause, it would
thereby forestall invalid arrests of innocent persons on inadequate
cause and the attendant invasion of their personal liberty and
reputation. If it revealed probable cause, it would do no more than
open the way to a valid arrest. It would then not be possible for a
guilty defendant to magnify slight detention for questioning, based
on probable cause to question, into an arrest lacking the validity
that proceeds from a higher level of probability, probable cause to
arrest.
1276
295. People v. Mickelson, 59 Cal. 2d 448, 450-51, 380 P.2d 658, 660, 30 Cal. Rptr. 18, 20 (1963).
296. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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. . . We have upheld the authority of officers not only to
question but also to make a subsequent arrest on the basis of
probable cause that developed in the course of the questioning.
When questioning prompts flight or obvious attempts to conceal or
dispose of something, such action in sequence of the initial
suspicious circumstances constitutes probable cause for arrest. It
would seem highly unrealistic to hold such an arrest invalid on the
ground that arrest actually coincided with the initial police
questioning and that the then suspicious circumstances fell short of
probable cause for arrest. Such technicality would invite the
circumvention of building up suspicious circumstances to probable
cause for arrest, and the eventual consequence might be lower
standards of arrest. Surely there is a middle ground between the
excesses of questioning on mere suspicion and of invalidating an
arrest that followed upon questioning on suspicion reasonably
generated by the immediate circumstances.297
On the first occasion after Mapp to address this issue, Traynor maintained
the California rule, arguing that it was consistent with the Constitution and
to some extent actually supported privacy interests:
It wards off pressure to equate reasonable cause to investigate with
reasonable cause to arrest, thus protecting the innocent from the
risk of arrest when no more than reasonable investigation is
justified.298
However, detentions could not be justified on the basis of vague or
insubstantial suspicions. In People v. Reulman,299 for example, a police
officer observed the defendant driving a Cadillac in an alleyway near the
location where police had discovered a narcotics kit.3" The defendant
appeared nervous and wary of the officers.3"' He parked his car adjacent
297. Traynor, Mapp at Large supra note 3, at 333-34 (emphasis added, footnotes omitted); see Barrett,
Personal Rights, supra note 268, at 65-70. In many ways Traynor appears to have been greatly influenced by
the concepts and arguments of Professor Edward Barrett, who was then teaching at Traynor's alma mater, Boalt
Hall, and who, incidentally, was the author's faculty advisor while writing for the California Law Review.
298. Mickelson, 59 Cal. 2d at 452, 380 P.2d at 660-61, 30 Cal. Rptr. at 20-21 (citing Barrett, Personal
Rights, supra note 259, at 65-66, 69-70).
299. 62 Cal. 2d 92, 396 P.2d 706, 41 Cal. Rptr. 290 (1964).
300. d at 94, 396 P.2d at 707, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 291.
301. Id.
1277
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 25
to where the kit was found and walked aimlessly in the vicinity.0 2 The
court found detention of the defendant unjustified by these facts, and noted
that the officer's feeling that the defendant "did not belong in the Cadillac"
was "not impressive [and added] little to create any real suspicion." 3 3
Furthermore, Traynor refused to extend authority to detain for investigation
to allow officers to invade the privacy of a suspect's home.3t 4
The right to seek interviews with suspects at their homes does not
include the right to demand that a suspect open his door. A suspect
has no duty to cooperate with officers in securing evidence against
him, and in the absence of probable cause to make an arrest, he is
entitled to have a magistrate determine whether there is justification
for invading the privacy of his home.30 5
Again, Traynor took the "middle ground," accommodating individual right
to privacy and government need for limited investigatory methods, and
recognizing the benefits of a flexible analysis which would justify
intrusions short of arrest by suspicion short of traditional probable cause.
Fortunately, the United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio3 6 and
its progeny adopted the Traynor approach which justified limited intrusions
into privacy on the basis of circumstances short of full probable cause.307
We would be confronting a vastly different legal landscape in the
numerous contexts of limited police investigative techniques had the
Supreme Court either demanded full probable cause for stops or detentions
or held that until a suspect has been formally arrested, there has been no
search or seizure within the Fourth Amendment.
B. Focus on Promoting Reasonable Police Conduct and Rejection of
Complex and Technical Rules
The Cahan3 °8 court looked forward to developing "workable rules
governing searches and seizures" and sought to avoid "needless refine-
302. Id.
303. Id. at 96, 396 P.2d at 708-09, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 292-93.
304. People v. Shelton, 60 Cal. 2d 740, 746-47, 388 P.2d 665, 668-69, 36 Cal. Rptr. 433, 436-37 (1964).
305. Id. at 746, 388 P.2d at 668, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 436 (citations omitted).
306. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
307. Id. at 27.
308. People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
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ments and distinctions."3" In seeking "workable rules," Traynor focused
on encouraging reasonable, good faith law enforcement practices rather
than demanding that police comply with technical or complex rules and
make no mistakes in investigating and suppressing crime. The virtues of
Traynor's approach become apparent when contrasted with the United
States Supreme Court's decisions in such areas as "mere evidence,"
310
good faith failure to comply with knock and announce requirements,"'
and minor or technical violations of search and seizure standards. 2
1. Rejection of the Federal Mere Evidence Rule
At the time of Cahan, and for years thereafter, the federal mere
evidence rule prohibited searches for, as well as seizures of, objects having
evidentiary value only, whether under a warrant or incident to a valid
arrest 3  The rule appeared to be based on property concepts, and in
particular upon the theory that the sovereign may seize only objects that
are illegal to possess or as to which the sovereign may assert a claim on
the ground they were wrongfully obtained or used.314 Thus, the rule did
not apply to contraband or to stolen goods since the defendant was not the
rightful owner.315 However, the rule was not thought to apply to instru-
ments used to commit crime, to fruits of crime generally,316 or to records
that the defendant was required by law to keep.317 These exceptions cut
the rationale for the rule away from property interests without providing
an alternative rational basis for the rule. By 1965, the United States
Supreme Court, as Traynor put it, had distinguished the rule "to the point
309. lId at 450-51, 282 P.2d at 915.
310. See infra notes 313-337 and accompanying text.
311. See infra notes 338-356 and accompanying text.
312. See infra notes 357-467 and accompanying text.
313. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 234-35 (1960); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 310
(1921).
314. Gouled, 255 U.S. at 309.
315. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 154-55 (1947).
316. See Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 199 (1927) (upholding the seizure of the defendant's
business ledger and utility bills on the ground they were convenient, if not necessary, for the operation of
defendant's illegal liquor business, and therefore instrumentalities of the crime); see also Abel v. United States,
362 U.S. at 237-39 (upholding the seizures of a forged birth certificate, a vaccination certificate, and a bank
book, on the ground that they were documents used to establish a false identity and hence were a means to
commit espionage and failure to register as an alien).
317. Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582,593 (1946); Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624,626-27 (1946).
1279
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 25
of extinction.., by the use of technical exceptions and without discussion
of policy.
318
Shortly after Mapp v. Ohio, 319 Traynor spoke out against the mere
evidence rule, referring to arguments offered in its support as "explanations
in the dark."32 First, he was puzzled by the characterization of an object
as having evidentiary value only.
The real thick of the thing is the disputation as to what is
"evidentiary value only." . . . The apple and the arrow may be
admissible, and also the bow; but the quiver, is it no more than an
only?
Should any state court in its right mind risk losing it in the pursuit
of learning whatever the total message is of a federal rule of such
elaborate obfuscation?
32'
Moreover, Traynor could not abide the rule's lack of reason and purpose,
its restrictions on proper law enforcement practices, and its detrimental
effect on reliable fact-finding.
Suppose for example that there falls on the ears of police a cry of
"Don't shoot!" and then what sounds like a shot, then the fall of a
body. The police enter the suspected house and find a corpse with
a bullet wound. They search for and find the gun. The
circumstances make it reasonable for them to continue their search,
regardless of whether it is incident to the arrest of the eventual
defendant or whether he has already made his escape. Surely there
would be no constitutional condition that they could seize only the
gun that was the instrument of the crime and that they must keep
their distance from other evidence that would be "of evidentiary
value only" on matters of such high relevance as motive,
premeditation, provocation, self-defense, or the identity of the
killer.
322
318. People v. Thayer, 63 Cal. 2d 635, 642, 408 P.2d 108, 112, 47 Cal. Rptr. 780, 784 (1965).
319. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
320. Traynor, Mapp at Large, supra note 3, at 330.
321. Id. at 330-31.
322. Id. at 331. Others have been equally critical of the rule. See generally Comment, Limitations on
Seizure of "Evidentiary" Objects - A Rule in Search of a Reason, 20 U. CHI. L. REV. 319 (1953); Yale Kamisar,
The Wire Tapping-Eavesdropping Problem: A Professor's View, 44 MINN. L. REV. 891, 914 (1960).
1280
1994 / Contrasting Approaches to Search and Seizure
In 1965, Traynor faced the question of the rule's status, and, in
particular, the validity of a California statute which rejected the rule3"
in the face of the Supreme Court's pronouncement that the standard of
reasonableness is the same under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. 24 Noting the rule's basis in ancient property concepts,325
Traynor found it anachronistic to determine admissibility of evidence on
the basis of the sovereign's right of replevin at common law, and believed
that emphasis on property rights leads to "technical rules that are entirely
unrelated to the real issues of individual privacy and law enforce-
ment." 326 Traynor pointed out that the rule protected not private papers,
but anything of only evidentiary value.327 Traynor found it "impossible
to understand why the admissibility of seized items should depend on
whether they are merely evidentiary or evidentiary plus something
else., 328 In conclusion, Traynor found the mere evidence restriction on
police seizures "a dubious technical rule" 329 which "creates a totally
arbitrary impediment to law enforcement without protecting any important
interest of the defendant." 33 Accordingly, he regarded the mere evidence
restriction as a federal procedural rule rather than a constitutional standard
to be applied to the states. 3
Less than two years later, the United States Supreme Court announced
that the mere evidence rule was in fact a "Fourth Amendment ruling," but
agreed with Traynor that the rule was an irrational anachronism and should
be discarded.332  Citing People v. Thayer133  as the leading case
exemplifying judicial opposition to the rule,334 the Court labelled it
"wholly irrational, 335 attributed its perpetuation "more to chance than
323. California Penal Code § 1524 as amended in 1957 permitted the issuance of a warrant "[w]hen the
property or things to be seized consist of any item or constitutes any evidence which tends to show a felony has
been committed, or tends to show that a particular person has committed a felony." CAL PENAL CODE § 1524
(West 1982).
324. People v. Thayer, 63 Cal. 2d 635, 639, 408 P.2d 108, 110,47 Cal. Rptr. 780, 782 (1965).
325. The sovereign may seize only objects illegal to possess or which have been wrongfully obtained or
used. l at 637, 408 P.2d at 109, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 781.
326. l at 638, 408 P.2d at 109, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 781.
327. Id at 637, 408 P.2d at 109, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 781.
328. Id He noted that the rule allowed seizure of private papers-even personal books and diaries-which
were instruments of crime. Id at 638, 642-43, 408 P.2d at 110, 112, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 782, 784.
329. Id. at 642, 408 P.2d at 112, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 784.
330. L at 637, 408 P.2d at 109, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 781.
331. d at 642, 408 P.2d at 112, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 781.
332. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 300-03 (1967).
333. 63 Cal.2d 635, 408 P.2d 108, 47 Cal. Rptr. 780 (1965).
334. Warden. 387 U.S. at 300 n.6.
335. Id at 302.
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to considered judgment, '3 36 and found "no viable reason to distinguish
intrusions to secure 'mere evidence' from intrusions to secure fruits,
instrumentalities, or contraband., 337 Again, the Supreme Court advanced
its search and seizure standards by looking to the Traynor approach.
2. Reasonable Good Faith Failure to Comply with Statutory
Knock and Announce Requirements
California, like most states and the federal government, prescribes the
means'by which officers can enter homes to make arrests or execute search
warrants. For example, Penal Code section 844 allows an officer making
an arrest to break open the door or window of the house in which the
person to be arrested is located "after having demanded admittance and
explained the purpose for which admittance is desired." '338 After
Cahan,339 it was unclear whether an officer must comply with section
844 by demanding admittance and explaining the purpose when the result
might be the escape of the suspect or destruction of evidence."4 Federal
law on the issue was also unclear.
3 41
In People v. Maddox, 2 Traynor once again looked to the "primary
purpose" of the exclusionary rule, 3 and found that the requirements of
section 844 should be waived where the officer has reasonable cause to
believe that a felony is being committed and reasonably believes that
compliance with the section may increase the officer's peril or enable the
suspect either to escape or to destroy evidence.344
Suspects have no constitutional right to destroy or dispose of
evidence, and no basic constitutional guarantees are violated
because an officer succeeds in getting to a place where he is
336. Id. at 308.
337. Id at 310.
338. CAL. PENAL CODE § 844 (West Supp. 1994).
339. People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
340. Barrett, Exclusion of Evidence, supra note 16, at 573.
341. See Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313-14 (1958); Collings, Toward Workable Rules, supra
note 3, at 450.
342. 46 Cal. 2d 301, 294 P.2d 6 (1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 858 (1956).
343. Id at 306, 294 P.2d at 9. "The answer to this question must be sought in the basic reasons for the
exclusionary rule." Id. at 305, 294 P.2d at 8.
344. Id. at 306, 294 P.2d at 9.
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entitled to be more quickly than he would, had he complied with
section 844.34
Traynor concluded that evidence should not be excluded for failure to
comply with the formal requirements of section 844 when the facts known
to the officer "are not inconsistent with a good faith belief . . that
compliance ... is excused." 346
Furthermore, Traynor led the court in developing the doctrine of sub-
stantial compliance in the context of knock and announce requirements.
Shortly after Cahan, Traynor focused on whether the officers "substantially
complied" with section 844, 7 and in Maddox, Traynor refused to de-
mand strict, technical compliance with the statute, reasoning that "since the
officer's right to invade the defendant's privacy clearly appears, there is
no compelling need for strict compliance with the requirements of section
844 to protect basic constitutional guarantees." 8 However, officers must
state their purpose as well as their identity. Merely identifying themselves
as officers would not constitute substantial compliance unless the circum-
stances made their purpose clear to the occupants or demand for admit-
tance would be futile. 349 Furthermore, the requirements were held to
apply to entries through unlocked and even open doors as well as to efforts
to apprehend parole violators and other fugitives from justice.50 Finally,
345. Id.
346. Id. at 306-07, 294 P.2d at 9. Furthermore, the court found that § 844 was a codification of the
common law and should be interpreted as subject to common law exceptions which included cases where
compliance with formalities of the section would increase the officers peril or frustrate the arrest. Id. at 306,294
P.2d at 9.
In People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 P.2d 855 (1955), the court supplied an alternative basis for
this result. It found that failure to comply with the knock and announce requirements is unrelated and collateral
to the product of the search, thus rendering the exclusionary rule inapplicable. Id. at 763,290 P.2d at 859. Where
the officer already has cause to make the arrest and therefore to conduct a search incident thereto, the product
of the search in no way depends on compliance with the statutory formalities. Id. at 763, 290 P.2d at 858-59.
Nevertheless, the Martin court concluded that the officers had "substantially complied" with § 844. Id. at 762-63,
290 P.2d at 858. In Maddox, the court noted but moved away from the collateral violation rationale, preferring
to ask whether the officers acted reasonably in light of facts excusing compliance with the section. Maddox, 46
Cal. 2d at 305-07, 294 P.2d at 8-10.
347. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d at 762-63, 290 P.2d at 858-59 (1955).
348. Maddox, 46 Cal. 2d at 306, 294 P.2d at 9; see also People v. Marshall, 69 Cal. 2d 51, 55-56, 442
P.2d 665, 667, 69 Cal. Rptr. 585, 587 (1968) (holding that by persistently knocking, demanding entry, and
identifying themselves for several minutes... the officers "substantially complied with the notice requirements
of the statute").
349. People v. Rosales, 68 Cal. 2d 299, 302, 437 P.2d 489, 491, 66 Cal. Rptr. 1, 3 (1968).
350. See People v. Bradley, I Cal. 3d 80, 87-88, 460 P.2d 129, 133-34, 81 Cal. Rptr. 457, 461-62 (1969)
(discussing entry through an open door); Rosales, 68 Cal. 2d at 303, 437 P.2d at 492, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 4
(discussing entry through an unlocked door).
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failure to comply cannot be justified by a general assumption that certain
classes of persons, such as narcotics violators, are more likely to resist
arrest, attempt to escape or to destroy evidence. 351' Traynor regarded
unannounced forcible entry as "a serious disturbance of [the security of
people in their homes that] cannot be justified on a blanket basis."
352
These principles soon were applied in a number of cases.353
In 1963, the United States Supreme Court relied on Maddox in
upholding a California law with respect to warrantless entries to arrest. In
Ker v. California,354 the Court quoted with approval Traynor's language
in Maddox which stated that "[s]uspects have no constitutional right to
destroy or dispose of evidence [and that] since the demand and explanation
requirements . . .are a codification of the common law, they may rea-
sonably be interpreted as limited by the common law rules that compliance
is not required if the officer's peril would have been increased or the arrest
frustrated had he demanded entrance and stated his purpose."
355
Following Traynor once more, the High Court concluded that "the officer's
method of entry, sanctioned by the law of California, was not unreasonable
under the standards of the Fourth Amendment."
356
351. Rosales, 68 Cal. 2d at 304-05,437 P.2d at 493, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 5; People v. Gastelo, 67 Cal. 2d 586,
588, 432 P.2d 706, 708, 63 Cal. Rptr. 10, 12 (1967).
352. Gastelo, 67 Cal. 2d at 589, 432 P.2d at 708, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 12.
353. For example, in People v. Hammond, 54 Cal. 2d 846, 357 P.2d 289, 9 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1960), an
informer had just purchased heroin from the defendant in his home and reported to the police that the defendant
was in the process of preparing heroin for sale, was under the influence of heroin, and had a gun. Id. at 849,
357 P.2d at 291, 9 Cal. Rptr. at 235. Officers then broke into the home, arrested the defendant and seized heroin,
Id. The entry and search was upheld on the ground that the officers had reasonable cause to believe the
defendant was in the process of committing a felony, was armed, and was under the influence of a narcotic. Id.
853, 357 P.2d at 293-94, 9 Cal. Rptr. at 237-38. Thus, they could have concluded in good faith that compliance
with the knock and announce requirements of § 844 might allow defendant to attempt to dispose of heroin or
use the gun. Id. at 854, 357 P.2d at 294, 9 Cal. Rptr. at 238; see People v. Carrilto, 64 Cal. 2d 387, 391, 412
P.2d 377, 379, 50 Cal. Rptr. 185, 187 (1966).
354. 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
355. fad at 39-40.
356. Id. at 41.
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3. Giving Substance to the Reasonable or Probable Cause
Standard While Avoiding Technical Requirements
Prior to Cahan,357 California courts had defined reasonable cause in
a manner similar to the federal probable cause standard. Shortly after
Cahan, the court gave substance to the reasonable or probable cause
requirement in a number of cases, each of which relied principally on the
reasonableness clause of the Fourth Amendment and kept the purpose of
the exclusionary rule clearly in focus. Arguments founded on legal
technicalities were viewed with suspicion and were usually dismissed
outright. In People v. Brown,359 Justice Traynor, writing for the court,
rejected the argument that whenever an arrest is technically valid under
California law, it can be used to support a search incident even in the
absence of reasonable cause for arrest.3 ' Two officers parked on a street
comer observed defendant walk in front of their vehicle carrying a coin
purse in her right hand and clenching her left hand in a fist.361 They
went up to her, grabbed her hands, and when she refused to reveal what
she had in her left hand, took a small object from her left hand which
contained heroin.362 Traynor pointed out that the officers had no
reasonable cause to arrest defendant, but the prosecution argued that the
language of California Penal Code section 836(2) governing warrantless
arrests, provided that an arrest, even if made without reasonable cause, was
legal if defendant was later found to have committed a felony.363 Traynor
concluded, however, that searches must be found "reasonable" without
regard to the technical legality of the arrest.364 Focusing primarily on the
reasonableness clause and on the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary
rule, Traynor stated that:
357. People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
358. See People v. Nagle, 25 Cal. 2d 216, 222, 153 P.2d 344, 347 (1944) (stating that reasonable cause
may exist although there is some room for doubt); People v. Kilvington, 104 Cal. 86, 92, 37 P. 799, 801 (1894)
(holding that reasonable cause amounts to a state of mind that would lead a man of ordinary care and prudence
to believe and conscientiously entertain an honest and strong suspicion that the arrested person is guilty of a
crime); see also Collings, supra note 3. at 440 (observing that "the federal test of 'probable cause,' a term which
is synonymous with reasonable cause, appears to be the same as the California test").
359. 45 Cal. 2d 640, 290 P.2d 528 (1955).
360. Id. at 642-43, 290 P.2d at 529-30.
361. Id. at 641, 290 P.2d at 529.
362. Id.
363. Id. at 642, 290 P.2d at 529; see CAL. PENAL CODE § 836(2) (West Supp. 1994).
364. Brown, 45 Cal. 2d at 643, 290 P.2d at 530.
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[A] search, whether incident to an arrest or not, cannot be justified
by what it turns up.... [W]hether or not the arrest of a guilty
defendant is lawful, it is clearly unreasonable if the officer has no
'reasonable cause' to believe the defendant guilty, and a search
incident thereto can be no more reasonable than the arrest
itself.
3 65
This approach, which was consistent with the federal view, reflected the
court's rejection of legal technicalities and its focus on the objective of
encouraging reasonable police conduct.
366
Officers and magistrates who must decide whether searches are
justified are not limited by ordinary technical rules of evidence. In People
v. Boyles,367 the court followed the federal rule368 and affirmed both
the propriety of basing reasonable cause on information from third parties
such as informers and the principle that evidence supporting reasonable
cause is not limited to evidence that would be admissible at the guilt
trial.369 Likewise, it is immaterial that the supporting evidence lacked
independent proof of the corpus delicti and, thus, could not support a
370conviction.
Traynor also gave substance to the reasonable cause requirement in
other contexts. Following the federal approach, Traynor rejected an
invitation to allow arrests and searches based on the subjective, but
unarticulated, feelings of police:
[T]o permit an officer to justify a search on the ground that he
"didn't feel" that a person on the street at night had any lawful
business there would expose anyone to having his person searched
by any suspicious officer no matter how unfounded the suspicions
365. Id. at 643-44, 290 P.2d at 530.
366. See Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 150-51 (1947) (stating that search and seizure incident to
a valid arrest is an ancient and integral part of law enforcement); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 60
(1950) (holding that, in order for a warrantless search incident to an arrest to be valid, the arrest must also be
valid).
367. 45 Cal. 2d 652, 290 P.2d 535 (1955).
368. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 171-76 (1949).
369. Boyles, 45 Cal. 2d at 656, 290 P.2d at 537-38. However, consistent with federal law, the court found
that ordinarily reasonable cause may not be based solely on information from an anonymous informant. See
Willson v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. 2d 291, 294, 294 P.2d 36, 38 (1956) (stating that, "Although information
provided by an anonymous informer is relevant on the issue of reasonable cause, in the absence of some pressing
emergency ... an arrest may not be based solely on such information" (emphasis added)); see also Brinegar,
338 U.S. at 171-76 (providing the federal rule of evidence pertaining to searches).
370. People v. Rios, 46 Cal. 2d 297, 299, 294 P.2d 39, 41 (1956).
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were. Innocent people, going to or from evening jobs or
entertainment, or walking for exercise or enjoyment, would suffer
along with the occasional criminal who would be turned up.371
The police should not be the ultimate judges of the propriety of Fourth
Amendment intrusions. In Boyles, the court demanded that the officer
"testify to the facts or information known to him on which his belief is
based" since "the court and not the officer must make the determination
whether the officer's belief is based upon reasonable cause. "372
In Priestly v. Superior Court,3 73 Traynor strengthened the exclu-
sionary rule in the context of searches based on information from
informers. When the prosecution seeks to show reasonable cause for a
search by testimony as to communications from an informer, the identity
of the informer must be disclosed on the defendant's request, in order to
give the defendant a fair opportunity to present impeaching evidence con-
cerning "the truth of the officer's testimony and the reasonableness of his
reliance on the informer.,
374
If an officer were allowed to establish unimpeachably the
lawfulness of a search merely by testifying that he received
justifying information from a reliable person whose identity cannot
be revealed, he would become the sole judge of what is probable
cause to make the search. Such a holding would destroy the
exclusionary rule.375
Traynor regarded the standard as consistent with the federal rule 376 and
found it "sound and workable. ' 377 It would not impede law enforcement,
but would "compel independent investigations" to verify information from
informers or to uncover other evidence.3 78 However, the United States
371. People v. Simon, 45 Cal. 2d 645, 650-51, 290 P.2d 531, 534-35 (1955).
372. Boyles, 45 Cal. 2d. at 656,290 P.2d at 537; see People v. Haven, 59 Cal. 2d 713,717,381 P.2d 927,
929, 31 Cal. Rptr. 47, 49 (1963) (holding that the officers' testimony was "barren of the details" as to the
information earlier received such that the trial court was unable to determine whether the officers acted
reasonably).
373. 50 Cal. 2d 812, 330 P.2d 39 (1958).
374. Id. at 818, 330 P.2d at 43; Coy v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 2d 471, 473, 334 P.2d 569,570-71 (1959).
375. Priestly, 50 Cal. 2d at 818, 330 P.2d at 43.
376. Id. at 817,330 P.2d at 42; see id. at 816,330 P.2d at 41-42 (citing Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S.
53, 61 (1957) to describe the federal rule with regard to searches based on informers' information).
377. Id at 817, 330 P.2d at 42.
378. Id. at 818, 330 P.2d at 43.
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Supreme Court changed course in 1967, holding that disclosure of an
informant's identity is not invariably required on the question of probable
cause to arrest or search "if the trial judge is convinced, by evidence
submitted in open court and subject to cross-examination, that the officers
did rely in good faith upon credible information supplied by a reliable
informant."3 79 The Court emphasized that the officers had described
"with specificity" what the informer said and the "underlying circum-
stances" from which they concluded that the informant was credible or that
the informant's information was reliable.38 California soon followed the
new federal rule,38' but demanded a showing of "underlying circum-
stances or ... factual proof in court as to reliability and credibility.
382
In grappling with the totality of circumstances approach to a reasonable
cause, Traynor was reluctant to allow arrests or searches based on
suspicious conduct when there may be other legitimate explanations for a
defendant's acts, and a suspect's prior criminal record or reputation for
criminal activities was not allowed to substitute for specific, factual
reasons for individual intrusions. In People v. Sanders,383 Traynor,
writing for the majority, concluded that the defendant's reputation as a
bookmaker could not be used to bootstrap observations of the defendant's
conduct into probable cause when that conduct was consistent with
innocent as well as criminal activities.3 4 Police entered the defendant's
record store in search of a man they had arrested there for bookmaking the
day before. 385 Finding no one, they looked through a hole in a door into
a private room observing the defendant" standing behind a desk with a
pencil and pads of paper with writing on them.386 They entered, arrested
the defendant, and searched the premises. 387 Though the pads of paper
were described as the kind used by bookmakers and another person had
been arrested for bookmaking at the shop the day before, the papers were
ordinary pads used by lawful businesses and the previously arrested person
was not shown to have used the shop for bookmaking.388 Accordingly,
379. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 305 (1967).
380. Id. at 304.
381. Martin v. Superior Court, 66 Cal. 2d 257, 259, 424 P.2d 935, 936-37 (1967); CAL. EVID. CODE
§ 1042(c) (West Supp. 1994).
382. People v. Johnson, 68 Cal. 2d 629, 634, 440 P.2d 921, 924, 68 Cal. Rptr. 441, 444 (1968).
383. 46 Cal. 2d 247, 294 P.2d 10 (1956).
384. Id. at 249-51, 294 P.2d at 11-12.
385. Id. at 248, 294 P.2d at 11.
386. Id. at 248-49, 294 P.2d at 1.
387. Id. at 249, 294 P.2d at 11.
388. Id. at 249-50, 294 P.2d at 11-12.
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the defendant's conduct observed by the officers was "perfectly consistent
with the lawful conduct of his record business," '389 and the fact that he
had a record or reputation for bookmaking could not elevate otherwise
innocent conduct into probable cause for warrantless entry into a private
business office.39°
Likewise, in People v. Privett,391 furtive conduct, even in conjunction
with a defendant's criminal record, was not allowed to substitute for
specific, factual evidence of criminal conduct.392 The defendant and
another, both with burglary records, were seen going in and out of the
defendant's home over a three day period. 93 Seven or eight officers in
"rough clothing" came across the front lawn, saw the defendant looking at
them, and knocked on the door.39 When the lights went out and there
was no response, the officers kicked in the front door.395 Finding no
probable cause for the entry, the court observed that while evasive conduct
may under proper circumstances justify an arrest or search, the conduct
here was perfectly consistent with innocent activity.396
[T]he observed approach to a private home in the nighttime of a
party of seven or eight roughly dressed men and their knocking on
the door might reasonably lead the most innocent of persons to
extinguish the lights hoping that they would depart, and their
subsequent announcement that they were police officers might
reasonably arouse a degree of skepticism that would lead the
occupants to make no immediate response or indeed any response
at all, except possibly to telephone for the aid of those whom they
knew with certainty to be police.397
Shortly after Mapp,398 Traynor faced the issue of probable cause to
arrest one who was told by a suspect to destroy evidence and who there-
389. d at 250, 294 P.2d at 12.
390. Itd at 250-51, 294 P.2d at 12.
391. 55 Cal. 2d 698, 361 P.2d 602, 12 Cal. Rptr. 874 (1961).
392. Id. at 702, 361 P.2d at 604-05, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 876-77; see Collings, supra note 3, at 439.
393. Id. at 701, 361 P.2d at 604, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 876.
394. Id.
395. Id.
396. Id. at 703-04, 361 P.2d at 605-06, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 877-78.
397. Id. at 702, 361 P.2d at 604-05, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 876-77; see People v. Shelton, 60 Cal. 2d 740, 744,
388 P.2d 665, 667, 36 Cal. Rptr. 433, 435 (1964) (holding that association between a suspect and a known
criminal does not provide reasonable cause for arrest and search).
398. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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after refused to produce the evidence for the police.3 Finding no pro-
bable cause to arrest for attempting to destroy or conceal evidence of
crime,' Traynor concluded that refusal to produce evidence on request
does not give reasonable cause to arrest for attempt to conceal. 401
To hold otherwise would make it a crime for a person merely to
assert the right to have a magistrate determine whether police
officers are entitled to seize evidence from his home. . . . Were
there a right to arrest persons for insisting on search warrants and
to conduct warrantless searches and seizures as incidental to such
arrests, search warrants would become pointless niceties except
when no one could be found at home.402
4. Defining Reasonableness in the Context of Slight or Minor
Privacy Intrusions
In looking forward to developing "workable rules governing searches
and seizures," the Cahan"3 court emphasized the need to focus on the
reasonableness of the police conduct and to avoid "needless refinements
and distinctions."4" Cases following Cahan took a practical, common
sense approach, and tended to allow natural police responses to suspicious
circumstances, particularly when they involved only slight or minor intru-
sions into privacy.
People v. Robertsa0 5 clearly illustrates this approach. Police officers
saw a man standing in front of a store display window at 10:00 p.m.
n4 6
The man got into his car, and as he drove away, officers noted the license
number.407 The next night the store was burglarized and five table model
radios were among the items taken.4°s Police found the car was
registered to a woman residing in an apartment house.409 They inter-
viewed the apartment manager who told them the woman lived in a
399. People v. Edgar, 60 Cal. 2d 171, 173, 383 P.2d 449, 450, 32 Cal. Rptr. 41, 42 (1963).
400. Id. at 174, 383 P.2d at 450-51, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 42-43.
401. Id.
402. Id. at 174, 383 P.2d at 451, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 43.
403. People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
404. Id. at 450-51, 282 P.2d at 915.
405. 47 Cal. 2d 374, 303 P.2d 721 (1956).
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specified apartment with a sickly man who did not work often.41
Officers knocked on the door but there was no answer.41' Hearing moans
or groans which sounded like a person in distress, the officers asked the
manager to admit them.412 Inside, they looked for the person who made
the sounds but could find no one.413 However, they noticed a table model
radio that "stood right out as being a new radio. 414 They picked it up,
turned it over, and noted the serial number.415 The radio was later found
to be one of those taken in the earlier burglary.416 On the basis of these
facts, police procured a search warrant for the apartment and seized the
radio.41 7 Writing for a unanimous court, Chief Justice Gibson reasoned
that the officers had a right to enter if they reasonably believed someone
was in distress, and once inside, they could search as necessary to look for
someone in distress. 4" At this point, the new radio was in plain
sight.419 The court concluded that:
Under the circumstances, there appears to be no reason in law or
common sense why one of the officers could not pick up the radio
and examine it for the purpose of dispelling or confirming his
suspicions. The fact that abuses sometimes occur during the course
of criminal investigations should not give a sinister coloration to
procedures which are basically reasonable.420
Traynor's rejection of the mere evidence rule led to an expansion of
the Roberts principle, allowing reasonable examination of suspicious
objects that are in plain sight, in addition to stolen property or contraband.
In People v. Gilbert,421 witnesses to a robbery at the Alhambra Bank saw
stolen currency and coins being placed in a brown Alpha Beta Market









418. Id. at 380, 303 P.2d at 724.
419. Id.
420. Id.
421. 63 Cal. 2d 690, 408 P.2d 365, 47 Cal. Rptr. 909 (1965).
422. Id. at 697, 408 P.2d at 369, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 913.
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entered an apartment in fresh pursuit of a suspect.421 In the course of
their search for the suspect, they saw, on a coffee table, a note book con-
taining a drawing of the area of the Alhambra Bank.424 Police also saw
an Alpha Beta shopping bag in which they found rolls of coins bearing the
name Alhambra Bank.425 On a dresser, the officers observed a photo-
graphy studio envelope in which they discovered a photograph of the
defendant.
426
Citing Roberts, Traynor wrote for a unanimous court upholding the sei-
zures and admitting the evidence.427 The court concluded the officers had
acted reasonably.4 8 They did not enter to conduct an exploratory search
to find evidence, but rather, in fresh pursuit to search for a suspect and to
make an arrest.
429
The search ... was also properly limited to, and incident to, the
purpose of the officers' entry. While the officers were looking
through the apartment for their suspect they could properly
examine suspicious objects in plain sight.430
The California Supreme Court later relied on Traynor's rejection of the
mere evidence rule,43' together with his analysis in Gilbert,432 for the
general principle that when officers are lawfully searching for suspects,
they can properly examine suspicious objects in plain sight, without
confining such seizures to stolen property or contraband.433
Recent United States Supreme Court cases contrast sharply with
California's liberal, non-technical approach toward the examination of
suspicious containers. In Arizona v. Hicks,434 police responded to a report
that a bullet was fired through the defendant's apartment floor, injuring a
423. Id. at 705-06, 408 P.2d at 374, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 918.
424. Id. at 706, 408 P.2d at 374, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 918.
425. Id.
426. Id.
427. Id. at 707, 408 P.2d at 375, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 919.
428. Id.
429. Id.
430. Id. (citing People v. Roberts, 47 Cal. 2d 374, 378-80, 303 P.2d 721, 723-24 (1956)). The court also
stated that the police could "look through the apartment for anything that could be used to identify the suspects
or to expedite the pursuit." Id.
431. See supra notes 323-331 and accompanying text.
432. See supra notes 421-430 and accompanying text.
433. Guidi v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 1, 12-13, 513 P.2d 908, 915-16, 109 Cal. Rptr. 684, 691-92
(1973).
434. 480 U.S. 321 (1987).
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person in the lower apartment.435 The police entered the defendant's
apartment searching for the one responsible, for other victims, and for
weapons.436 They found and seized weapons, including a sawed-off rifle,
and a stocking-cap mask.437 An officer noticed two sets of expensive
stereo components which "seemed out of place" in the squalid and ill-
appointed apartment.438 Suspecting they were stolen, the officer read and
recorded their serial numbers, moving some components, including a B&O
turntable, in order to do so. 3 An officer phoned the station with the
serial numbers and was advised that the turntable had been stolen in an
armed robbery. 440 Officers seized the turntable and later determined that
the serial numbers on the other equipment also matched those taken in
same robbery.44' The officers obtained a search warrant, and the equip-
ment was seized and offered in evidence at the defendant's trial for
robbery." 2
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, characterized the issue as
"whether probable cause is required in order to invoke the plain-view
doctrine." 443 Answering in the affirmative, he concluded that the evi-
dence should be suppressed.444 Although the mere recording of the serial
numbers did not constitute a seizure since it did not "meaningfully inter-
fere" with defendant's possessory interest in either the numbers or the
equipment, moving the stereo equipment constituted a "search" unrelated
to the objectives of the authorized intrusion.445 Scalia reasoned that
moving the equipment was a new invasion of defendant's privacy,
exposing to view portions of the apartment or its contents, and was unjusti-
fied by the exigent circumstances that validated the entry.4'




439. Id. In his dissent, Justice Powell explained that the officer was able to read serial numbers of some
components without moving them since there was a foot between the components and wall, but to read the serial
number on the B&O turntable, the officer had to "turn it around, or turn it upside down." Id. at 332 (Powell,
J., dissenting).
440. Id. at 323.
441. Id.
442. Id. at 324.
443. Id. at 326.
444. Id. at 326-27.
445. Id. at 324-25.
446. Id. at 325.
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[Mioving [an object] even a few inches is much more than trivial
for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. It matters not that the
search uncovered nothing of any great personal value to
[defendant] . . . . A search is a search, even if it happens to
disclose nothing but the bottom of a turntable.
447
Furthermore, Scalia concluded that the search could not be justified on the
basis of reasonable suspicion to believe the object was contraband or evi-
dence of crime.44s Suspicion could be unrelated to the object of the
initial entry, but full probable cause was required to either seize or search
the equipment.449
In Justice O'Connor's view, which she believed to be consistent with
the approach taken by the "overwhelming majority" of state and federal
couits, police must have probable cause for seizing or searching an object
in plain view, but need only reasonable suspicion for conducting a
"cursory inspection" of an item in plain view. 450 Such limited inspection,
which could not involve "exploratory rummaging," would be restricted to
items the police reasonably suspect as evidence of crime.451 However,
Scalia and the majority rejected O'Connor's argument that a cursory
inspection, as opposed to a full-blown search, should require only rea-
sonable suspicion.45 2 Scalia asserted that "a truly cursory inspection" is
not a search at all. 453 Noting cases that allowed warrantless seizures of
suspicious objects, Justice Scalia recognized that police may make warrant-
less seizures in public places of objects such as weapons and contraband
in plain view, and argued that this same principle may apply to home sei-
zures where police are lawfully present during an unrelated search.454
However, in Scalia's view, "[d]ispensing with the need for a warrant is
worlds apart from permitting a lesser standard of cause for the seizure than
a warrant would require."455 With respect to cases allowing seizures for
investigative purposes on reasonable suspicion only, Scalia recognized that
seizures on less that probable cause can be justified "where... the seizure
447. Id. (emphasis added).
448. Id. at 326-27.
449. Id. at 326.
450. Id. at 336 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 67(b),
at 717 (2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE]).
451. Id. at 334 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
452. Id. at 328-29. 0
453. Id. at 328.
454. Id. at 326-27.
455. Id. at 327.
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is minimally intrusive and operational necessities render it the only practi-
cable means of detecting certain types of crime. 456 Scalia found no
"special operational necessities" in the present case.457
Pointing to the practical necessities of the situation, Justice Powell
asked, what should the officers have done assuming their suspicion that the
equipment was stolen was both reasonable and based on specific arti-
culable facts? 58 Scalia gave a straightforward, but simplistic, answer: If
the police have probable cause, they can seize or search the object.459 If
not,
[i]t may well be that.., no effective means short of a search exist.
But there is nothing new in the realization that the Constitution
sometimes insulates the criminality of a few in order to protect the
privacy of us all.40
Scalia's absolutist approach avoids careful analysis of the nature the
privacy interest protected and the weight of countervailing government
interests. Is the privacy interest protected here at all significant when
weighed against the need to investigate? Justice Powell certainly was on
point when he noted that distinguishing between looking at a serial number
on an object and moving or picking up the object to see the serial number
amounts to "trivializing the Fourth Amendment" and creates uncertainties
which will hinder law enforcement without enhancing privacy.46'
Furthermore, is this not a case where the "search" is less intrusive that
a seizure would be? Seizing and detaining personal articles until a search
warrant is obtained often can involve a greater intrusion into liberty and
security interests than an immediate search of the article.462 Assuming
456. See id. (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981), which upheld an investigative detention
of an automobile on the basis of reasonable suspicion, and United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709 & n.9
(1983) which held that Terry principles allow warrantless seizure and detention of a suspected drug dealer's
luggage on basis of reasonable suspicion to permit exposure to a trained dog, but the ninety-minute detention
there was unlawful).
457. Id. at 327.
458. Id. at 329.
459. Id.
460. Id.
461. Id. at 333 (Powell, J., dissenting).
462. For example, see United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983), where agents stopped Place at an
airport concourse with reasonable suspicion that his suitcases contained narcotics. Id. at 698-99. When he refused
consent to search, the agents seized his luggage in order to take it to a judge and obtain a warrant. Id. They
allowed Place to go on his way. Id. The bags were taken to another airport where, 90 minutes after the seizure,
a trained narcotics dog reacted positively to the luggage. Id. Since it was late Friday afternoon, the agents held
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police had reasonable suspicion, but not probable cause, that the turntable
had been stolen in a recent robbery, and thus could "seize" but not
"search" it, might they post a guard in the home to stand over the turntable
but order it not moved until the robbery victim could arrive and identify
it? If so, have the privacy interests of the suspect been protected to any
greater degree? Arguably, they have been significantly diminished. On the
other hand, if police could not conduct even this minor seizure on rea-
sonable suspicion, is not the line drawn an unreasonable ofie: An all-or-
nothing distinction between viewing and writing down the serial number
on an object which requires no probable cause at all, and moving an object
a few inches to see the serial number which requires full probable cause?
The Court's restrictions on such minor intrusions become all the more
difficult to understand when contrasted with police authority in other
investigatory contexts. Based on reasonable suspicion, police can seize for
investigation, persons and property in public places4 63 and conduct
limited searches of persons and automobiles for weapons.4" When
making an arrest in a home, police may search any area in the home which
they reasonably suspect may harbor an individual who may pose a danger
to them.465 Furthermore, without any reasonable suspicion, officers
executing a search warrant may seize and detain persons who happen to
be on the premises. Given the numerous situations in which police
may, on the basis of no more than reasonable suspicion, seize and detain
individuals and their property and conduct limited searches of homes, it is
difficult to understand why the Fourth Amendment prevents police from
moving a piece of stereo equipment a few inches to observe its serial
number when they have reason to suspect that it had been stolen.
In this area as well, the High Court might find Traynor's approach
instructive.' Clearly focusing on the goal of promoting reasonable
police conduct, the United States Supreme Court should reject complex
and technical rules and should be reluctant to hold as unreasonable police
the bags until Monday morning when a warrant was obtained and cocaine found in the luggage. Id. The court
upheld the initial detention but found its length - 90 minutes - unreasonable, stating that police could have
arranged to meet Place with a trained dog at the first airport. Id. at 706, 709.
Assuming that police had used a trained dog at the time of the initial detention and thus gained probable
cause to search the luggage at that time, the length of the detention of the luggage until a search warrant was
procured may have been the same, and the intrusion on Place's liberty and privacy interests identical.
463. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968); see United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706 (1983).
464. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-21; see Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049-50 (1983).
465. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334-35 (1990).
466. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981).
467. See supra notes 421-430 and accompanying text.
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conduct which is a natural reaction to suspicious circumstances and which
involves only slight or minor intrusions into privacy.
C. Relationship Between The Reasonableness and Warrant Clauses in
the Contexts of Homes, Cars and Containers
With respect to intrusions into the sanctity of the home, Traynor did
not hesitate to read the warrant clause into the reasonableness requirement.
He emphatically rejected the argument that the installation of listening
devices into private residences could be made lawful by the authorization
of the chief of police or the district attorney.468 "[Constitutional]
provisions protect the people from unreasonable invasions of their privacy
by the police, and the determination of what is reasonable cannot be left
to [the police]. 469 In the context of home searches, Traynor agreed with,
and incorporated into California law, decisions of the United States
Supreme Court which demanded authorization by a neutral magistrate and
which struck down warrantless searches despite facts unquestionably
demonstrating probable cause.470 In cases dealing with home searches,
he often quoted the following well-known passage from the United States
Supreme Court's opinions regarding the importance of prior review by a
neutral and detached magistrate.
[The] protection [of the Fourth Amendment] consists in requiring
that... inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate
instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. Any assumption that
evidence sufficient to support a magistrate's disinterested
determination to issue a search warrant will justify the officers in
making a search without a warrant would reduce the Amendment
to a nullity and leave the people's homes secure only in the
discretion of police officers. . . .The right of officers to thrust
468. People v. Tarantino, 45 Cal. 2d 590, 594, 290 P.2d 505, 508 (1955).
469. Id. at 594, 290 P.2d at 509 (emphasis added).
470. "'Absent some grave emergency, the Fourth Amendment has interposed a magistrate between the
citizen and the police."' Id. at 594 (quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948)); see People
v. Marshall, 69 Cal. 2d 51, 56, 442 P.2d 665, 667, 69 Cal. Rptr. 585, 587 (1968) (stating that the delay and
inconvenience necessary to obtain a warrant are never very convincing reasons to by-pass the constitutional
requirement); People v. Privett, 55 Cal. 2d 698, 703, 361 P.2d 602, 605, 12 Cal. Rptr. 874, 877 (1961) (opinion
by Dooling, J., with Traynor, J., concurring) (stating that "[tihe sanctity of a private home is not only guaranteed
by the Constitution ... but it is traditional to our Anglo-Saxon heritage. 'A man's home is his castle' is, and
should be, more than an empty phrase.").
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themselves into a home is also a grave concern, not only to the
individual but to society which chooses to dwell in reasonable
security and freedom from surveillance. When the right of privacy
must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be
decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or Government
enforcement agent.471
Thus, the court established a presumption that warrantless searches and
seizures are invalid. Once a defendant establishes that an arrest was made
or search conducted without a warrant, the burden rests with the pro-
secution to show proper justification.472 In contrast, with respect to
searches or seizures outside the home or office context, Traynor generally
relied on the reasonableness requirement rather than the warrant clause.
This general reliance on reasonableness, however, often collides with the
requirement of a warrant for home searches, particularly in the context of
an arrest of a suspect in the suspect's home and search of the home as
incident to such arrest.
1. The Search Incident Exception to the Warrant Requirement
Cahan473 did not indicate whether the court would follow what was
then the federal rule of reasonableness announced in United States v.
Rabinowitz.474 Rabinowitz empowered law enforcement officers, incident
to the arrest of an occupant, to search the occupant's entire home without
a search warrant based on the view that "the relevant test is not whether
it is reasonable to secure a search warrant, but whether the search was rea-
sonable., 47 5 The California court did not leave the issue unanswered for
471. People v. Edgar, 60 Cal. 2d 171, 175, 383 P.2d 449,451-52, 32 Cal. Rptr. 41,43-44 (1963) (quoting
Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 614-15 (1961) which quoted Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10,
13-14 (1948)); see People v. Marshall, 69 Cal. 2d 51, 57, 442 P.2d 665, 668, 69 Cal. Rptr. 585, 588 (1968);
People v. Henry, 65 Cal. 2d 842, 845, 423 P.2d 557, 559, 56 Cal. Rptr. 485, 487 (1967); People v. Shelton, 60
Cal. 2d 740, 747-48, 338 P.2d 665, 669, 36 Cal. Rptr. 433, 437 (1964) (Traynor, J., concurring); People v.
Haven, 59 Cal. 2d. 713, 717, 381 P.2d 927, 929, 31 Cal. Rptr. 47, 49 (1963).
472. Badillo v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. 2d 269, 272, 294 P.2d 23, 25 (1956); People v. Farrara, 46 Cal.
2d 265, 268, 294 P.2d 21, 23 (1956).
473. People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
474. 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
475. Id. at 66. A careful reading of the record in Cahan suggests to Professor Barrett that the court would
reject the broad federal rule. Barrett, Exclusion of Evidence, supra note 15, at 572. Looking to the record in
Cahan, Barrett speculated that "perhaps unintentionally" the court cast doubt on the search incident justification.
1aL
1298
1994 / Contrasting Approaches to Search and Seizure
long. Less than a year after Cahan, the court adopted what was then the
federal approach, holding that the fact that there is ample time to procure
a search warrant will not invalidate a search incident to a lawful
arrest.4 76 The court declined to follow the earlier rule of Trupiano v.
United States477 which would "[require] a search warrant solely on the
basis of the practicability of procuring it rather than upon the reason-
ableness of the search after a lawful arrest."47 8 Furthermore, the court
was not concerned that the police might fail to obtain an arrest warrant. As
long as the arrest was based on probable cause and the method of entry
was not unlawful, a search of the premises was justified as incident to the
arrest despite the absence of an arrest warrant.479
Also, the California Supreme Court lost no time in defining when a
search is incident to an arrest. Justice Traynor rejected the technical
requirement, which then appeared to be the prevailing view in the federal
courts, that a search incident to an arrest must follow, rather than precede,
the arrest.480 In People v. Simon,4"' a police officer observed the
defendant, age twenty-one, and a friend, who had a bottle of liquor,
The record showed that the police had forced entrance into several houses, arrested the occupants,
and seized evidence of book making operations. The court referred to "a mass of evidence obtained
by numerous forcible entries and seizures without search warrants." It set forth testimony of the
police officers relating to forcible entries, but did not mention the fact that arrests were made, and
it concluded that the police had been guilty of "flagrant acts" in violation of Constitutional
provisions. Was the court disapproving warrantless searches as incident to a valid arrest? Or did it
conclude without discussion that the arrests were illegal because the officers did not have reasonable
cause" to arrest without a warrant, or because they did not make the prior demand for admission
which under California Penal Code section 844 must precede a forcible entry to affect an arrest?
Id (footnotes omitted).
476. People v. Winston, 46 Cal. 2d 151, 162-63,293 P.2d 40,46-47 (1956). The court later clearly stated
that a search incident to a lawful arrest need not be authorized by a search warrant and that it had adopted the
reasonableness rule of Rabinowitz. See People v. Berutko, 71 Cal. 2d 84,94,453 P.2d 721,726-27,77 Cal. Rptr.
217, 222-23 (1969); People v. Burke, 61 Cal. 2d 575, 578-79, 394 P.2d 67, 69, 39 Cal. Rptr. 531, 533 (1964).
A Court of Appeal decision explained the rationale which parallels Rabinowitz principles: "The Fourth
Amendment does not forbid all searches, but only unreasonable searches. The authors of the Bill of Rights did
not suggest or imply that when law enforcing agencies have learned that a person has committed a felony, they
must wait the convenience of the offender before moving to his lair." People v. Allen, 142 Cal. App. 2d 267,
280, 298 P.2d 714, 722 (1956).
477. 334 U.S. 699 (1948).
478. Winston, 46 Cal. 2d at 163, 293 P.2d at 47 (1956) (quoting United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S.
56, 66 (1950)).
479. Id. at 162-63, 293 P.2d at 46-47.
480. See Papani v. United States, 84 F.2d 160, 164 (9th Cir. 1936); Raniele v. United States, 34 F.2d 877,
880 (8th Cir. 1929); United States v. Waller, 108 F. Supp. 450,452-53 (N.D. I!. 1952); United States v. Sully,
56 F. Supp. 942,943-944 (S.D.N.Y. 1944); United States v. McCunn, 40 F.2d 295,296 (S.D.N.Y. 1930); United
States v. Swan, 15 F.2d 598, 599 (N.D. Cal. 1926).
481. 45 Cal. 2d 645, 290 P.2d 531 (1955).
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walking in a warehouse district at 10:40 p.m. 482 The officer stopped the
men, searched them, and found a marijuana cigarette on the defendant.48 3
The officer testified that he stopped the men because he suspected they
were in possession of an alcoholic beverage.48 Justice Traynor rejected
the defendant's argument that the search must always follow the
arrest.485 If an officer has reasonable cause to justify an arrest before he
makes a search incident, the officer may conduct the search incident either
before or after the arrest.486 It was not until 1980 that the United States
Supreme Court agreed with Traynor and declared that a search incident to
a valid arrest does not become invalid merely because it precedes, rather
than follows, the arrest.48 7
An arrest, however, may not be used as a pretext to conduct a search,
and police may not delay a formal arrest until the defendant is taken to the
place of the search in order to justify the search as incident to the
arrest.488 Moreover, a search incident must not only be justified by
reasonable cause, it must also be closely linked, both spatially and tem-
porally, with the arrest. In People v. Gorg,4" 9 following the defendant's
arrest for shoplifting, police learned that he had been twice arrested for
narcotics offenses.490 They went to the house where the defendant was
renting a room and searched the room, discovering drugs.49' Rejecting
the argument that police could reasonably search a person's dwelling after
arresting the person in some other place for a crime involving theft, Justice
Traynor, writing for the court, cautioned that "[e]ven if the object of the
search was to recover other stolen articles, it was not incidental to the
arrest, for it was at a distance from the place thereof and was not
482. Id. at 647, 290 P.2d at 532.
483. Id.
484. Id.
485. Id. at 649, 290 P.2d at 533.
486. See Willson v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. 2d 291, 294, 294 P.2d 36, 38 (1956); People v. Martin. 45
Cal. 2d 755, 761-62, 290 P.2d 855, 858 (1955); People v. Boyles, 45 Cal. 2d 652, 655, 290 P.2d 535, 537
(1955).
487. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 111 (1980) (holding that where the formal arrest follows
quickly on the heels of the search, it is not particularly important that the search precedes the arrest rather than
vice versa). In People v. Simon, 45 Cal. 2d 645, 290 P.2d 531 (1955), Traynor cited a number of federal cases
stating a contrary rule, but refused to follow them, noting that in most, "there were either other reasons for
holding the search unreasonable or the statement of the rule was dictum." Id. at 649 n.*, 290 P.2d at 533 n.l.
488. People v. Haven, 59 Cal. 2d 713, 719, 381 P.2d 927, 931, 31 Cal. Rptr. 47, 51 (1963).
489. 45 Cal. 2d 776, 291 P.2d 469 (1955).
490. Id at 779, 291 P.2d at 471.
491. Id.
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contemporaneous therewith." '492 Thus, early on, Justice Traynor adopted
the general approach of the United States Supreme Court requiring that a
search incident to arrest have a spatial and temporal nexus with the
arrest.493 For example, an arrest outside a house would not justify entry
and search of the home,494 and a search of a home could not be justified
by an arrest in the home three hours later49 However, as incident to an
arrest in a home, police could search the entire premises, including the
garage which is under the immediate control of the arrestee, in order to
find evidence connected with the crime.496
On the other hand, California decisions demanded that a search
incident bear some reasonable relationship to the arrest, in the sense that
officers have some reason for the search other than the mere fact of arrest.
Otherwise, the search becomes an unlawful exploratory search. For
example, the search of Gorg's home for narcotics following his arrest for
shoplifting elsewhere, in addition to violating the temporal and spatial
nexus principle, failed to qualify as a search incident to arrest because its
492. Id. at 781,291 P.2d at 472; see People v. Burke, 61 Cal. 2d 575, 580, 394 P.2d 67,70, 39 Cal. Rptr.
531, 534 (1964) (holding that the search of a car trunk at police impound lot was too remote in time and place
from the arrest of the occupants).
493. See Stoner v. State of California, 376 U.S. 483, 486 (1964) (stating that a search must not be
conducted at a place remote from the arrest); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 61 (1950); Agnello v.
United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925) (holding that a search must be substantially contemporaneous with the
arrest).
494. See People v. Henry, 65 Cal. 2d 842,845,423 P.2d 557,560,56 Cal. Rptr. 485,488 (1967) (Traynor,
J., concurring) (holding that the search of a hotel room is not incident to arrest when the arrest occurs several
feet from the hotel entrance); People v. Sandoval, 65 Cal. 2d 303, 307 n.1, 419 P.2d 187, 189 n.1, 54 Cal. Rptr.
123, 125 n.l (1966).
495. People v. Marshall, 69 Cal. 2d 51, 60-61, 442 P.2d 665, 670-71, 69 Cal. Rptr. 585, 590-91 (1968);
see People v. Shelton, 60 Cal. 2d 740, 744, 388 P.2d 665, 667, 36 Cal. Rptr. 433, 435 (1964) (holding that a
search of one apartment cannot be justified by defendant's arrest in another apartment two miles distant).
496. People v. Dixon, 46 Cal. 2d 456,459,296 P.2d 557,559 (1956). During the search of the defendant's
apartment following her arrest therein, police saw defendant take something from her dress and move it toward
her mouth. Id. at 458, 296 P.2d at 558. They seized it and found it was a key to one of the apartment garages
which she rented. Id. at 458, 296 P.2d at 558-59. The police then searched the garage, discovering heroin. Id.
at 458, 296 P.2d at 559. Remanding the case to the trial court, Justice Traynor instructed that if the court found
that the officers had reasonable cause to enter the defendant's apartment and arrest her, "the contemporaneous
search of the garage would be a lawful search as an incident to that arrest since the garage was on the premises
and under defendant's control." Id. at 459, 296 P.2d at 559.
The Courts of Appeal, however, resisted limits on search incident authority. The search of an apartment,
garage and car was found to be incident to an arrest which took place in the backyard. People v. Smith, 166 Cal.
App. 2d 302, 305-06. 333 P.2d 208, 210 (1958). Search of the defendant's home was found to be a valid search
incident to his arrest on the street in front of his house, where he was seen going in and out of his house and
making deliveries of narcotics to occuplnts of cars. People v. Montes, 146 Cal. App. 2d 530, 532-33, 303 P.2d
1064, 1066 (1956). However, the search of a suspect's apartment was not deemed incident to his arrest on a
public street 95 feet away from his apartment. Hernandez v. Superior Court, 143 Cal. App. 2d 20, 24, 299 P.2d
678, 681 (1956).
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purpose was not limited to a search for stolen property-the subject of
defendant's arrest.497 The court explained that since the search of the
defendant's home occurred two days after his arrest and after police had
discovered that he had a narcotics arrest record and after police learned
that his landlord had found a bucket containing marijuana in his bathroom,
"[t]he conclusion is inescapable that the . . . search was not made to
discover other stolen articles, and that it had no reasonable relation to
defendant's arrest."4 98 Later cases suggested that this relationship
standard demands that police have cause to believe that evidence of the
crime for which defendant was arrested would be found on the
premises.49 The effect of this limitation on police search incident powers
becomes more evident in the automobile context.
In People v. Blodgett,5°° officers approached a double-parked cab
and, observing suspicious conduct, ordered the passengers out and searched
under the rear seat.5 'O As to whether the search might be valid as
incident to an arrest, Traynor stated that while the cab driver could have
been arrested for double-parking, "the search of his cab cannot be justified
on that ground, for it had no relation to the traffic violation and would not
have been incidental to an arrest therefor." 502 Similarly, an arrest of a
driver for an unlawful U-turn could not justify the search of the car since
497. People v. Gorg, 45 Cal. 2d 776, 781, 291 P.2d 469, 472 (1955).
498. Id.; see Ex parte Dixon, 41 Cal. 2d 756, 761-62, 264 P.2d 513, 516 (1953).
499. See People v. Winston, 46 Cal. 2d 151, 162, 293 P.2d 40, 46 (1956) (opinion by Spence, J., with
Traynor, J., concurring) (stating that the Court regarded as "well settled" the rule that a search incident to a valid
arrest is valid "if it is reasonable and made in good faith; and that a seizure, during such a search, of evidence
related to the crime is permissible"); see also People v. Van Eyk, 56 Cal. 2d 471, 477-78, 364 P.2d 326, 330,
15 Cal. Rptr. 150, 154 (1961) (opinion by Gibson, J., with Traynor, J., concurring) (upholding the search of the
defendant's apartment for a receipt connecting him to the crime for which he was arrested, staling that the
receipt "was not discovered as the result of a general or exploratory search but at the specific direction of [the
officer] who had reason to believe that such a receipt might be there.... Accordingly, its seizure was proper
under the rule that a reasonable search of the area under the control of the accused to obtain things used as a
means of committing the crime is justified as an incident to his arrest."); People v. Smith, 166 Cal. App. 2d 302,
305, 333 P.2d 208, 210 (1958) (stating that the officers had a reasonable belief that contraband might be found
on the property searched and thus were not conducting an "exploratory search").
The court most likely viewed this relationship requirement as a beneficial aspect of federal search incident
principles worth adopting, rather than a deviation from them. See, e.g., People v. Winston, 46 Cal. 2d 151, 162,
293 P.2d 40, 46 (1956) (stating that during a search incident, "seizure ... of evidence related to the crime is
permissible," and quoting Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20,30 (1925), that the justification for such search
is "to find and seize things connected with the crime").
500. 46 Cal. 2d 114, 293 P.2d 57 (1956).
501. Id. at 116, 293 P.2d at 58.
502. Id.
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it bore no relation to the traffic violation or vagrancy charge for which the
occupants were arrested. 3
In summary, the search incident to arrest rules formulated by the
California Supreme Court under the leadership of Justice Traynor required
that the arrest be supported by probable cause and that the search be
closely linked, both spatially and temporally, with the arrest.5 4 While the
scope of the search can include the entire premises or automobile in which
the arrest took place, the search must bear a reasonable relationship to the
arrest, in that it is supported by reasonable cause to believe that evidence
of crime for which the defendant was arrested would be found in the
search.505 Traynor felt that permitting a warrantless search when
incidental to a lawful arrest on the premises "strikes a balance between the
community's interest in law enforcement and its interest in preserving the
privacy of homes. ' 6
Studying the United States Supreme Court's development of search
incident standards, one is immediately struck by the uncertainty and
inconsistency of the Court's decisions. The Court first voiced approval of
a search incident to the arrestee's person in 1914.507 Later, the Court
expanded this authority to include "whatever is found . . . in [the
arrestee's] control" 508 and then to "the place where the arrest is
made."' ' Over the next four decades, the Court gyrated between
opposing rules and principles. Initially, search incident authority was not
qualified by any requirement that police obtain a search warrant when
practicable.5 10 However, in 1931, the Court indicated that despite a
lawful arrest, police could not search the place of arrest if they had the
opportunity to obtain a search warrant."1 ' The Court again reversed
direction in 1947, rejecting any requirement for a search warrant when a
search follows a valid arrest in a home.512 Then a few years later, the
Court reversed directions yet again and required a search warrant
503. People v. Molarius, 146 Cal. App. 2d 129, 130-31,303 P.2d 350,351 (1956) (following Blodget and
noting that nothing occurred which gave the officers reasonable cause to go through the defendant's car).
504. See supra notes 497-503 and accompanying text.
505. Id.
506. People v. Shelton, 60 Cal. 2d 740, 747, 388 P.2d 665, 669, 36 Cal. Rptr. 433, 437 (1964).
507. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 390 (1914).
508. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158 (1925).
509. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925).
510. See supra notes 507-509; see also Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 199 (1927).
511. See Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 358 (1931) (stating that the agent had the
information and the time to obtain a search warrant, but failed to do so); see also United States v. Lefkowitz,
285 U.S. 452, 465 (1932).
512. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 151 (1947).
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"whenever reasonably practicable," despite a valid arrest. 13 Two years
later in 1950, the Court once again did an about face, ruling that "[t]he test
... is not whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant, but whether
the search was reasonable.,
514
For the next nineteen years, the Court maintained this broad
reasonableness standard with respect to the place of the arrest. However,
while no search warrant was required if the search was incident to a valid
arrest, the Court strongly suggested that to be reasonable, the search
incident could not go beyond its valid purpose which was to discover
evidence of the crime for which the suspect is arrested. Many times, the
Court clearly set forth this limited purpose of a search incident, suggesting
that it must have a reasonable relationship to the crime for which the
suspect is arrested and not be a general exploratory search for the purpose
of discovering evidence of other criminal conduct.
515
In 1969, the Supreme Court, in Chimel v. California,51 6 limited the
scope of a search incident to the arrest of one inside a home to the
arrestee's person and the area within the arrestee's immediate control.5
17
This area was defined as the area from which the arrestee might gain
possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. 5t8 This new rule
dramatically reduced the legitimate scope of a search incident to the arrest
of one in a home or office. Authority to search the place of the arrest no
longer included the right to search rooms other than the one in which the
arrest occurs, or even through all closed or concealed areas in that room
itself. The Court took its rationale from Terry v. Ohio519 and other stop
and frisk cases: The scope of a Fourth Amendment intrusion must be
"'strictly tied to and justified by' the circumstances which render its
initiation permissible."52 However, the real thrust of Chimel was the
shift in the Court's view of the proper purpose of the search incident
513. Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 705, 708 (1948) (stating that the search incident authority
"grows out of the inherent necessities of the situation" and demands "something more in the way of necessity
than merely a lawful arrest").
514. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950).
515. See Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925) (stating that the justification for a search
incident to arrest is "to find and seize things connected with the crime"); see also Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 61
(citing Agnello, 269 U.S. at 30); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 151 (1947) (upholding an extensive
search of a home on the ground that the agents were looking for items used in connection with the mail fraud
offense for which the defendant was arrested).
516. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
517. Id. at 763.
518. Id.
519. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
520. Id. at 19 (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring)).
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justification in relation to the importance of a search warrant. The purpose
of search incident to arrest was narrowed from the interest in discovering
evidence relating to the crime for which the suspect was arrested to the
need to prevent the suspect from hiding or destroying evidence or gaining
a weapon with which the suspect could harm officers or effect an
escape. 2 Officers could search for evidence only if necessary to
preserve it from loss or destruction by the arrestee, not to preserve it from
future loss at the hands of others, and certainly not merely to acquire it for
use as evidence. 22
However, many on the Court were clearly frustrated with the Court's
search incident jurisprudence. As Justice White remarked, "[flew areas of
the law have been as subject to shifting constitutional standards over the
last fifty years as that of the search 'incident to an arrest.' ' 523 Thus, it
was not long before the Court, in its search to avoid "fine subtle
distinctions," began moving away from strictly limiting the scope of the
search according to the justification for its initiation as in the stop and
frisk cases, and toward broad sweeping "workable" rules. 24
With respect to searches of articles found on the arrestee's person, the
Court unhinged the scope of the search from the demand that it be strictly
tied to the reasons supporting it. A valid custodial arrest, the Court
decided, permits a full search of the arrestee, which includes a thorough
search of the arrestee's clothing and articles discovered on the aiTestee's
person. 5 Such search authority "while based on the need to disarm and
to discover evidence, does not depend on what a court may later decide
was the probability in a particular arrest situation that weapons or evidence
would in fact be found on the person of the suspect. '526 Thus, it is
irrelevant that the arresting officer has no reason to suspect the arrestee of
being armed or of destroying evidence. The Court thereby untied the scope
of search incident from the rationale justifying the initial intrusion.
This "workable rules" approach was next applied in the context of an
arrest of an occupant of an automobile. New York v. Belton5 27 declared
a "workable rule" in this context: "[W]hen a policeman has made a lawful
custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a
521. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762-63.
522. Id.
523. Id. at 770 (White, J., dissenting).
524. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1980).
525. Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 266 (1973); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973).
526. Gunstafson, 414 U.S. at 265-66 (quoting Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235).
527. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
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contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment
of that automobile," which is defined as the interior of the passenger
compartment, but not the trunk.528 The search may include all containers,
whether open or closed, found anywhere therein and it need not be shown
that the container might possibly hold a weapon or evidence of criminal
conduct for which the suspect was arrested.52 9 Thus, courts need not
litigate "in each case the issue of whether or not there was present one of
the reasons supporting the authorization for the search of the person
incident to a lawful arrest."
530
The Court soon applied Belton's workable rule approach in other
contexts. In formulating rules governing the inventory of an arrestee's
possessions, the Court relied on the benefits of Belton's "single familiar
standard." 531 The Court anticipated that this standard would not require
officers to make fine and subtle distinctions as to which containers may be
searched and which must be sealed.532 Police may fully search the
personal effects of a person lawfully arrested as part of routine
administrative procedures at the police station incident to booking and
jailing the arrestee.533 The same approach was applied to automobile
inventories. As long as the inventory is conducted pursuant to standardized
procedures and for a regulatory rather than investigatory purpose, it may
be conducted on the street at the time of the vehicle stop rather than at the
station and may include opening all closed containers found in the vehicle
regardless of the lack of suspicion or reason for individual intrusions.
534
The Court then used Belton's "familiar standard" in the Terry v. Ohio
stop and frisk context. In Michigan v. Long,535 the Court concluded that
Terry principles allow police who have detained an occupant of an
automobile, and who reasonably believe that the occupant is dangerous and
may gain immediate control of a weapon, to conduct a warrantless search
528. Id. at 460-61 n.4.
529. Id. at 461.
530. hd at 459 (quoting Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235).
531. Id. at 458 (citing Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213-214 (1979)).
532. Id. at 458.
533. Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 648 (1983).
534. Colorado v. Berdine, 479 U.S. 367, 372-73 (1987); see Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990)
(holding that police discretion to open closed containers in the course of vehicle inventory must be regulated
by standardized criteria or established routines in order to prevent such searches from becoming a ruse for
general rummaging in the search to discover incriminating evidence. However, such criteria need not take an
"all or nothing" form, and officers may be allowed sufficient latitude to determine whether a particular container
should or should not be opened in light of such criteria as the nature of the search and the characteristics of the
container).
535. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
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of the car's passenger compartment, limited to those areas where a weapon
may be hidden.536 In defining the proper scope of the search, the Court
looked to Belton's "area search" rule, noting that it was developed because
lower courts had not derived a workable definition of the "area within the
immediate control of arrestee" in the automobile context.53' The Court
justified the adoption of a similar "workable rule" covering the narrow
compass of the passenger compartment of an automobile on the ground
that roadside encounters between police and suspects are "especially
hazardous. 538
It appears that a number of lower courts are having great difficulty
defining "the area within the immediate control of arrestee" with respect
to arrests outside the automobile context. Some courts have used Belton to
justify the search of the entire room in which the suspect was arrested,539
even after the suspect has been removed from it" or has been disabled
by handcuffs or other physical restraints.54" ' Courts often refer to the fact
that the Belton rule gives police automatic search authority with respect to
a designated area and does not demand cause to believe weapons or
evidence of crime are present or limit the scope of search to discovery of
such evidence. Consequently, Belton's "workable rule" is currently
undermining the limits imposed by Chimel on the scope of home searches
following an occupant's arrest. The Supreme Court someday may hold that
the room in which an arrest takes place should be considered the
functional equivalent of the passenger compartment of an automobile and
authorize a search of the entire room or office in which an arrest takes
place regardless of whether police can point to a concern for weapons or
to reasons justifying a search for evidence.
536. Id. at 1049.
537. Id. at 1048-49 (quoting Belton, 453 U.S. at 460).
538. Id. at 1049.
539. See United States v. Anderson, 813 F.2d 1450, 1456 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that an arrest in a hotel
room allows a search of the whole room and a closed suitcase).
540. See United States v. Fleming, 677 F.2d 602, 607 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that the search of a room
where a person was arrested was justified as incident to the arrest, though the person had been removed five
minutes earlier and was handcuffed, provided that the area searched was within the immediate control of the
person when arrested and nothing happened between the time of the arrest and the search to make the search
unreasonable); see also United States v. Turner, 926 F.2d 883, 887-88 (9th Cir. 1991) (adopting the Seventh
Circuit's standard in Fleming); Gay v. Florida, 607 So. 2d 454, 461-62 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that
an arrest of defendant at his place of employment-a video rental shop-allowed the search of a container found
in the shop five minutes after defendant had been removed from the scene).
541. See State v. Murdock, 445 N.W.2d 618, 626 (Wis. 1990) (holding that the area in a home
immediately surrounding place where the suspect was arrested could be searched, after the suspect had been
handcuffed and placed face down on the floor, without regard to whether the suspect could actually gain access
to the area searched).
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Chimel, of course, rejected the distinction between the room in which
the suspect is arrested and the entire house, characterizing it as "highly
artificial.' 42 However, so is Belton's "workable rule." Nevertheless,
limits on searches following arrests are less definable in the context of
homes than in the contexts of automobiles or personal inventories. The
room in which the suspect is arrested may not be easily identifiable. Is it
the room in which the person is caught, where the person is handcuffed,
or where the person happens to be when informed that he or she is under
arrest? What are the room's parameters when the room opens through an
alcove to another room or to a hallway?
Perhaps we should look to the approach of Justice Traynor and the
California Supreme Court. While allowing a search of the entire premises,
the California standard at least would guard against "exploratory searches"
by requiring reasonable cause to believe that evidence of the crime for
which the suspect is arrested would be found on the premises and limiting
of the search to areas likely to contain such evidence.543
On the other hand, adoption of Traynor's search incident rule might be
viewed as an unequal exchange which unduly enhances police authority to
make warrantless searches. Allowing police to search the entire premises
in which the suspect is arrested, even when limited to a search for
weapons and evidence for which police have cause to search, often may
be more intrusive than an automatic search without cause limited to the
room in which the suspect is arrested. Furthermore, a rule that regards a
home arrest as justifying a search of the entire home for evidence of the
crime for which the suspect was arrested may encourage police to make
home arrests in order to avoid search warrants. This is especially true
when a warrantless search, not being circumscribed by the particularity
requirements of the Fourth Amendment's warrant clause, may give police
more latitude than if they had procured a search warrant. Justice Traynor
himself had misgivings as to the breadth of the search incident rules in
relation to the rules governing warrant-based searches.
[In the case of a search incident to a valid arrest] the police are not
required to call upon a magistrate in advance for a judicial
determination of probable cause. Once they have made an arrest
542. Chimel. 395 U.S. at 766. The Court agreed with Justice Jackson's dissenting opinion in Harris v.
United States, 331 U.S. 145, 197 (1946),'who could find "no practical limit" once the search is allowed to go
beyond "the person arrested and the objects upon him or in his immediate physical control." Id. at 766 n. 11.
543. See supra notes 488-506 and accompanying text.
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and obtained the evidence, their very success may serve as a
retroactive make weight for probable cause and thus tilt the scales
for a judicial finding of such cause. Moreover, searches and
seizures without a warrant, though always subject to the require-
ment of reasonableness, are not under the constraint of specifi-
cations "particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized." We can better appreciate the need
for a correlation once we perceive that a limited search and seizure
under a warrant may culminate in a valid arrest and that further
search and seizure beyond the warrant specifications may then be
legitimated as incident to the valid arrest. In other words, the police
may have a shorter reach if they are armed with a warrant than if
they are not. Understandably they may prefer to go unarmed.
So patent a discrepancy suggests how great is the need for a
review of warrant requirements to determine whether they are
unrealistically rigid in relation to the alternative of warrantless
searches and seizures. Such a review would logically entail a con-
verse inquiry, whether the sanctions of warrantless searches and
seizures incident to a valid arrest are unduly lax.5"
Nevertheless, later United States Supreme Court decisions streng-
thening the warrant requirement for home entries and enhancing the impor-
tance of warrants generally have in some respects made Traynor's con-
cerns less weighty. First, the Court has made it clear that there is no
"murder scene" or serious crime exception to the search warrant require-
ment which would allow a warrantless "emergency search" for evidence
when there is no indication that the evidence would be destroyed or
removed before police could obtain a search warrant.545 Second, in 1984,
the Court adopted a good faith rule covering warrant-based searches
according to which evidence need not be suppressed when obtained by
officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant later found to be
defective.546 This good faith exception to the exclusionary rule
encourages police to procure warrants in those cases where the
Fourth Amendment does not demand a warrant or it is unclear as to
544. Traynor, Mapp at Large, supra note 3, at 333.
545. Mincey v. Arizona. 437 U.S. 385, 395 (1978); see Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 21 (1984)
(per curiam) (finding unjustified the warrantless search of a murder scene though it lasted only two hours and
was conducted on the same day as the murder).
546. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S 897, 922 (1984).
1309
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 25
whether one is required.547 Third, the Court's insistence that, absent
exigent circumstances, police must obtain an arrest warrant for the arrest
of a suspect in the suspect's own home, 8 and a search warrant for a
suspect's arrest in the home of another, 9 severely restricts warrantless
home entries for the purpose of making routine arrests. In the case of an
arrest of a suspect in the suspect's own home, an arrest warrant guarantees
that probable cause to believe the suspect has committed a crime was
reviewed and affirmed by a magistrate. In the case of an arrest in the
home of a third person, a search warrant demands that a magistrate also
find probable cause to believe that the suspect is present on the premises
to be searched.55 As a result of these decisions, police authority to make
routine home arrests usually must be founded on a warrant issued by a
magistrate and supported by an affidavit spelling out probable cause.
Despite these protections, in most cases searching a home for evidence
of a crime will be more intrusive than searching a home for a suspect.
However, police already have entered the home for the valid purpose of
making an arrest, and the Supreme Court has taken the view that the
principal intrusion involved in a home search is the entry itself rather than
the extent or scope of the ensuing search.552 Also, the Court has
authorized rather extensive searches for weapons and confederates in the
course of a home search for a suspect. When the police are in hot pursuit
of a suspect who has committed a dangerous felony, they may search
enclosed areas and containers for weapons that the suspect may have used
or is about to use to resist or escape.553 Similarly, the Court has held that
547. Police officers will have an incentive to obtain warrants in doubtful cases, since they will know that
as long as they reasonably rely on a warrant, the evidence will not be suppressed on the ground that probable
cause later is found lacking.
548. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980).
549. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 215 (1981).
550. Payton, 445 U.S. at 586.
551. Steagald, 451 U.S. at 214 n.7.
552. See Payton, 445 U.S. at 589 (relying on Judge Leventhal's view that an entry to arrest and an entry
to search for and seize property implicates the same interest in preserving the privacy and sanctity of the home
and justifies the same level of Constitutional protection).
While the area legally searched may be broader when a search warrant is being executed, the difference
is more theoretical than real because the police may need to check the entire premises for safety reasons
and sometimes they ignore the restrictions on searches incident to arrest.... Differences between search
and arrest warrants are not a matter of kind but of degree since they share same fundamental characteristic-
breach of entrance into one's home. In no case is the zone of privacy more clearly defined than when
bounded by the unambiguous dimensions of one's home.
Id.
553. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294,298 (1967) (holding that while searching a house for a suspect
in a robbery that had occurred five minutes before, police could search the washing machine, the bathroom flush
tank, the bureau in the defendant's room, and under the defendant's mattress).
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with an arrest warrant for a suspect in a robbery committed with an
accomplice, police may enter the suspect's house and, as incident to the
arrest of the suspect, conduct a "protective sweep" of the areas of the
house that the officers have a reasonable belief may harbor an individual
posing a danger to the officer or to others.5 4 Thus, where police enter
a suspect's home with an arrest warrant and lawfully search for
confederates and weapons, as well as for the subject of the warrant, a
further search for evidence often may not be significantly more intrusive
as long as the search is conducted only after the suspect's arrest and is
limited in scope to areas and containers which may conceal evidence of
the crime for which the arrest was made. Police have already entered the
home and searched for the suspect and possibly for weapons and
confederates. Furthermore, whenever police have probable cause to believe
that a suspect has committed a serious felony, they will usually have cause
to believe that the suspect's home may contain weapons, contraband, or
other evidence of the crime. At this point, securing the home by police
presence inside and outside and detaining unarrested occupants may be as
intrusive as an immediate warrantless search for evidence.
If the Supreme Court were to adopt Traynor's search incident rule
allowing search of the entire premises in which the suspect is arrested, it
should establish guidelines to guard against abuses. First, the requirement
of a warrant for entry into homes to make arrests should not be weakened
by insubstantial exceptions. Second, the good faith rule applicable to
warrant-based arrests should cover only authority to arrest. It should not
provide a shield for overly broad searches incident to arrests. Third, the
Court should demand that the ensuing search incident, for evidence of the-
crime for which the suspect was arrested, be supported by probable cause.
As in the case of an automobile search based upon probable cause, the
scope of the search should be determined by what a magistrate could
authorize, particularly describing the place to be searched and things to be
seized. Only the prior approval of the magistrate should be waived.555
Thus, an arrest for outstanding traffic warrants would not justify a search
incident for evidence, and an arrest for simple battery with a baseball bat
would justify only a search for the bat. Fourth, the search incident for
evidence should be limited to the time of the arrest and not authorize later
554. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 327 (1990) (holding that following the defendant's arrest on an
arrest warrant in his home, police could enter the basement to search for additional suspects in order to protect
the safety of the officers).
555. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823 (1982).
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warrantless entries or searches. Finally, no search for evidence should be
allowed if a suspect was not discovered and arrested in the home. Without
an actual arrest in the home, there would be no authority for an incidental
search of the home for evidence.
With such boundaries, the Traynor approach would be worth
considering with respect to both automobile and home searches. Belton's
"workable rule" allowing an automatic search of the car in which one is
arrested, unlimited by any requirement of cause to believe that the search
may reveal evidence of crime, is as underprotective of the automobile
occupant's privacy as the current limitation on searches incident to home
arrests is overprotective of the home occupant's privacy.
2. Seizing or Securing a Home While Seeking a Search Warrant
The general warrant requirement for home searches, in conjunction
with the restrictions Chimel places on searches incident to an arrest in a
home, raises the question whether, when faced with a threat of loss or
destruction of evidence, police are permitted to secure a home, and if so,
in what manner? At the time Traynor faced this question, searches incident
to home arrest were not limited by Chime5 56 and thus the matter was
less urgent. However, Traynor did offer some guidance. In People v.
Edgar,557 the defendant was in jail awaiting trial on extortion charges
when he told his mother during her visit with him that "there were pictures
at home that might be important to his case and asked her to hide them
until he told her what to do with them., 558 A deputy sheriff overheard
the conversation and informed police who went to Edgar's home, arriving
a few minutes before his mother.5 59 Police obtained the photographs by
illegally threatening the mother with arrest.51 Writing for the court,
Traynor found that the illegal coercion which produced the photographs
was the equivalent of a warrantless search, and that the photographs must
be suppressed.56' The prosecution, however, asserted that it was nec-
essary for the officers to act without a search warrant in order to prevent
Edgar's mother from disposing of the pictures.562 Traynor found no such
556. See supra notes 516-522 and accompanying text.
557. 60 Cal. 2d 171, 383 P.2d 449, 32 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1963).
558. Id. at 173. 383 P.2d at 450, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 42.
559. Id.
560. Id. at 174. 383 P.2d at 450-51, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 42-43.
561. Id. at 174-75, 383 P.2d at 451, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 43.
562. Id. at 175, 383 P.2d at 452, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 44.
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necessity. The police, Traynor reasoned, "could have kept his mother under
surveillance, and forewarned of what Edgar wished her to do, they were
confronted with no substantial risk that she would succeed in putting the
pictures beyond their reach before a warrant could be obtained."' 63
In People v. Marshall,564 police, acting without a warrant but with
probable cause to arrest the defendant for selling marijuana to an informant
moments earlier, entered the defendant's apartment to arrest him. 65 After
discovering that the occupants had fled, they continued to search and found
marijuana in a brown paper bag in a bedroom closet.56 Traynor
concluded that, although the entry was proper, "[h]aving ascertained that
no one was in the apartment, the officers could not legally search it
without a warrant. ' 567 He pointed out that "a short period of watching"
would have prevented the possibility of material change in the situation
during the time necessary to secure a warrant. 568 Thus, in the course of
limiting the police in conducting warrantless home searches, Traynor
informed police of what they could do when confronted with the prospect
of immediate loss or destruction of evidence.
To this day, the United States Supreme Court has not provided a clear
answer to these issues. The Court missed a number of opportunities to
point the way. In Chimel, for example, the Court could have provided
some guidance through its answer to Justice White, who in dissent sought
to justify the search of Chimel's home on the ground that his valid home
arrest provided "an exigent circumstance justifying police action before the
evidence [could] be removed., 569 Justice White believed that it was
"unreasonable to require the police to leave the scene in order to obtain a
search warrant when they are already legally there to make a valid arrest,
and when there must almost always be a strong possibility that con-
federates of the arrested man will in the meanwhile remove the items for
which the police have probable cause to search."57 White asserted that
Chimel's wife must have known of the robbery for which Chimel was
arrested and would have removed the evidence had the police simply
563. Id. at 175-76, 383 P.2d at 452, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 44.
564. 69 Cal. 2d 51, 442 P.2d 665, 69 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1968).
565. Id. at 54-55, 442 P.2d at 667, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 587.
566. Id. at 55, 442 P.2d at 667, 69 Cal. Rptr.'at 587.
567. Id. at 61, 442 P.2d at 671, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 591.
568. Id (citing Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1, 6 (1932)).
569. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 780 (1969) (White, J., dissenting).
570. Id. at 774 (White, J., dissenting).
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arrested him and later returned with a search warrant.57" ' White further
noted that there were three officers at the scene, and assuming two would
be needed to bring Chimel to the station and obtain a search warrant, only
one could have been left to guard the house.572 White continued:
However, if he not only could have remained in the house against
petitioner's wife's will, but followed her about to assure that no
evidence was being tampered with, the invasion of her privacy
would be almost as great as that accompanying an actual search.
Moreover, had the wife summoned an accomplice, one officer
could not have watched them both.573
Justice White apparently assumed that if prevented from searching incident
to arrest, police either would have to leave the premises, thereby allowing
confederates to remove or destroy evidence, or would likely be frustrated
in any effort to secure the house until an warrant was obtained. Yet the
majority did not think it important to disabuse anyone of these
assumptions.574
One year later, Vale v. Louisiana575 provided the Court with another
opportunity to guide law enforcement officers and lower courts. With
arrest warrants for Vale, police went to his home and observed a car drive
up.576 Vale came outside, conducted a narcotics transaction with the
driver, and walked quickly toward the house as the police approached.577
Vale was arrested on the front steps of his home.5 78 A cursory sweep of
the home revealed no one, but Vale's mother and brother arrived within
two to three minutes.579 Police then searched the house, discovering
narcotics in the rear bedroom.5"' The Court held the search unlawful
because it was not incident to Vale's arrest.58' Even under pre-Chimel
571. Id. at 775 (White, J., dissenting).
572. Id. at 775 n.5 (White, J., dissenting).
573. Id.
574. The majority noted and rejected other arguments put forward in Justice White's dissent. Id. at 766
n.12. It also summarily rejected the state's argument that obtaining a search warrant would have been unduly
burdensome. It did not however, suggest what the officers could have done to secure the home until obtaining
a warrant. Id. at 768 n.16.
575. 399 U.S. 30 (1970).
576. Id. at 32.
577. Id.
578. Id.
579. Id. at 33.
580. Id.
581. Id at 33-34.
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law, a home search was not regarded as incident to an arrest if the arrest
was conducted outside the home. 82 Furthermore, the majority argued
that the search was not justified by an emergency, in the form of a need
to prevent the destruction of evidence, since no one was in the house when
the officers first entered and, since the officers had procured arrest
warrants for Vale, they could have obtained a search warrant for the
house. 83 However, the Court failed to respond to Justice Black's dissent
which pointed out that the arrest warrants were based on an increase in
bond for an earlier charge and police did not have the grounds for a search
warrant for the house until they observed the narcotics transaction.8 4 Nor
did the Court suggest the proper police response to a situation in which
they reasonably believe that confederates or other third parties are likely
to hide or destroy evidence.
For well over a decade, the Court provided no guidance to police and
courts facing this not infrequent problem.8 Finally in 1984, the Court
grappled with the question, yet failed to provide clear, workable rules.586
The most the justices could muster in Segura v. United States587 was a
judgment with a plurality opinion by Chief Justice Burger stating that
police do not violate the Fourth Amendment when they enter the premises
with probable cause, arrest the occupants who have legitimate possessory
interests in the contents of the premises, take the occupants into custody
for a reasonable period and thereafter secure the premises from within to
preserve the status quo while other officers in good faith are in the process
of obtaining a warrant.588 Burger found that entry and internal securing
of premises while police seek to obtain a search warrant does not
constitute an impermissible seizure of all contents of the premises.58 9 He
noted that here, the securing was from within and that, arguably, the wiser
course would have been to depart and secure premises from outside by
stakeout.5 9g However, while the internal securing may have constituted
an illegal search, it was no more interference with defendant's possessory
582. Id.
583. Id. at 35.
584. Id. at 40 (Black, J., dissenting).
585. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 106 (1980) (noting that it was an open question whether
police could detain persons on the premises while a search warrant was being sought).
586. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984) (plurality opinion).
587. Id.
588. Id. at 798 (plurality opinion).
589. Id. at 810 (plurality opinion).
590. Id. at 811 (plurality opinion).
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interests in the contents of the apartment than a perimeter stakeout.5 9' In
other words, the initial entry and internal securing, legal or not, did not
affect the reasonableness of the seizure. Intrusions on possessory interests
occasioned by seizures can vary in nature and extent. Here, the persons
whose possessory interests were interfered with by the occupation were
already under arrest and in custody throughout the entire period.592 Thus,
the actual interference with their possessory interests was virtually non-
existent.593 Chief Justice Burger's opinion, therefore, provides little
guidance for future cases. It was not an opinion of the Court. Furthermore,
it emphasized the limited intrusion on possessory interests due to the fact
that the occupants were under arrest during the entire seizure and failed to
confront the more difficult situation where the residents are absent or
present but not under arrest.
3. The Automobile and Plain View Exceptions to the Warrant
Requirement
The automobile and plain view exceptions to the warrant requirement
provide another fertile ground for instructive contrasts between the
approaches of the California Supreme Court under Traynor's leadership
and the United States Supreme Court. They demonstrate that much of the
mischief perpetrated by the United States Supreme Court in the search and
seizure area can be traced directly to the Court's practice of shifting bet-
ween different rationales for its rules and leaving broad areas unresolved.
These cases also provide an example of the Court's tendency to announce
a sweeping new rule without clearly thinking through its consequences.
Then, when the Court discovers that the rule's application has led to
illogical or unworkable results, the Court's reluctance to overrule it
outright has led to the creation of subtle, illogical and often unworkable
distinctions or exceptions that soon return to haunt courts and law
enforcement officials.
With respect to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement,
Traynor initially followed the approach taken by the Supreme Court in
Carroll v. United States.59 Carroll relied on exigent circumstances to
justify warrantless searches of automobiles based on reasonable or
591. Id.
592. Id. at 813 (plurality opinion).
593. Id.
594. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
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probable cause alone: "Since an automobile may readily be moved from
place to place, its search without a warrant is not unreasonable if the
officer has reasonable cause to believe it is carrying contraband. ' 5
Ordinarily, however, vehicle searches would not be permitted absent such
reasonable cause or the valid arrest of an occupant.596 The result was a
rather simple and workable standard: If police have probable cause to
believe that an automobile contains contraband, they need not obtain a
search warrant in order to search it. However, in Preston v. United
States, 597 the Court held that a search of an automobile at the police
station some time after the arrest of the driver could not be justified as a
search incident to that arrest.598 The California Supreme Court read
Preston as modifying Carroll, such that police could search an automobile
on the highway but, absent exigent circumstances, could not search it
without a warrant later at the police station.59
Not until 1970 did the United States Supreme Court put the matter to
rest by adopting the rule, founded on the Carroll mobility rationale, which
had been- clearly stated by Traynor in 1956.6m In Chambers v.
Maroney,6°1 the Court upheld the search of a car at the police station
following the arrest of its occupants for armed robbery on the basis of
probable cause to believe that the car contained evidence of the crime.'
595. People v. Gale, 46 Cal. 2d 253,255,294 P.2d 13, 14 (1956) (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132, 153 (1925)).
596. Id at 256, 294 P.2d at 15.
597. 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
598. Id. at 368. The arrest was for vagrancy, and apparently the officers had no cause to believe that the
car contained evidence of criminal activity. Id. at 365.
A few years later, the Court in Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967), upheld the warrantless search
of a car held for forfeiture under state law following defendant's arrest for narcotics offenses. Id. at 62. In
Cooper, the Court viewed Preston as dealing primarily with a search incident to an arrest where seizure and
impound of the car were unrelated to the charge against the accused. Id. at 61.
599. See People v. Terry, 61 Cal. 2d 137, 152,390 P.2d 381,391,37 Cal. Rptr. 605,615 (1964) (applying
the Traynor approach in Gale, the court approved the later warrantless search of the car on reasonable cause).
Compare People v. Burke, 61 Cal. 2d 575, 580, 394 P.2d 67, 39 Cal. Rptr. 531, 534 (1964) (holding invalid the
later warrantless stationhouse search of the car, the court distinguished Terry, stating that the search in Terry
was justified by a need to prevent removal of evidence by the defendant and noting that it was decided "only
a few days before Preston") with People v. Webb, 66 Cal. 2d 107, 126-27, 424 P.2d 342, 355, 56 Cal. Rptr. 902,
915 (1967) (finding, after an exhaustive review of the confusing and conflicting cases on the subject, that the
stationhouse car search justified on the ground that in view of the conditions at the scene of arrest, it was
reasonable for the officers to interrupt the search of the car until it could be moved to a safer location as well
as on the ground that, as in Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967), the car was subject to forfeiture, though
forfeiture proceedings were never instituted). See also People v. Terry, 70 Cal. 2d 410, 427, 454 P.2d 36, 48,
77 Cal. Rptr. 460, 472 (1969).
600. See supra notes 594-596 and accompanying text.
601. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
602. Id. at 52.
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The High Court read Carroll as allowing the search of an automobile on
probable cause wholly apart from a search incident justification on the
basis that the car is moving, the occupants are alerted, and the car's
contents may never be found again if a warrant must be obtained.6 3
Since the car could be searched immediately based upon reasonable cause
for believing it contained contraband under Carroll, it could be searched
later at the station since the same probable cause factor existed in both
situations, as did the mobility of the automobile, "unless the Fourth
Amendment permits a warrantless seizure of the car and the denial of its
use to anyone until a warrant is secured." 4 However, "[f]or consti-
tutional purposes," the Court saw "no difference between on the one hand
the seizing and holding of a car before presenting the probable cause issue
to a magistrate and on the other hand carrying out an immediate search
without a warrant."6 5 Given probable cause to search, the Court
regarded either course as reasonable.f While the mobility rationale
arguably fails to justify stationhouse car searches, the Chambers rule
allowing warrantless automobile searches based on probable cause was
relatively clear and workable. With probable cause, police could search an
automobile without a warrant either when it was seized or later after it had
been impounded without regard to the arrest of its occupants.
However, in Coolidge v. New Hampshire,6°7 the Court created a
monster which for decades has haunted courts and law enforcement
officials. Coolidge held that neither the automobile nor the plain view
exceptions to the warrant requirement applied where a suspect was arrested
in the suspect's home and where the suspect's car, parked in the suspect's
driveway, thereafter was impounded and searched at the police station
without a valid warrant but with probable cause to believe it contained
evidence of crime. °8 Following the murder of a young girl, the investi-
gation headed by the state attorney general focused on Coolidge.6 A
warrant for the search of his Pontiac was signed and issued by the attorney
general acting as justice of the peace under a New Hampshire law which
authorized all justices of the peace to issue search warrants.610 Coolidge
603. Id. at 51.
604. Id. at 52.
605. Id.
606. Id.
607. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
608. Id. at 447-49, 462, 472-73.
609. Id. at 447.
610. Id.
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was arrested in his home on the day the warrant was issued.61' Two and
one-half hours after he had been taken into custody, his car, which was
parked in his driveway, was towed to the police station.1 2 At the station,
Coolidge's car was searched and vacuumed two days after the seizure and
twice more over a year later.613 Vacuum sweepings, including particles
of gun powder taken from the car were introduced in evidence at
Coolidge's trial to prove that the victim had been in the automobile.
6 4
After rejecting the argument that the automobile search was a valid
search incident to arrest,6 5 the Court turned to the automobile search
exception. The Court recognized that police may make a warrantless search
of an automobile where they have probable cause to believe that contra-
band goods are concealed therein 616 and that police may also seize the
car and take it to the station and search it there without a warrant.
617
However, the Court viewed the automobile exception as limited to a
movable vehicle or other "means of transportation" situations where it is
not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be
sought.618 Here, the automobile exception did not apply since the
opportunity for obtaining a warrant was not "fleeting. 619 This was not
the open highway situation involved in the usual car stop. Not only did the
police have probable cause for some time before the search, there was no
evidence to indicate that the car might be moved or the evidence inside
destroyed.62 Coolidge had been arrested, police were on guard at the
house, and his wife had been sent elsewhere to spend the night.62' Thus,
there was no way in which anyone could have destroyed evidence in the
car. Curiously, the Court also noted that the objects for which there was





613. Id. at 448.
614. Id.
615. Id. at 457.
616. Id. at 458-60.
617. Id. at 458; see Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156 (1925); see also Chambers v. Maroney,
399 U.S. 42, 52 n.10 (1970).
618. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 459-60.
619. Id. at 460.
620. Id. at 462.
621. Id. at 460-61.
622. Id. at 462.
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Finally, the Court rejected the argument that the intrusion could be
justified as a seizure of an instrumentality of the crime in plain view.
62
A section of the opinion commanding only a plurality 24 regarded the
plain view doctrine as having two limits: (1) Plain view alone cannot
justify entry into a home for the purpose of seizing evidence, and (2) the
discovery of the evidence in plain view must be inadvertent.' 5 Here, the
plain view exception did not apply since the discovery was not inadvertent
and the items seized did not involve contraband or objects dangerous in
themselves. 626
Coolidge stirred the pot of search and seizure law with respect to the
automobile exception to the warrant requirement. The Court previously had
established that automobile searches were subject to the probable cause,
but not the warrant requirement, whether the search took place on the
highway627 or later at the police station impound lot.628 In Chambers
v. Maroney,629 the Court saw no constitutional difference between
warrant-based car searches, where the car was seized and held while the
probable cause question was being presented to a magistrate, and
immediate car searches without a warrant. As to which is the greater
intrusion, the Court responded that it is "a debatable question . . .
depend[ing upon] a variety of circumstances.""63
Coolidge, however, implicitly rejected this reasoning and found oppor-
tunity to obtain a warrant a critical factor in car search cases, at least
where such opportunity existed prior to the car's seizure and where the
objects of the search were not stolen, contraband or dangerous articles.
This approach conflicted with the privacy intrusion analysis of Chambers,
as well as with the Court's earlier abandonment of the "mere evidence"
rule but appeared to follow Chambers in judging exigent circumstances by
looking to the time of the seizure rather than to the time of the search.
Chambers, the Court recently recognized, had "refined the exigency
requirement... when it held that the existence of exigent circumstances
was to be determined at the time the automobile is seized. ' 63' In both
623. Id. at 464.
624. Justice Harlan concurred on another ground. See id. at 490-92 (Harlan, J., concurring).
625. Id. at 468-69.
626. Id. at 472.
627. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158 (1925).
628. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970).
629. Id
630. Id. at 51-52.
631. California v. Acevedo, I11 S. Ct. 1982, 1986 (1991).
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Chambers and Coolidge, the car was securely held at the police station at
the time of the search, and the Court has consistently rejected any require-
ment of exigency for warrantless stationhouse automobile searches.632
However, this approach runs counter to the rule that the opportunity to
obtain a warrant must be judged at the point immediately prior to the
search.633 The Court has failed to explain why the time element for
determining the existence of exigent circumstances should be different in
the case of automobiles than in the context of homes or movable objects
such as luggage or packages. The Court later placed the automobile
exception on firmer ground by recognizing a lesser expectation of privacy
in cars than in homes634 and rejecting inherent mobility as its principal
foundation,63 but has not overruled Coolidge on its facts. Nor has the
Court explained why it might not apply when the objects sought include
contraband or stolen property.636
Coolidge also threw a monkey wrench into the law of plain view
seizures. The case led most lower courts to assume that the inadvertency
limitation on the plain view seizures was constitutionally mandated, and
they developed a significant body of law on the subject of reasonable
anticipation of the presence of evidence.637 Indeed, as late as 1983, a
plurality opinion by Justice Rehnquist applied the inadvertency
requirement, but held it satisfied in that case.638 However, some lower
courts did not regard that portion of Coolidge setting forth the
inadvertency rule as binding authority.639 California, for example, refused
to follow the Coolidge inadvertency rule in a case that was factually nearly
identical to Coolidge because the Court found the Coolidge rule irrational
and unnecessary. The California court pointed out that "the judgment of
632. Florida v. Meyers, 466 U.S. 380, 382 (1984); Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259, 261 (1982); cf.
United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478, 487 (1985).
633. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 763 (1979) (stating that, "the exigency of mobility must be
assessed at the point immediately before the search-after the police have seized the object to be searched and
have it securely within their control" (emphasis added)); see also United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13
(1976); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 446-447
(1973).
634. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 391 (1985); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974)
(plurality opinion of Justice Blackmun).
635. See Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 13.
636. Distinctions between such articles and "mere evidence" were eliminated by the Court in Warden v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) and Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976).
637. See 2 LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, supra note 450 § 5.3(b), at 490-91; Comment, The Plain View
Doctrine After Horton v. California: Fourth Amendment Concerns and the Problem of Pretext, 96 DICK. L. REV.
467, 473-77 (1992) [hereinafter Comment, Plain View After Horton].
638. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 743-44 (1983).
639. See Comment, Plain View After Horton, supra note 637, at 473.
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an equally divided United States Supreme Court is without force as
precedent."' '
Also confusing was the United States Supreme Court's reference to the
fact that Coolidge did not involve contraband or objects dangerous in
themselves, suggesting that the inadvertency requirement would not apply
if such objects were involved. As noted, the Court earlier had rejected the
"mere evidence" rule of Gouled v. United States.6" Was the Court
returning to distinctions between contraband, instrumentalities, and "mere
evidence" or was the Court referring to the presence of objects that may
create an emergency, justifying immediate seizure without warrant?
Founding the distinction on an emergency rationale would not be unrea-
sonable, but it does not seem that the presence of "contraband" invariably
would present a situation calling for an immediate warrantless search.
Nearly two decades after creating confusion in the plain view area, the
United States Supreme Court rejected inadvertency as a necessary
condition to plain view seizures, and adopted the California view. Noting
that the plurality opinion in Coolidge was not binding precedent, the Court
in Horton v. United States 2 found no reason to impose the rule since
it would do little to protect Fourth Amendment values." 3 However, not
content with merely rejecting the inadvertency requirement, the Court
sowed confusion anew by explaining the requirements for plain view sei-
zures: (1) An officer must not violate the Fourth Amendment in arriving
at the place from which the evidence is plainly viewed; (2) the
incriminating character of the evidence must be "immediately apparent;"
and (3) the officer must have a lawful right of access to the object
itself.644 The Court used these requirements to distinguish Coolidge, and
to avoid overruling it. 45 The incriminating character, and thus probative
value, of Coolidge's car, the Court reasoned, was not immediately apparent
640. North v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 301, 308, 502 P.2d 1305, 1309, 104 Cal. Rptr. 833, 837 (1972).
641. 255 U.S. 298, 310 (1921).
642. 496 U.S. 128 (1990). A coin collector was robbed by two masked men armed with a machine gun
and a "stun gun." Id. at 130. Police had probable cause to believe that the defendant committed the crime, and
obtained a search warrant for his home. Id. at 130-31. The affidavit referred to police reports describing weapons
as well as proceeds, but the warrant issued by the magistrate authorized the search only for proceeds. Id. On
executing the warrant, police did not find the stolen property but did find weapons in plain view and seized
them. Id. at 131. The officer testified that while he was searching for the rings, he was also interested in finding
other evidence connecting the defendant to the robbery, and thus the seized evidence was not discovered
"inadvertently." Id.
643. Id. at 136.
644. Id. at 136-37.
645. Id.
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but remained uncertain until after the interiors were swept and
examined.' Furthermore, the seizure of the car was accomplished by
means of a warrantless trespass on Coolidge's property.647 Therefore,
"the absence of inadvertence was not essential to the Court's rejection of
the State's 'plain view' argument in Coolidge.' ' 4 Recently, citing
Horton, the Court reaffirmed that plain view seizures are justified only "if
they are unaccompanied by unlawful trespass."649
In clarifying one area of plain view doctrine by adopting the California
approach, the Court planted confusion in other areas. Specifically, what
relevance was it that the officers trespassed on defendant's property? If, for
example, the officers had looked inside Coolidge's car and had seen the
bloody clothing or a plastic bag of drugs, could they have seized the car
or examined it without a warrant? What if officers trespassing in the open
fields come across bloody clothing which they have probable cause to
believe connects the defendant to a recent murder; can they seize it
without a warrant? If so, can they take it to the station and examine it
without a warrant? Trespass alone has never been a reason to reject plain
view of evidence in the open fields cases.65 In fact, the Court has
regarded the trespass factor as having little relevance to the propriety of
police conduct under the Fourth Amendment.65 The crucial requirement
is simply that the plain view seizure must not be the product of an
unlawful search and that the police must not be engaged in a search in
violation of the Fourth Amendment when they come upon the contraband.
Furthermore, what is the meaning of "immediately apparent"? In
Coolidge, the officers had probable cause to believe the car contained
seizable evidence. 652 Thus, "immediately apparent" appears to require
more than probable cause, but how much more? In United States v.
Jacobsen,653 the Court seemed to demand "virtual certainty" for
application of the plain view doctrine. Federal Express agents had opened
a damaged package and discovered plastic bags containing white
powder.6 4 They placed the bags back in the package and called federal
646. Id. at 137.
647. Id.
648. Id.
649. Soldal v. Cook County, 113 S. CL 538, 546 (1992).
650. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 304 (1987).
651. Id.
652. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,450 (1971).
653. 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
654. Id. at 111.
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agents who came and examined the package, removed the bags, and
examined the powder.655 Since the Federal Express actions were private
in character, they lacked state authority and thus did not violate the Fourth
Amendment. However, the actions of the federal agents had to "be tested
by the degree to which they exceeded the scope of the private search. 65 6
Had the white powder been in plain view at the time the federal agents
arrived, there would have been no further search, but it was not entirely
clear that powder was visible to the agent before he removed the tube from
the box 657 Yet the Court concluded that even if the powder was not
itself in plain view," there was no government search since there was
a virtual certainty that nothing else of significance was in the package and
that an inspection of the package would not reveal anything more than that
which the agent had already been told.659 Following Jacobsen, the Tenth
Circuit required that in order to rely on plain view the police must be
virtually certain of what they will find inside a package, i.e., that the
contents of the package be a "foregone conclusion."0 Later, however,
the Supreme Court equated "immediately apparent" with probable cause.
In Arizona v. Hicks, 6 the Court rejected the argument that plain
view seizures of articles in the home are justified on less than probable
cause.6 2 The Court stated that "[d]ispensing with the need for a warrant
is worlds apart from permitting a lesser standard of cause for the seizure
than a warrant would require, i.e., the standard of probable cause. ' ' 63 In
Minnesota v. Dickerson,64 the Court decided that officers may seize
655. Id. at 111-12.
656. Id. at 115.
657. Id. at 118.
658. 1d at 118-19. The powder was still enclosed in the many containers and covered with papers. Id.
659. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 764 n.13 (1979) (suggesting that not all containers and
packages deserve full protection of the Fourth Amendment, and giving as examples "a kit of burglar tools or
a gun case which by their very nature cannot support any reasonable expectation of privacy because their
contents can be inferred from their outward appearance"); see also Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730,743-44 (1983)
(upholding the seizure of a tied-off balloon and later search of the balloon without a warrant under the plain
view doctrine). In Brown, Justice Stevens believed that ordinarily probable cause that a container conceals
contraband would not authorize a warrantless search, but the balloon here could be one of those rare single-
purpose containers which by their very nature could not support a reasonable expectation of privacy. Id. at 750-
51. Unlike a suitcase or paper bag, a balloon of this kind might be used only to transport drugs. Id. at 751. Thus,
the officer could have concluded that it contained heroin "with a degree of certainty that is equivalent to the
plain view of the heroin itself." Id.
660. United States v. Corral, 970 F.2d 719, 725 (10th Cir. 1992).
661. 480 U.S. 321 (1987).
662. Id. at 326-27.
663. Id at 327.
664. 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993).
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contraband based on plain feel, as well as plain view, provided its
incriminating character is immediately apparent, but warned that the plain
view doctrine will not apply if the police lack probable cause to believe
that the object in plain view is contraband, "i.e., if 'its incriminating
character [is not] immediately apparent."'" 5 Recently, the Court stated
that plain view seizures can be justified only if they meet the probable
cause standard, that is, "there is probable cause to associate the property
with criminal activity." While suggesting that "probable cause" is the
equivalent of "immediately apparent," the Court did not overrule Jacobsen
and other authorities which clearly indicated that probable cause alone was
not sufficient to invoke the plain view doctrine.667 At least one lower
court has continued to rely on these older authorities in holding that plain
view demands more than probable cause." 8
Confusion now abounds. In Coolidge, the Court assumed that police
had probable cause to believe that Coolidge's car contained evidence of
the crime." 9 It even appeared that the officers had cause to believe that
the car was more than a mere container of evidence since there was reason
to believe that it might have been used in the victim's abduction and
murder.670 Thus, it seems that the incriminating character of the car was
"immediately apparent" to the officers at the time of the seizure. Yet we
are left with the Court's announcement in Horton that although Coolidge's
discussion of plain view is not binding precedent, "the decision nonetheless
is a binding precedent.""67 Does the "immediately apparent" meaning of
this statement, that the Coolidge result on its facts is entitled to binding
precedent, mean that the California Supreme Court decision on nearly
identical facts holding the other way672 is inconsistent with the Fourth
Amendment? Much of this uncertainty could have been avoided by the
Court merely overruling Coolidge rather than allowing the ghosts of bad
665. Id. at 2136-37 (citing Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136 (1990)).
666. Soldal v. Cook County, 113 S. Ct. 538, 547 (1992).
667. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983); see id. at 749-50 (Stevens, J., concurring) (stating that
ordinarily probable cause that a container conceals contraband would not authorize a warrantless search). In his
plurality opinion in Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649 (1980), Justice Stevens rejected the contention that
labels on boxes which gave probable cause to believe that the films contained therein were obscene was enough
to invoke the plain view doctrine. Id. at 658 n.11. Justice Stevens' opinion for the Court in United States v.
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984) relied on and affirmed the foregoing principles. Id. at 121.
668. United States v. Villarreal, 963 F.2d 770 (5th Cir. 1992).
669. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 446-47, 460 (1971) (plurality opinion).
670. Id. at 447 (plurality opinion).
671. Horton v. United States, 496 U.S. 128, 136 (1990).
672. North v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 301, 307, 502 P.2d 1305, 1308, 104 Cal. Rptr. 833, 836 (1972).
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precedent, with its subtle, illogical and unworkable distinctions, to turn
search and seizure law into a house of horrors.
4. Other Movable Containers and Plain View
The Court's reluctance to overrule decisions announcing illogical or
unworkable rules has led to even greater confusion with respect to searches
of movable containers of evidence outside the home or office context. The
history of Chief Justice Burger's opinion in United States v. Chadwick673
provides a good example of the confusion created by the Court's water-
torture overruling technique.
Prior to Chadwick, federal courts had tended to treat searches of
movable containers, such as packages and luggage, as similar to searches
of automobiles. In the vehicle context, as long as the car was initially
seized on the highway or in a situation where it would be impractical to
obtain a warrant, a warrantless search could be made later at the police
station even though the police could easily have obtained a warrant at the
station.674 Following this approach, lower courts routinely held that
containers and packages found during a legitimate warrantless search of an
auto also could be searched without a warrant.675 Even outside the auto-
mobile context, warrantless searches of luggage, packages, and other
movable containers were allowed if the searching officer had probable
cause to believe that the article contained seizable items though it might
be securely in police custody at the time of the search.676 Reviewing the
authorities in 1974, after Coolidge but before Chadwick, Professor Anthony
673. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
674. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42,52 (1970); see Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,482-
83 (1971) (plurality opinion).
675. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 819 n.25 (1982) (citing United States v. Vento, 533 F.2d
838, 867 n.101 (3d Cir. 1976), United States v. Tramunti, 513 F.2d 1087, 1104 (2d Cir. 1975), United States
v. Issod, 508 F.2d 990, 993 (7th Cir. 1974), United States v. Soriano, 497 F.2d 147, 149-50 (5th Cir. 1974) (en
banc), United States v. Bowman, 487 F.2d 1229 (10th Cir. 1973), and United States v. Evans, 481 F.2d 990,
994 (9th Cir. 1973)).
Earlier, however, several justices in Coolidge stated that they "found no case that suggests [an extension
of the automobile exception] to 'containers' that are equally movable, e.g., trunks, suitcases, boxes, briefcases,
and bags." Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 461 n.18 (plurality opinion).
676. See, e.g., Hemandez v. United States, 353 F.2d 624, 627-28 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S.
1008 (1966); United States v. Zimmerman, 326 F.2d 1, 4-5 (7th Cir. 1963); Romero v. United States 318 F.2d
530, 532 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 946 (1963). However, there was some authority to the effect
that warrantless searches of containers other than vehicles required a showing of likelihood that the object would
be moved during the period necessary to obtain a warrant. See Comgold v. United States, 367 F.2d 1, 3 (9th
Cir. 1966); cf. Nugent v. United States, 409 U.S. 1065, 1066 (1972) (White, J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing); Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 461 n.18 (plurality opinion).
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Amsterdam concluded that "[a]pparently, warrantless searches of other
highly mobile articles-such as luggage deposited for shipment out of rail
or air terminals-are also permissible when there is probable cause to
believe that they contain criminally related objects." 677
The Court in Chadwick, however, concluded that containers and
movable property outside the home or vehicle context should be treated
similarly to homes rather than to automobiles.678 The Court viewed the
Chambers automobile search principles as not applicable to movable
containers other than cars-in this case a locked footlocker.679 With
probable cause to believe that a footlocker carried by the defendants
contained contraband, police arrested the defendants after they loaded it
into a car trunk, but before they could drive off.6 80 Defendants and the
footlocker were taken to the station where, an hour and a half after its
seizure, the footlocker was searched without a warrant.68 1 Rejecting the
government's contention that the search of movable luggage should be
considered analogous to the search of an automobile,682 the Court
declared that one's expectation of privacy in personal luggage and other
personal effects is "substantially greater" than in an automobile.6 3 The
Court also rejected the argument that the search was justified as incident
to the defendants' arrest.6 84 The search of the footlocker was remote in
time and place from the arrest, and the fact that a person arrested in public
is in possession of property as to which there is probable cause to believe
contains contraband or evidence, does not justify search of the property
after it "comes under the exclusive dominion of police authority."
685
Once law enforcement officers have reduced luggage or other
personal property not immediately associated with the person of the
arrestee to their exclusive control, and there is no longer any
danger that the arrestee might gain access to the property to seize
677. Anthony Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MiNN. L. REv. 349, 359 (1974).
678. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13 (1977).
679. Id. at 11-13.
680. Id. at 3-4.
681. Id. at 4.
682. Id. at 11-12.
683. Id. at 13. The Court also noted that secure storage facilities are usually available for luggage and that
such "may often not be the case when automobiles are seized." Id. at 13 n.7.
684. Id. at 15.
685. Id.
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a weapon or destroy evidence, a search of that property is no
longer an incident of the arrest.
68 6
Soon after Chadwick, the Court expanded its principles. In Arkansas
v. Sanders,687 police observed the defendant arrive at an airport with a
suitcase, which they had probable cause to believe contained marijuana,
and watched as the defendant's companion placed the suitcase in the trunk
of a taxi cab.688 Police stopped the taxi several blocks from the airport,
seized the suitcase and opened it, discovering marijuana.689 Holding that
Chadwick required police to obtain a warrant to search the suitcase, the
Court announced that its principles were not limited to where the vehicle
was parked at the curb and the container searched at the station, but also
applied where the car was moving and the police stopped it, seized the
luggage, and searched it at the scene.6 90 Furthermore, the Court
concluded that Chadwick's protection was not limited to luggage, but
applied to all closed or opaque containers: "[A] diary and a dish pan are
equally protected by the Fourth Amendment." 691' However, the Court
vacillated on the question of whether Chadwick applied to packages found
in a car lawfully searched under the Chambers automobile exception. The
Court first answered in the affirmative, stating that "closed pieces of
luggage found in a lawfully searched car are protected to the same degree
as are closed pieces of luggage found anywhere else." 692 Then, one year
later, in United States v. Ross,693 the Court executed an about-face,
holding that "once probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped
vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents
that may conceal the object of the search. ' 69  The Court rejected
Chadwick's distinction between automobile compartments and separate
containers, stating that: "Certainly, the privacy interests in a car's trunk or
686. Id. (emphasis added).
687. 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
688. Id. at 755.
689. Id.
690. lId at 763-64.
691. Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981); see United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822 (1982)
(stating that "[j]ust as the most frail cottage in the kingdom is absolutely entitled to the same guarantees of
privacy as the most majestic mansion, so also may a traveler who carries a toothbrush and a few articles of
clothing in a paper bag or knotted scarf claim an equal right to conceal his possessions from official inspection
as the sophisticated executive with the locked attache case").
692. Robbins, 453 U.S. at 425.
693. 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
694. Id. at 825.
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glove compartment may be no less than those in a movable container." '695
After cutting away Chadwick's principal foundation, the Court left its
skeletal remains hanging in the wind to frighten and confuse travelers who
must take the perilous journey through the land of cars and containers.
Rather than clarifying the law by overruling Chadwick and Sanders, the
Court distinguished them. The Court in Ross pointed out that "the
suspected locus of the contraband" was the luggage, not the automobile,
and police had no probable cause to search anything in the automobile
except the luggage. 69 On the other hand, in Ross the officers had
probable cause to search "the entire vehicle" on the ground that an
informant had said that the defendant had narcotics in the trunk of his
car.697 The result of this attempt to distinguish rather than overrule a
confusing and unworkable rule was that the more the police knew of the
specific location and packaging of contraband, and thus the greater
probability of discovering contraband in a particular container in an auto-
mobile, the less freedom they had to search it. In Ross, the probable cause
was based on an informant's tip that the defendant was selling narcotics
which he kept in the trunk of his car.698 This justified the warrantless
searches of a brown paper bag and a zippered leather pouch which were
found in the trunk of the defendant's car.699 In Chadwick, on the other
hand, the probable cause arose principally from a dog sniff of the
defendants' luggage, which was thereafter placed in the trunk of a
defendant's car.7°° Similarly in Sanders, the probable cause centered on
defendant's suitcase which was placed in the trunk of a taxi. 0
Apparently, if the police in Ross had been told that defendant kept the
narcotics in a brown bag in the car trunk, police would have needed a
warrant to search the bag. Luckily for them, they had not been informed
of the brown bag but only of the presence of narcotics in the trunk.
Fourteen years after Chadwick, the Court recognized these anomalies
and abandoned the Chadwick-Sanders rule with respect to searches of
containers found in automobiles. In California v. Acevedo,0 2 the Court
695. Id. at 823. In California v. Acevedo, the Court read Ross as concluding that "the expectation of
privacy in one's vehicle is equal to one's expectation of privacy in the container... California v. Acevedo.
II1 S. Ct. 1982, 1987 (1991).
696. Ross, 456 U.S. at 813.
697. Id.
698. Id.
699. Id. at 817.
700. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 4 (1977).
701. See supra notes 687-689 and accompanying text.
702. 111 S. Ct. 1982 (1991).
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adopted "one clear-cut rule": "The police may search an automobile and
the containers within it where they have probable cause to believe contra-
band or evidence is contained."7 3 Police saw the defendant leave an
apartment carrying a brown paper bag which they believed contained
marijuana, place the bag in the trunk of a car, and start to drive away. 0
They stopped the car, opened the trunk, and searched the bag, discovering
marijuana.7°5 The Court noted that while the police had probable cause
to believe the bag in the trunk contained marijuana, they did not have
probable cause to believe that there was contraband in any other part of
the car and, thus, had no probable cause to search the entire vehicle.
70 6
Rejecting the Chadwick-Sanders rule respecting the search of a containers
in cars, the Court upheld the search of the bag on the ground that con-
tainers found in an automobile may be searched without a warrant if the
search is supported by probable cause.7 7 Thus, the Court finally
eliminated the "curious line between the search of an automobile that coin-
cidentally turns up a container and the search of a container that coin-
cidentally turns up in an automobile.,
7 8
However, the Supreme Court viewed Chadwick as generally demanding
a search warrant for the search of a container outside the automobile
context, even with full probable cause to believe that it contained
contraband or seizable evidence,7'9 and Acevedo maintained this aspect
of Chadwick's warrant requirement.710 Though Ross had rejected any dis-
tinction between expectations of privacy in car compartments and separate
containers,7 1' Acevedo maintained the warrant requirement for searches
of containers not found in automobiles.712 While a paper bag or a
briefcase carried on the street is protected by the general warrant
703. Id. at 1991.
704. Id. at 1984-85.
705. Id. at 1985.
706. Id. at 1991.
707. Id.
708. Id.
709. See Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 658 (1980) (holding that although labels on boxes gave
probable cause to believe that a package contained obscene films, a search warrant was required absent consent
or exigent circumstances). Chadwick held that authority to possess a package is distinct from authority to
examine its contents. Id. at 654; see United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 120 n.17 (1984) (refusing to
sanction warrantless searches of closed or covered containers or packages whenever probable cause exists as a
result of a prior private search, noting that according to Chadwick, "[a] container which can support a reasonable
expectation of privacy may not be searched, even on probable cause, without a warrant").
710. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. at 1986.
711. Ross, 456 U.S. at 823.
712. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. at 1986.
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requirement, it loses this protection as soon as it is placed in a car, even
if the owner locks it in the glove compartment or trunk. Thus, by keeping
alive the Chadwick rule with respect to containers not found in vehicles,
the Court drew another curious line between a container that coincidentally
turns up in an automobile and one that does not. The Court in Ross had
recognized that it was arguable that the same exigent circumstances that
permit a warrantless search of an automobile would justify the warrantless
search of a movable container, 13 but the Court put that question to one
side "[i]n deference to the rule of Chadwick and Sanders. 714 The
Acevedo Court answered the question as to containers in cars, but in
distinguishing cases involving container searches outside the automobile
context,715 the Acevedo Court left in place Chadwick's warrant
requirement for movable containers generally and left us still struggling
under the weight of Chief Justice Burger's baggage.716
Movable container searches and plain view seizures also bedeviled
Justice Traynor and the California Supreme Court. In People v.
Marshall,717 decided after Preston718 but prior to Chambers,719 police
sent an informant to the defendant's apartment to purchase marijuana.720
The informant soon returned with marijuana in a cellophane bag and told
the officers waiting outside that, when in the defendant's bedroom, the
defendant had given it to him after taking it from a brown paper bag that
contained more cellophane bags of marijuana.721 The officers entered to
arrest the defendant, but found no one after a cursory search of the living
room, bedroom, and bathroom. 722 An open window indicated that the
occupants had fled.723 One officer detected a sweet odor similar to that
of the marijuana produced by the informant and recognized it as similar
to marijuana soaked in wine.72' The officer noted that the odor came
713. Ross, 456 U.S. at 809.
714. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. at 1988 (citing Ross, 456 U.S. at 809-10).
715. Id. at 1988-89.
716. Id. Justice Scalia in concurrence described the Court's holding as "the continuation of an inconsistent
jurisprudence that has been with us for years" and warned that "[t]here can be no clarity in this area unless we
make up our minds." Id. at 1993 (Scalia, J., concurring).
717. 69 Cal. 2d 51, 442 P.2d 665, 69 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1968).
718. Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1974); see supra note 597.
719. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); see supra note 601.
720. Marshall, 69 Cal. 2d at 54, 442 P.2d at 667, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 587.
721. Id.
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from an open cardboard box on the floor inside an open bedroom
closet.725 Inside the box the officers discovered a closed brown paper bag
which they opened to find twenty-one plastic bags of wine-soaked, sweet-
smelling marijuana.726 Justice Traynor, writing for the court, found that
the officers had properly entered the apartment to arrest the defendant,
727
but he concluded that they acted unlawfully in seizing and searching the
brown paper bag without a warrant.728 The plain view doctrine did not
apply since "in plain smell" is plainly not the equivalent of "in plain
view. 72 9 The paper bag itself was not contraband, and only by prying
into its interior could the officer "be sure that he was seizing contraband
and nothing more."730 Traynor reasoned that relying on odor might
mislead officers and lead to fruitless invasions of privacy. T3
Furthermore, prior to discovery of the marijuana, the officers were satisfied
that the occupants had departed.732 Thus, even if the marijuana had been
in plain view, it was found during an unlawful search for evidence, rather
than in the course of a lawful search for suspects.733
Although the result in Marshall rests comfortably on the proposition
that plain view does not apply when police are searching in violation of
the Fourth Amendment and do not come upon an article "from a lawful
vantage point,"7' the California Supreme Court relied on Marshall's
dicta limiting inspection of articles discovered in the course of a lawful
search to require a warrant for the search of packages outside the context
of homes and automobiles. The court, with Traynor concurring, declined
to limit Marshall to dwelling houses, and applied Marshall to luggage,
packages, and other containers shipped through common carriers. 3
725. Id.
726. Id.
727. The case was decided prior to Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), at a time when it was
lawful for police to enter a home without a warrant for the purpose of making an arrest.
728. Marshall, 69 Cal. 2d at 62, 442 P.2d at 671, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 588.
729. Id. at 59, 442 P.2d at 670, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 590.
730. Id. at 58-59, 442 P.2d at 669, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 589.
731. Id. at 59, 442 P.2d at 670, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 590.
732. Id. at 60, 442 P.2d at 670, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 590.
733. Id.
734. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2137 (1993); see Soldal v. Cook County, 113 S. Ct. 538,
548 (1992) (holding that if the officer's presence in the home itself entails a violation of the Fourth Amendment,
no amount of probable cause will justify seizure of an item in plain view).
735. See People v. McGrew, I Cal. 3d 404, 413, 462 P.2d 1, 8, 82 Cal. Rptr. 473, 479 (1969) (holding
that closed footlockers containing wrapped packages of marijuana consigned to shipment by United Airlines
could not be opened by police without a search warrant); see also Abt v. Superior Court, I Cal. 3d 418, 421,
462 P.2d 10, 11, 82 Cal. Rptr. 481,483 (1969) (holding that the probability that a carton of brick-shaped tinfoil-
wrapped packages shipped with an airline would contain marijuana is not sufficient to justify a search without
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Thus, probable cause to believe that such articles contained contraband was
not enough. A search warrant was required.
However, shortly after Traynor's retirement, 36 the United States
Supreme Court decided Chambers v. Maroney.737 In light of Chambers,
the California Supreme Court reconsidered and rejected the requirement of
a warrant for the search of a container consigned to a common carrier for
shipment.738 The court reasoned that the rationale of Chambers (that
there is no constitutional difference between seizing and holding an
automobile while presenting the probable cause to a magistrate and
carrying out an immediate search without a warrant) applies equally to
goods or chattels consigned to common carriers.Z The California court
believed that the United States Supreme Court had drawn the line between
"things readily moved" and a "fixed piece of property,"740 and saw a box
or package consigned to a common carrier as "no less movable than an
automobile. 7 4' As noted previously, the United States Supreme Court
in Chadwick rejected the notion that the Chambers automobile exception
governed the search of movable containers generally.742 In later cases the
Court relied on Chadwick and its progeny for the proposition that an
officer's authority to possess a package is distinct from the authority to
examine its contents,743 and a container which can support a reasonable
expectation of privacy may not be searched, even on probable cause, with-
out a warrant.7 " Unless inside an automobile, closed, opaque containers
generally remain subject to the warrant requirement.745
Thus, we once more confront the curious line between containers found
inside and those discovered outside automobiles. The rationale for this
distinction rests on weak foundations. The Supreme Court first pointed to
a warrant).
736. See supra note 7.
737. See supra note 601 and accompanying text.
738. People v. McKinnon, 7 Cal. 3d 899, 910, 500 P.2d 1097, 1104, 103 Cal. Rptr. 897, 904 (1972).
739. Id.
740. Id. at 909, 500 P.2d at 1104, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 904.
741. Id. However, first class mail historically had been accorded special treatment and would remain
protected by the warrant requirement. Id. at 909 n.3, 500 P.2d at 1104 n.3, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 904 n.3.
742. See supra notes 678-683 and accompanying text.
743. See Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 654 (1980) (holding that though labels on boxes gave
probable cause to believe that films inside were obscene, a search warrant was required absent consent or exigent
circumstances).
744. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114 (1984).
745. United States v. Villarreal, 963 F.2d 770, 774 (5th Cir. 1992).
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mobility and the impracticability of obtaining a warrant,74 6 but after
finding this factor inadequate, the Court shifted to differences in
expectations of privacy.747 Yet the Court has backed away from this
explanation also.748 Consequently, the curious line which developed from
Burger's baggage-Chadwick and its progeny-remains because of the
Court's reluctance to overrule precedent, except on the installment plan.
In this area, neither the United States Supreme Court nor the California
Supreme Court has developed rational, workable standards.
Courts should consider returning to the simple standard that has its
roots in Carroll v. United States749 and that Traynor adopted for auto-
mobile searches one year after Cahan:750 If police have probable cause
to believe an automobile contains contraband, they need not obtain a
search warrant in order to search it either at the scene or later at the police
station."5 The same standard should govern the search of other movable
containers outside the home or office context. In fact, a strong argument
can be made that reasonableness, rather than the warrant clause, should
govern the search of automobiles and all movable containers outside the
context of serious intrusions such as home or office searches, electronic
interception of conversations, and invasions of the body of the suspect. To
think of the reasonableness clause as governing all searches and seizures,
but demanding a warrant to make reasonable particularly intrusive ones,
is more consistent with the result of most Supreme Court search and
seizure decisions75 2 than the general rule, which won out in the final
hours of the Warren Court in the late 1960's, 753 and which demands
746. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,467-68 (1970); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42,
52 n.10 (1970)..
747. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386,391 (1985) (holding that the pervasive schemes of regulation
which necessarily lead to reduced expectation of privacy and the exigencies attendant to ready mobility justify
searches without warrants if based on probable cause); see also United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13
(1976) (holding that a person's expectation of privacy in personal luggage is substantially greater than in an
automobile).
748. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823 (1982) (stating that certainly the privacy interests in
a car's trunk or glove compartment may be no less than those in a movable container).
749. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
750. People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
751. People v. Gale, 46 Cal. 2d 253, 255, 294 P.2d 13, 14 (1956).
752. As Justice Scalia has pointed out, the general preference for warrants is illusory since the warrant
requirement has "become so riddled with exceptions that it [is] basically unrecognizable." California v. Acevedo,
111 S. Ct. 1982, 1992 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
753. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
357 (1967)).
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warrants for all searches and seizures, "subject only to a few specifically
established and well-delineated exceptions."7 4
As a general matter, the greater the expectation of privacy, the more
protections afforded by the Constitution. Where the Court has found a
lesser expectation of privacy, it has applied less stringent Fourth Amend-
ment protection.75 Conversely, Fourth Amendment reasonableness
requires that "when a State seeks to intrude upon an area in which our
society recognizes a significant heightened privacy interest, a more
substantial justification is required to make the search reasonable.
756
Homes, for example, traditionally have been accorded heightened
protection. The Court has stated that the "physical entry of the home is the
chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is
directed, 757 and has emphasized "that 'at the very core' of the Fourth
Amendment 'stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home.'
' 758
On the other hand, only a strained reading of the Fourth Amendment's
prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures could lead one to
conclude that the search of a paper bag or other container found or carried
in a public place is a greater invasion of privacy than a search of the same
container which its owner had securely locked in a car trunk or glove
compartment.7 59
While people are not shorn of all Fourth Amendment protections when
they step from their homes onto the public walkways7'6 or from the
sidewalks into their automobiles,7 6 1 the Supreme Court has clearly held
that neither a warrant nor probable cause, nor indeed any measure of
individualized suspicion, is an independent component of reasonableness
in every circumstance.762 The Court recently affirmed that "'reason-
754. The Supreme Court has continued to claim that the general rule requiring warrants is subject to only
a few exceptions: "Time and again, this Court has observed that searches and seizures 'conducted outside the
judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment - subject only to a few specifically established and well delineated exceptions."' Minnesota v.
Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2135 (1993).
755. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 767 (1985).
756. lit
757. United States v. United States Dist. Ct. for the E. Dist. of Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972).
758. Soldal v. Cook County, 113 S. Ct. 538,543 (1992). The Court has found "stronger privacy interests"
in a home than in a business. See Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 296 (1984) (comparing a home to a
furniture store).
759. See supra notes 709-716 and accompanying text.
760. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 6 (1968).
761. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 651 (1979).
762. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989); Skinner v. Railway
Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 624 (1989).
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ableness is still the ultimate standard' under the Fourth Amendment. 763
According to the balancing test used to determine reasonableness, "a
search of the house or office is generally not reasonable without a warrant
issued on probable cause."7 4 Other particularly intrusive searches, such
as the interception of conversations by means of wiretapping or electronic
devices and non-emergency intrusions into the body of suspects,
undoubtedly should remain on this list, but the list should not include
searches of movable containers found in public places, any more than it
now encompasses the arrest and search of a suspect in a public place.765
These standards would provide clear, workable guidelines for law
enforcement while protecting the privacy of citizens through the necessity
of a warrant for home searches and comparably serious intrusions and the
requirement of probable cause for automobile and other movable container
searches.
These simple rules also would help clarify the plain view doctrine.
With probable cause alone justifying the search of a movable container,
there would be little need to draw fine lines between degrees of cause,
asking whether police only reasonably believed, or were virtually certain,
of the presence of contraband. Despite the Supreme Court's recent
indications that probable cause may be the equivalent of "immediately
apparent,"7 66 the Fifth Circuit has continued to read the Court's precedent
as requiring a warrant even if labels on a container identify its contents
and its owner orally informs the police of the container's contents.
767
Nor would courts have to inquire whether police were virtually certain, not
only that the containers held contraband, but that it contained nothing else.
Two years after Traynor's retirement, the California Supreme Court in
Guidi v. Superior Court768 largely rejected the limitation of Marshall
69
on plain smell seizures and upheld the seizure and search of a closed
shopping bag which .was discovered in a house during the course of a
lawful search for suspects, emitted an odor of hashish, and had previously
763. Soldal v. Cook County, 113 S. Ct. 538, 549 (1992).
764. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 331 (1990).
765. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411,423-24 (1976) (holding that the Fourth Amendment does
not demand a warrant or exigent circumstances for an arrest in a public place).
766. See supra notes 661-667 and accompanying text.
767. United States v. Villarreal, 963 F.2d 770, 776 (5th Cir. 1992).
768. 10 Cal. 3d 1. 513 P.2d 908, 109 Cal. Rptr. 684 (1973).
769. People v. Marshall, 69 Cal. 2d 51, 442 P.2d 665, 69 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1968).
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been described to the police as containing contraband.77 ° Seizure of the
bag was justified as seizure of evidence in plain view because the bag was
"highly portable" and its contents were described to police by an informant
as consisting "solely of the proffered hashish and nothing else.""' The
Court warned that the rule may not apply when "contraband is believed to
be hidden among several items within a container" or with respect to
containers which are "less portable." '772 The United States Supreme Court
in United States v. Jacobsen03 seems to have ascribed to a similar
limitation on plain view seizures in suggesting that plain view requires not
only a virtual certainty that the article contains contraband, but a virtual
certainty that nothing else of significance is in the container and that
inspection of it would not reveal anything more than what is already
known to the police."7
Furthermore, under a conventional probable cause standard, courts
would not have to ask whether cause for a seizure stems from the
container's outward appearance alone or from information previously
gathered by the police. The rationale of the plain view doctrine rests on the
notion that if the condition of an article renders its contents "immediately
apparent," seizure of the article is a reasonable Fourth Amendment
intrusion and its inspection involves "no invasion of a legitimate
expectation of privacy and thus no 'search' within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment." 775 Yet courts have applied plain view to closed,
opaque containers where police previously observed a suspect place
contraband in it or have been told by an informant that the particular
article contains contraband. The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, in a opinion written by then Judge, now Justice, Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, found that the plain view doctrine allowed the police to
seize and open a "black purse" containing drugs on the ground that an
770. The court stopped short of overruling Marshall, but found that the odor of contraband could be used
to corroborate other information supporting a plain view seizure and directed that to the extent inconsistent with
its views, Marshall "is no longer to be followed." Guidi, 10 Cal. 3d at 17 n.18, 513 P.2d at 919 n.18, 109 Cal.
Rptr. at 695 n.18. The United States Supreme Court appears also to allow "plain smell" seizures. See United
States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696,707 (1983) (subjecting luggage to a "dog sniff' does not constitute a search since
it does not compromise any privacy interest); see also Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2136 (1993)
(allowing a tactile discovery to support a "plain view" seizure, the Court concluded that police may seize
contraband "detected" during a lawful pat-down for weapons).
771. Guidi, 10 Cal. 3d at 17, 513 P.2d at 919, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 695.
772. Id. at 17-18, 513 P.2d at 920, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 696..
773. 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
774. Id. at 130.
775. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2137; see Soldal v. Cook County, 113 S. Ct. 538, 546 (1992) (stating that
when an item in plain view is seized, no invasion of privacy occurs).-
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officer, viewing a drug transaction through binoculars from the window of
a third floor apartment, had witnessed a suspect place packets of drugs in
the bag." 6 The Court emphasized that "[n]o considerable time span
separated the sighting of the packets from the search."7 " Yet how much
time must elapse to render plain view inapplicable? How much more strict
is such a standard than one founded on probable cause which would allow
police to search the bag as long as the delay and other circumstances
rendered reasonable their belief that the bag still contained the drugs? On
the other hand, what if the officers had not witnessed the drugs being
placed in the bag, but were told of it by an informant? The California
Supreme Court in Guidi allowed the plain view seizure and inspection of
a closed shopping bag based in part on the fact that an informant
previously had described the bag as containing hashish.778 These cases
indicate that once officers have information that a container holds
contraband, they may open it though its physical characteristics fail to
reveal its contents. This result is difficult to square with the rationale of
the plain view doctrine-that an inspection of an article in plain view is
not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment since it does
not invade any legitimate expectation of privacy. A simple, straightforward
rule allowing the search of a movable container on probable cause would
lead to similar results but would be more rational and offer greater clarity.
Such a rule would assume the inspection of the containers in these cases
were searches under the Fourth Amendment, but would find these searches
reasonable if, from any legitimate source, police have probable cause to
believe they contain contraband or other seizable items.
Finally, a rule based on probable cause would not lead courts to
embark on the fruitless course of asking whether an object is merely a
container of evidence, is itself evidence, or is an instrumentality of the
crime. The California Supreme Court, with Traynor Concurring, drew this
distinction in People v. Teale.779 After Traynor's departure, the court
named the rule the instrumentality exception to the warrant require-
ment, regarding it as "implicit" in Coolidge and other United States
776. United States v. Gibson, 636 F.2d 761, 764 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
777. Id.
778. Guidi v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 1, 5, 14-17, 513 P.2d 908, 910, 917, 109 Cal. Rptr. 684, 686,
693 (1973).
779. 70 Cal. 2d 497, 511,450 P.2d 564, 572-73, 75 Cal. Rptr. 172, 180-81 (1969); see Guidi, 10 Cal. 3d
at 14-15, 513 P.2d at 917, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 693.
780. See People v. Griffin, 46 Cal. 3d 1011, 1024, 761 P.2d 103, 109, 251 Cal. Rptr. 643, 649 (1988),
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Supreme Court decisions.71  According to this principle, when police
lawfully seize an object which they reasonably believe "is itself evidence"
of the commission of crime, any later examination of the object for the
purpose of determining its evidentiary value does not constitute a "search"
under the Fourth Amendment. 82 The source of this rule lies in the notion
that properly seized items of evidentiary value, such as firearms or other
weapons, can be subjected to inspection and scientific testing without the
approval of a judge or magistrate.783 The rule has been applied primarily
to cases of automobiles used in the commission of violent crimes, but
the court, in Guidi, also applied the rule to a bag containing drugs.
785
However, the California Supreme Court in Teale required that courts
distinguish a "container for evidence of the charged crime," which is not
subject to plain view seizure, from "an object reasonably believed to be
itself evidence of the charged crime," which is subject to seizure and
detailed examination under the plain view doctrine.786 In Guidi, the
California court founded the distinction on principles of relevance. The
Guidi court drew a line between an object which was "merely a container
concealing items of evidentiary value" and one which was "itself...
evidence of a crime and additionally contained within it other items of
evidentiary value. 787 The court concluded that since the shopping bag
containing the drugs in that case matched an earlier description of a bag
containing drugs, it was "relevant evidence" even absent its contraband
contents. 88 The court later emphasized the "instrumentality" aspect of
781. Griffin, 46 Cal. 3d at 1025, 761 P.2d at 110, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 650.
782. See People v. Teale, 70 Cal. 2d 497, 511, 450 P.2d 564, 572, 75 Cal. Rptr. 172, 180 (1969). Later
cases rejected the "no search" rationale and rested the rule on the reasonableness of the intrusion. See, e.g.,
Guidi, 10 Cal. 3d at 18-19 n.19, 513 P.2d at 921 n.19, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 697 n.19; People v. Minjares, 24 Cal.
3d 410,422,591 P.2d 514, 520, 153 Cal. Rptr. 224, 230 (1979). However, the court returned to the "no search"
rationale in People v. Griffin, 46 Cal. 3d 1011, 761 P.2d 103, 251 Cal. Rptr. 643 (1988). The court held that
when a seized automobile is itself evidence, any later examination for the purpose of determining its evidentiary
value does not constitute a search. Id. at 1025, 761 P.2d at 110, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 650.
783. Griffin, 46 Cal. 3d at 1023-25, 761 P.2d at 109-12, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 649-51.
784. When a car has been used in a kidnapping or when a rape or murder has occurred in the vehicle, it
is viewed as evidence of the crime, rather than as a mere container of evidence and is subject to warrantless
seizure and inspection. See People v. Teale, 70 Cal. 2d 497, 510-11,450 P.2d 564, 572, 75 Cal. Rptr. 172, 180
(1969); see also People v. Rogers, 21 Cal. 3d 542, 549, 579 P.2d 1048, 1052-53, 146 Cal. Rptr. 732, 736-37
(1978); North v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 301, 305-06, 502 P.2d 1305, 1307, 104 Cal. Rptr. 833, 835 (1972).
785. Guidi v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 1, 18-19, 513 P.2d 908, 920-21, 109 Cal. Rptr. 684, 696-97
(1973); see People v. Farley, 20 Cal. App. 3d 1032, 1037-38, 98 Cal. Rptr. 89, 93 (1971) (holding that the rule
applies to examination of a paper bag found in a car believed to be stolen).
786. Teale, 70 Cal. 2d at 511 n.l0, 450 P.2d at 572 n.10, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 180 n.10.
787. Guidi at 14-15, 513 P.2d at 917, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 693.
788. Id. at 14, 513 P.2d at 917, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 693.
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the article in order to avoid conflict with Chadwick and other federal
container cases. Holding that a tote bag found in a car used in a robbery
could not be searched without a warrant, the court regarded Chadwick as
narrowing the exception to apply "only to a scientific examination of the
object itself, for example for fingerprints, bloodstains, or the taking of tire
impressions or paint scrapings."789 However, after Chadwick's demise,
the court returned to the broader rule, finding that the exception applied to
cases where the vehicle is itself evidence or the instrumentality of a
crime.790
Distinguishing between evidence and a container of evidence is as
workable and rational as the "mere evidence" rule disparaged by Justice
Traynor and long ago abandoned by the California and the United States
Supreme Courts. 9 When based on relevance, the rule leads to absurd
results. If police gain probable cause from a reliable informant that X is
carrying drugs in a specifically described briefcase, the rule would regard
the briefcase as evidence in plain view and would allow its warrantless
inspection on the theory that no privacy interest is invaded. On the other
hand, if police knew that at a certain time X would be carrying drugs, but
were not informed of how X would be carrying them, the plain view
doctrine would not apply. Furthermore, if the informant describes the car
or house in which X has the drugs, the rule logically would subject the car
or house to a warrantless inspection which would not be regarded as an
invasion of privacy.
A more fundamental objection to the rule is that a standard based on
relevance has few rational limits. A container of contraband always has
"evidentiary value" and is "relevant evidence," regardless of whether or
not the police were aware of its precise nature at the time of the
seizure.79 2 Even the "mere evidence" rule criticized by Justice Traynor
789. People v. Minjares, 24 Cal. 3d 410, 422, 591 P.2d 514, 520-21, 153 Cal. Rptr. 224, 230-31 (1979).
790. See People v. Griffin, 46 Cal. 3d 1011, 1025, 761 P.2d 103, 110, 251 Cal. Rptr. 643, 650 (1988)
(allowing the examination of the interior of a truck in which the victim was murdered on the ground that the
truck "was itself evidence"). The court described Minjares as a case "where the car trunk was merely a container
of evidence." Id.
791. See supra notes 313-337 and accompanying text.
792. According to modem liberal relevancy rules, evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence. See FED. R. EViD. § 401; CAL. EVID. CODE § 210 (West 1966). In all
my years as a criminal defense lawyer, prosecutor, and evidence professor, I have never run across a case in
which contraband was ruled admissible, but its container was excluded as irrelevant.
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was more restrictive since it excluded from seizure those objects having
"evidentiary value only."793
Even if limited to instrumentalities, as opposed to evidence of crime,
the exception fails for the same reasons that Justice Traynor opposed the
"mere evidence" rule.7 94 Admitting the apple, the arrow, and the bow,
but not the quiver, would require relying on "explanations in the
dark."795 The attempt to limit the rule to "scientific examination" also
fails.79 Scientific examinations and tests usually involve the same entry
into a vehicle or other container as an ordinary search, and often an even
more intrusive inspection. Also, is not a box or other container of
contraband an instrumentality of the crime, and is not the purpose of
opening such container in part ultimately to verify the nature of the drugs
by scientific examination? At bottom, the instrumentality exception is
merely a device to allow police greater search and seizure powers and to
avoid exclusion of important evidence in cases of violent crimes, as
opposed to cases of possessory or "victimless" offenses.
The simple rule based on probable cause proposed in this Article would
go far toward dispensing with the irrational and unworkable distinctions
that have developed around the concept of plain view. Once an object is
seizable by reason of probable cause to believe it contains contraband or
otherwise is associated "with criminal activity,"7 97 it should be subject
to inspection either on the ground that the same probable cause renders the
container's search reasonable or, if the object's appearance, smell, or other
characteristics advertise its contents, on the ground that the inspection
invades no legitimate expectation of privacy and, thus, is not a search
under the Fourth Amendment.798
793. See supra notes 313-314 and accompanying text.
794. See supra notes 320-322 and accompanying text.
795. See supra notes 320-321 and accompanying text.
796. See People v. Minjares, 24 Cal. 3d 410, 422, 591 P.2d 514, 520-21, 153 Cal. Rptr. 224, 230-31
(1979).
797. Soldal v. Cook County, 113 S. Ct. 538, 547 (1992).
798. On the other hand, seizures on less than probable cause may be justified when based on "operational
necessities." See Soldal, 113 S. Ct. at 546 n.9 (citing Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321,327 (1987)). In such cases,
unless probable cause develops during the period of lawful seizure, police cannot search absent consent or a
search warrant. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709 (1983).
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D. Clarifying the Law: Providing Signposts to the Future and Eliminating
the Skeletons of Bad Precedent
Following the adoption of the exclusionary rule in 1955,"9 the
California Supreme Court faced a formidable task. The court had declared
that evidence must be excluded if obtained in violation of search and
seizure rules which to a great extent were confusing or non-existent.
However, under Traynor's leadership, the court quickly undertook the
"long overdue clarification of standards of reasonableness in law enforce-
ment,"" and within a relatively brief period, the court had written a
clear and comprehensive body of search and seizure law.01 In 1962,
Traynor reflected that appellate court opinions after Cahan0 2 had
resulted in a "detailed articulation of what is reasonable and what is
unreasonable."8 3
In contrast, the United States Supreme Court's search and seizure rules
were confusing, irrational, and incomplete when it imposed the exclu-
sionary rule on the states in 1961.0' Over the next three decades the
Court proceeded haphazardly, often announcing confusing or inconsistent
standards and, in many significant areas, leaving important questions
unanswered for years. In 1965, Professor Wayne LaFave listed circum-
stances necessary for the exclusionary rule to be effective in improving
police performance.'0 5 These circumstances included development of
search and seizure law "in some detail and in a manner sufficiently
responsive to both the practical needs of enforcement and the individual
right of privacy" and in a manner understandable by the front-line
lower-echelon police officer. .,0 At that time, Professor LaFave
believed that deficiencies existed in these respects.0 7
The United States Supreme Court has taken decades, but eventually has
clarified the rules in many areas. In other areas, however, ambiguity and
799. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
800. Traynor, Mapp at Large, supra note 3, at 323.
801. See supra notes 18-24 and accompanying text.
802. People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
803. Traynor, Mapp at Large, supra note 3, at 327.
804. Id.
805. See Wayne J. LaFave, Improving Police Performance Through the Exclusionary Rule-Part I. Current
Police and Current Court Practices, 30 Mo. L. REV. 391, 395-96 (1965) [hereinafter LaFave, Police
Performance]. LaFave also believed that the rules must be effectively communicated to the police and that the
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confusion abound. It is not surprising that the Court has not been as
successful as the California Supreme Court in developing a coherent body
of search and seizure rules. Grappling with cases from fifty states and the
federal courts, the United States Supreme Court faced a more difficult task.
In fact, shortly after Mapp, Justice Traynor opined that the United States
Supreme Court would refrain from undertaking the onerous burden of
developing detailed search and seizure rules for the states.
There is little chance that the... Court would be willing and able
to receive fifty [processions of state court cases] marching through
its doors, calling upon it to give the details that make up the rules
that govern the officials who search and seize.8"8
Also, the nine federal justices appeared more ideologically divided than the
seven California Supreme Court jurists, and also lacked a unifying leader
able to achieve the compromises necessary for the pronouncement of clear,
consistent rules.
Whatever the reasons for the Court's failures, we now have a fait
accomplait, and whether or not the Court should be condemned for failing
to leave development of the details of the rules largely to the states, the
Court should recognize that its imposition on the states of search and
seizure standards as a detailed, comprehensive code of conduct for law
enforcement obliges the Court to clarify unsettled or confusing areas of the
law. To meet this responsibility, the Court should, in its opinions, offer
guides to the application of the rules in other contexts, such as by the use
of example or analogy. The Court's inability to issue advisory opinions
should not stand in the way of helpful pointers to state and lower courts
or present an excuse for the Supreme Court to stand aloof while judges,
lawyers, and police, flounder in a sea of constitutional uncertainty.
While the United States Supreme Court has stated that a federal court
has no authority "to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract
propositions or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the
matter in issue in the case before it,"8°9 the Supreme Court very often
has provided helpful pointers or guides through analogizing or distin-
guishing factual situations not directly involved in the case under
808. Traynor, Mapp at Large, supra note 3, at 327.
809. Church of Scientology v. Zolin, 113 S. Ct. 447, 449 (1992); Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401
(1975); North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971); Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653 (1895).
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consideration. For example, in Berkemer v. McCarty,1 ° the Court, in
holding that roadside questioning of a motorist detained pursuant to a
routine traffic stop is not a custodial interrogation under Miranda v.
Arizona,8 ' analogized such a routine traffic stop to a "Terry" stop,
strongly suggesting that Miranda would not apply to stops, frisks, and
detentions in the investigation of ordinary, non-traffic crimes. 12 Lower
courts have not missed the point and have generally followed the Supreme
Court's "guide by analogy."
Furthermore, the Court should face up to and overrule unworkable or
unreasonable decisions rather than subject them to capital punishment on
the installment plan through the slow, painful creation of exceptions and
distinctions. An unhealthy respect for bad precedent too often has led the
Court to disregard the principles of its decisions at the same time it is
formally bowing to their skeletal remains. Much of the mischief
perpetrated by the United States Supreme Court in the search and seizure
area can be traced directly to the Court's practice, when discovering that
it has made bad law, to distinguish it away rather than to reject it
outright.
13
The Court in some areas has announced a sweeping new rule without
clearly thinking through its consequences.814 When later the Court has
discovered that the rule's application has led to illogical or unworkable
results, the Court's reluctance to overrule bad precedent has resulted in the
creation of precedential ghosts in the form of subtle, illogical and often
unworkable distinctions that later return to haunt courts and law
enforcement officials.
Traynor had no fear of striking out in new directions even when a
novel approach required overruling long-established precedent. For
example, early in his judicial career, Traynor persuaded all his colleagues
to reject the collateral estoppel mutuality requirement, overruling three
prior decisions.1 5 The new rule came to be recognized in Restatement
(Second) of Judgments and eventually was accepted throughout the
810. 468 U.S. 420 (1984).
811. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
812. See Berkemer, 486 U.S. at 440 (1984) (stating that "[t]he comparatively non-threatening character
of Terry stops and detentions explains the absence of any suggestion in our opinions that Terry stops are subject
to the dictates of Miranda").
813. See, e.g., supra notes 642-672 and accompanying text.
814. See supra notes 667-748 and accompanying text.
815. Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Savings Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 813, 122 P.2d 892, 895
(1942) (en banc).
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country. 16 Later in his career, Traynor again persuaded all of his
colleagues to adopt a rule of strict liability in tort for defective products
which marked the beginning of a national trend.817 Traynor also did not
hesitate to overrule even his own precedent. In adopting an exclusionary
rule for California in 1955, he led the Court to overrule a decision he had
written little more than a decade earlier,818 despite the prospect that such
overruling would likely lead to bitter accusations from many politicians
and law enforcement officials. In summary, Traynor was not afraid to take
forward steps, as long as they were careful ones, and though he stepped
with caution, he always looked to the future.819
Traynor spoke out strongly against overruling on the installment plan.
He urged judges to face up to and overrule erroneous rules and decisions
rather than to overrule them slowly and painfully by exceptions and
distinctions. The technique of overruling precedents bit by bit through a
process of distinguishing them away piecemeal found no place in his
jurisprudence. He welcomed "frank renunciation" of unsatisfactory
precedents which "deserve liquidation,"82 and expressed sympathy for
advocates who face unfirm authority which has been left wounded but still
demanding an uncertain degree of respect. "It must be cold comfort to
bewildered counsel to ruminate that the precedent on which he relied was
never expressly overruled because it so patently needed to be."82' Thus,
816. See Friendly, Ablest Judge, supra note 47, at 1043.
817. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963) (en
banc). Traynor was not content always to wait for legislative remedies. Appellate judges, he wrote, should
discard
the superstition that once the courts have allowed a precedent to live beyond its time they are bound
to continue its social security indefinitely unless an impatient legislature steps in to decree otherwise.
Such superstition invited two hazards. One is that the legislators will never rush to the execution. The
other is that they will.
Roger J. Traynor, Badlands in an Appellate Judge's Realm ofReason, 7 UTAH L. REV. 157, 167 (1960).
818. People v. Gonzales, 20 Cal. 2d 165, 174, 124 P.2d 44, 49 (1942) (en banc), overruled by People v.
Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 450-51, 282 P.2d 905, 914-15 (1955) (en banc).
819. See Roger J. Traynor, Comment on Courts and Lawmaking, in LEGAL INSTITUrIONs TODAY AND
TOMoRROW 48, 50 (Paulsen ed. 1959) [hereinafter Traynor, Comment on Courts and Lawmaking] (stating that
whatever our admiration for ancient arts, few of us would turn the clock back to live out what museums
preserve.... The main preoccupation of [the] ... law must be with the future); see also Roger J. Traynor,
Better Days in Court for a New Day's Problem, 17 VAND. L. REV. 109 (1963) (asserting that tried and half-true
formulas will not serve [the judge] for all their show of stability. He must compose his own mind as he leaves
antiquated compositions aside to create some fragments of legal order out of disordered masses of new data.
There should be modem ways for such a task, in fairness not only to him but to those who must seek out his
judgment and abide by his decisions).
820. Roger J. Traynor, La Rude Vita, La Dolce Giustizia; Or Hard Cases Can Make Good Law, 29 U.
CHI. L. REv. 223, 230 (1962).
821. Traynor, Comment on Courts and Lawmaking, supra note 819, at 54.
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Traynor made no attempt in Cahan to distinguish the facts of earlier cases,
including the case he authored, and to draw fine, uncertain lines which
would avoid outright overruling at the high price of leaving the law
indefinite or unprincipled.822
Traynor took the right approach. The United States Supreme Court
should face up to erroneous decisions and overrule them. The Court has
described stare decisis as the preferred and usually the wise policy, but not
an inexorable command which binds the Court to follow decisions which
are "unworkable or badly reasoned"8 23 or which have "proved unstable
in application [and are] a continuing source of confusion . ."24 An
unhealthy respect for bad precedent too often has led to formal, artificial
bows to its skeletal remains while disregarding its substance in practice.
Stare decisis should be respected, but not worshipped, particularly with
respect to constitutional rules which stand as the last word, aloof from the
democratic process.
822. Although an activist in overruling precedent, Traynor was a practical activist with a keen eye to the
effect that new decisions may have on the administration of justice. For example, he thought to moderate the
harsh effects of the court's abandonment of prior decisions by using the doctrine of prospective overruling,
according to which the overruling of an earlier decision would be accompanied by an announcement that the
new rule would not be given retroactive effect. Traynor applied this principle to decisions altering common law
principles, such as Muskopf v. Coming Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211,221,359 P.2d 457, 463, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89,
95 (1961), as well as to decisions construing the California Constitution, and Forster Shipbuilding Co. v. County
of Los Angeles, 54 Cal. 2d 450, 458-59, 353 P.2d 736,740-41, 6 Cal. Rptr. 24, 28-29 (1960). He reasoned that
the "California Constitution permits an appellate court to apply an overruling decision prospectively only, even
though it thereby temporarily preserves a mistaken interpretation of the Constitution." Forster, 54 Cal. 2d at 459,
353 P.2d at 741, 6 Cal. Rptr. at 29.
Traynor used a similar approach in dealing with the question whether Cahan's exclusionary rule should
be applied retroactively to collateral attacks on final criminal convictions. To Traynor, the question presented
a conflict between the policy in favor of finality of judgments and the policies designed to discourage lawless
law enforcement. He reasoned that the latter policy, which underlies the exclusionary rule, would be adequately
protected at trial and on appeal and would not be further promoted by destroying the finality of judgments. In
re Harris, 56 Cal. 2d 879, 885, 366 P.2d 305, 309, 16 Cal. Rptr. 889, 893 (1961) (Traynor, J., concurring). This
approach was largely adopted by the United States Supreme Court when faced with the question of the
retroactive effect of Mapp. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 621-22, 639-40 (1965). Traynor also sought to
mitigate the effects of the exclusionary rule by a harmless error analysis, according to which the admission of
illegally obtained evidence which is merely cumulative of other undisputed evidence is not ground for reversal.
See People v. Parham, 60 Cal. 2d 378,385,384 P.2d 1001, 1005, 33 Cal. Rptr. 497,501 (1963); see also People
v. Tarantino, 45 Cal. 2d 590, 602-03, 290 P.2d 505, 513-14 (1955) (Traynor, J., dissenting). Traynor reasoned
that the illegally obtained evidence "may be ... only a relatively insignificant part of the total evidence and have
no effect on the outcome of the trial." See Parham, 60 Cal. 2d at 385, 384 P.2d at 1005, 33 Cal. Rptr. at 501.
Traynor's approach to harmless error also was embraced by the United States Supreme Court. CITE???
823. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597,2600 (1991). In Payne, the Court overruled Booth v. Maryland,
482 U.S. 496 (1987), and South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989), which restricted admission of"victim
impact" evidence in capital sentencing.
824. United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849, 2863 (1993) (overruling Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508
(1990), and returning to the traditional double jeopardy principles of Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299
(1932)).
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V. CONCLUSION
Six years before the United States Supreme Court imposed the
exclusionary rule on the states, the California Supreme Court adopted its
own exclusionary rule as a judicially created rule of evidence.8" At this
time, both the federal and California rules of search and seizure were
confusing, unclear, or non-existent.826 In view of the chaotic state of
search and seizure law, Justice Traynor and the California Supreme Court
faced the task of developing clear and workable rules of search and
seizure, and immediately undertook the "detailed articulation of what is
reasonable and what is unreasonable, 82 and the "long overdue
clarification of standards of reasonableness in law enforcement."
828
Under Traynor's leadership, the California Supreme Court wrote a
comprehensive body of search and seizure rules on a clean slate within a
relatively brief period, which rules were largely accepted as balanced,
rational, and workable.829
In contrast, the United States Supreme Court's journey through the land
of search and seizure has been a long and bumpy one. Following the
adoption of the exclusionary rule for federal courts in 1914,830 the
Supreme Court proceeded in a hesitant and haphazard fashion, often
announcing ambiguous and inconsistent standards and in significant areas
leaving important questions unanswered for years. 31 While the Court
followed the lead of Justice Traynor in resolving some difficult search and
seizure problems, 32 in many areas the Court rejected or failed to
consider the Traynor approach and created a body of doctrine regarded by
many judges and scholars as confusing, irrational and incomplete.133 For
example, Traynor took the view that the exclusionary rule's primary
objective is the protection of privacy through encouraging law enforcement
officials to act reasonably by providing them with a clear, practical guide
to proper law enforcement and then denying them the fruits of unlawful
searches and seizures." Although the United States Supreme Court has
825. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
826. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
827. Traynor, Mapp at Large, supra note 3, at 327.
828. Id. at 323.
829. See supra notes 17-25 and accompanying text.
830. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
831. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
832. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
833. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
834. See supra notes 147-149 and accompanying text.
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pointed to deterrence as the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule,
35
it has not been entirely faithful to this view. Focusing on influencing
police conduct by discouraging illegal searches and seizures would lead to
expansion of standing rules -to allow a defendant to object to evidence
procured through unreasonable searches that violate the rights of other
suspects, to reliance on apparent, rather than on actual, authority to
consent, and to a more expansive definition of Fourth Amendment seizures
which does not require touching or submission to authority.
Regarding the search and seizure rules primarily as a means of guiding
and controlling police conduct also would lead to rejection of complex or
technical rules in favor of clear, practical standards. Traynor emphasized
the need to avoid "needless refinements and distinctions," '36 and cases
following Cahan37 took a practical, common sense approach, usually
upholding natural police responses to suspicious circumstances, particularly
when they involve only slight or minor intrusions into privacy.838
Focusing on the goal of promoting reasonable police conduct, the United
States Supreme Court should reject complex and technical rules, and
should be reluctant to view as unreasonable police conduct which is a
natural reaction to suspicious circumstances and which involves only slight
or minor privacy intrusions.
The search for simple, practical, and ritional rules demands a
clarification of the dimensions of the warrant clause, particularly with
respect to search incident to arrest 839 and to searches of movable
containers outside the contexts of homes and automobiles.80 Currently,
a search incident to a home arrest is limited to the arrestee's person and
the area from which the arrestee might gain possession of a weapon or
destructible evidence."I4 This rule applies even when police are lawfully
inside and have probable cause to believe that evidence of the crime for
which the person is arrested is located in the house. 2 On the other
hand, following an arrest in a public place or in an automobile, the
Supreme Court's "workable rule" allows police automatically to conduct
a search incident without any suspicion and unlimited in scope by any
835. See supra notes 150-151 and accompanying text.
836. See supra note 309.
837. People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
838. See supra notes 404-433 and accompanying text.
839. See supra notes 474-555 and accompanying text.
840. See supra notes 673-798 and accompanying text.
841. See supra notes 516-518 and accompanying text.
842. See supra note 522.
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requirement of cause to discover evidence of crime relating to the
arrest.843 The Court should consider the approach of Justice Traynor
which would allow a search of the entire premises as incident to the arrest
of an occupant, but would guard against exploratory searches by requiring
reasonable cause to believe that evidence of the crime for which the
suspect was arrested would be found on the premises and by limiting the
search to areas likely to contain such evidence. With guidelines to guard
against abuses, 44 the Court should consider the Traynor approach as to
both home and automobile searches.
However, neither Traynor nor the United States Supreme Court
developed a satisfactory approach to searches of movable containers. 5
A clear and rational approach would treat searches of movable containers
outside the context of homes or offices the same, whether they are found
in an automobile, on a person, or unattended. This simple rule allowing the
search of such containers on probable cause would eliminate the irrational
and unworkable line between articles found inside and those discovered
outside automobiles, as well as the confusing distinctions that have
developed under the plain view doctrine. 6 In general, a search warrant
should not be required for the search of an automobile or other movable
container found in a public place. In fact, the Court might explicitly
recognize what has become the practical result of the many exceptions to
the warrant requirement: For a search to be reasonable, the Fourth Amend-
ment demands a warrant only for intrusions comparable in seriousness to
home or office searches, electronic interception of conversations, or
invasions of the body of a suspect.
To further meet its responsibility of clarifying unsettled and confusing
areas of the law, the Supreme Court should offer guides to application of
the rules in other contexts. Most important, the Court should face up to
and overrule unworkable or unreasonable decisions rather than subject
them to capital punishment on the installment plan through slow, painful
creation of exceptions and distinctions. Much of the confusion and
uncertainty in the search and seizure area has come from the Court's
attempt to distinguish away bad law rather than to overrule it outright" 7
843. See supra notes 525-534.
844. See supra notes 543-555 and accompanying text.
845. See supra notes 673-748 and accompanying text.
846. See supra notes 749-798 and accompanying text.
847. See supra notes 813-814 and accompanying text.
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These criticisms of the Supreme Court's development of search and
seizure standards have focused on the substance of the standards, as well
as on the process of articulating them, but this Article does not contend
that today's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is a disaster, any more than
it presents the rules developed by Justice Traynor and the California
Supreme Court as a model of perfection. It has taken decades, but
eventually the United States Supreme Court addressed most major areas
of search and seizure law and embraced many clear and workable rules
governing traditional law enforcement activities. Thanks largely to the lead
of Justice Traynor,848 there is less validity now than thirty years ago to
the charge that the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as
a whole suffers from significant gaps and from confusing unworkable rules
which offer police little guidance in criminal investigations. 849
Nevertheless, in a number of contexts the Court has left current rules
complex, arbitrary, or irrational, often as the result of rejecting or ignoring
Traynor's approach. While we must accept the fact that "the rules
governing police searches can never be precise, ' ' 5 it is vital that the
Court continue to pursue clarity, utility, and balance in the formation of
rules governing the conduct of law enforcement officials. The demise of
the California exclusionary rule following the departure of Justice Traynor
illustrates how public confidence in the criminal justice system in general,
and acceptance of the exclusionary rule in particular, can fade when search
and seizure standards are perceived as unworkable or unbalanced. After
Traynor's retirement, the California Supreme Court redefined many search
and seizure rules, expanding the types of police conduct deemed
unreasonable under California law. These restrictions on police invest-
igative techniques provided ammunition to criminal defendants seeking
suppression of reliable evidence and were strongly resented by a large
segment of the public who perceived the search and seizure standards
enforced by the exclusionary rule as overly protective of criminal
defendants. Prosecutors and victims' rights organizations sponsored an
initiative which, by popular vote, increased criminal penalties and
848. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
849. In 1991, Professor Kamisar criticized the Supreme Court for shrinking the scope of the Fourth
Amendment while expanding the scope of searches deemed reasonable, yet observed that by a process of "great
clarification and simplification," the law of search and seizure has become "a body of realistic workable rules."
Yale Kamisar at the Constitutional Law Conference, sponsored by U.S. Law Week, Sept. 6-7, 1991, 50 CRIM.
L. REP. (BNA) 1086, 1089 (1991). Kamisar believed that this shrinking of protections has been "almost always
in favor of the police [but] may be the price we have to pay to keep the exclusionary rule on the books." Id.
850. Barrett, Exclusion of Evidence, supra note 15, at 590.
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eliminated a number of procedures favoring defendants, including the
California exclusionary rule in criminal cases."' With few exceptions,
California courts were deprived of the power to suppress reliable evidence
unless mandated by federal law. 852  The federal exclusionary rule,
although resting on thin doctrinal grounds853 and the subject of continued
854 ntadebate, is not as vulnerable to public and law enforcement pressures
and is likely to be with us in some form for the foreseeable future.855
However, this independence from the democratic process only increases
the Supreme Court's responsibility to provide clear, rational and workable
rules.
Furthermore, we should keep in mind that the exclusionary rule is rigid
and absolute, standing immune from proportionality considerations such as
the severity of the violation, the seriousness of defendant's crime, and the
importance of the evidence in the case. Following Mapp's call to apply the
exclusionary rule to "all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in
violation of the Constitution.. ., 856 the Supreme Court has suppressed
evidence discovered from searches involving minor or slight invasions of
privacy, as well as from good faith attempts to follow Fourth Amendment
standards, and has affirmed that its decisions "recognize no exception to
the rule that illegally seized evidence is inadmissible at trials. .. .857
Except with respect to the good faith rule in the context of warrant-based
searches, 8  the Court has passed over opportunities to narrow application
of the exclusionary rule to cases in which police fail to act in good faith
851. The Victim's Bill of Rights (popularly known as Proposition 8), adopted June 8, 1982 and effective
June 9, 1982, amended the California Constitution to provide that, with limited exceptions, "relevant evidence
shall not be excluded in any criminal proceeding.. .." CAL. CONST., art. I, §28(d) (1982).
852. See In re Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d 873, 886-87, 694 P.2d 744, 752, 210 Cal. Rptr. 631, 639 (1985)
(holding that except to the extent compelled by the federal constitution, Proposition 8 eliminated judicially
created remedies for violation of state constitutional search and seizure provisions through exclusion of
evidence).
853. See supra notes 141-146 and accompanying text.
854. See, e.g., James D. Cameron & Richard Lustiger, The Exclusionary Rule: A Cost-Benefit Analysis,
101 F.R.D. 109, 142-52 (1984); Robert M. Hardaway, Equivalent Deterrence: A Proposed Alternative to the
Exclusionary Rule in Criminal Proceedings, 11 CRlM. JUST. . 357, 359 (1989); Yale Kamisar, "Comparative
Reprehensibility" and the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1, 10 (1987).
855. In 1965, Professor Wayne J. LaFave observed that "there does not appear to be any basis for
assuming that the Court will in any way make inroads on the Mapp holding in the years ahead." LaFave, Police
Performance, supra note 805, at 392.
856. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
857. Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 723 (1969).
858. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920 (1984); see also Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S.
981, 987-88 (1984).
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or in which the violation is flagrant, or at least substantial.859 The
exclusionary rule, as currently applied, is an automatic, per se rule of
inadmissibility which operates with respect to all violations of the Fourth
Amendment, regardless of the extent or purposefulness of the police
misconduct or of the seriousness of the defendant's crimes. Some have
urged the adoption of a doctrine of "comparative reprehensibility" which
would balance the seriousness of the police misconduct against the gravity
of defendant's crimes and would deny suppression where defendant's
conduct is more reprehensible than that of the police. The idea of
proportionality considerations as a limit on the operation of the
exclusionary rule has been around for some time and is the subject of
renewed interest.8 ° However, it raises serious practical and philosophical
problems861 and has not gained a foothold in the opinions of Supreme
Court justices. 862 In this light, the quest for clear, practical, and balanced
search and seizure standards takes on particular importance and demands
the Court's continued attention. Justice Traynor has been of great
assistance in this endeavor. He still can be.
859. For example, Americans for Effective Law Enforcement and the International Association of Chiefs
of Police, in an appendix to their amicus brief to the Court in 1972, argued that the exclusionary rule should
be narrowed to encompass only willful, flagrant and substantial violations, and cited sixteen published cases of
serious crimes in which evidence was suppressed for what they viewed as insubstantial violations by the police.
Brief for Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc., and the International Association of Chiefs of Police,
as Amici Curiae in support of the Petitioners, California v. Krivda, 409 U.S. 33 (1972).
Many judges and scholars have urged that the rule be narrowed to apply only to flagrant, deliberate, or
substantial violations. See, e.g., Friendly, Bill of Rights, supra note 82, at 953 (suggesting that the exclusionary
rule should be applied only to "evidence obtained by flagrant or deliberate violation of rights"]); Charles A.
Wright, Must the Criminal Go Free if the Constable Blunders?, 50 TEX. L. REV. 736, 744 (1972) (arguing to
save the exclusionary rule "for drastic cases in which the conduct of the police was outrageous"); A MODEL
CODE OF PRE-ARRAIrNMENT PROCEDURE § 290.2(2) (1975) (proposing that "a motion to suppress evidence
... shall be granted only if the court finds that the violation upon which it is based was substantial... ).
Only two federal courts of appeal have thus far extended the good faith rule to warrantless searches. See
United States v. Beck, 729 F.2d 1329, 1331 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 981 (1984); United States
v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 840 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981).
860. See John H. Wigmore, Using Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search and Seizure, 8 A.B.A. J. 479,482
(1922); Cameron & Lustiger, supra note 854, at 142-52.
861. Kamisar, supra note 854, at 10.
862. While the Court has pointed to the rule's lack of balance, see Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,489-90
(1976), it has not suggested that at suppression hearings the seriousness of the Fourth Amendment violation
should be weighed against the gravity of defendant's crime.
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